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Abstract: Reasoning is generally seen as a means to improve knowledge and make better decisions. However, much evidence shows
that reasoning often leads to epistemic distortions and poor decisions. This suggests that the function of reasoning should be rethought.
Our hypothesis is that the function of reasoning is argumentative. It is to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade.
Reasoning so conceived is adaptive given the exceptional dependence of humans on communication and their vulnerability to
misinformation. A wide range of evidence in the psychology of reasoning and decision making can be reinterpreted and better
explained in the light of this hypothesis. Poor performance in standard reasoning tasks is explained by the lack of argumentative
context. When the same problems are placed in a proper argumentative setting, people turn out to be skilled arguers. Skilled
arguers, however, are not after the truth but after arguments supporting their views. This explains the notorious confirmation bias.
This bias is apparent not only when people are actually arguing, but also when they are reasoning proactively from the perspective
of having to defend their opinions. Reasoning so motivated can distort evaluations and attitudes and allow erroneous beliefs to
persist. Proactively used reasoning also favors decisions that are easy to justify but not necessarily better. In all these instances
traditionally described as failures or flaws, reasoning does exactly what can be expected of an argumentative device: Look for
arguments that support a given conclusion, and, ceteris paribus, favor conclusions for which arguments can be found.
Keywords: argumentation; confirmation bias; decision making; dual process theory; evolutionary psychology; motivated reasoning;
reason-based choice; reasoning

Inference (as the term is most commonly understood in
psychology) is the production of new mental representations on the basis of previously held representations.
Examples of inferences are the production of new
beliefs on the basis of previous beliefs, the production of
expectations on the basis of perception, or the production
of plans on the basis of preferences and beliefs. So understood, inference need not be deliberate or conscious. It is
at work not only in conceptual thinking but also in perception and in motor control (Kersten et al. 2004; Wolpert &
Kawato 1998). It is a basic ingredient of any cognitive
system. Reasoning, as commonly understood, refers to a
very special form of inference at the conceptual level,
where not only is a new mental representation (or conclusion) consciously produced, but the previously held
representations (or premises) that warrant it are also consciously entertained. The premises are seen as providing
reasons to accept the conclusion. Most work in the psychology of reasoning is about reasoning so understood.
Such reasoning is typically human. There is no evidence
that it occurs in nonhuman animals or in preverbal
children.1
How do humans reason? Why do they reason? These
two questions are mutually relevant, since the mechanisms
for reasoning should be adjusted to its function. While the
how-question has been systematically investigated (e.g.,
# Cambridge University Press 2011
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Evans et al. 1993; Johnson-Laird 2006; Oaksford &
Chater 2007; Rips 1994), there is very little discussion of
the why-question. How come? It may be that the function
of reasoning is considered too obvious to deserve much
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attention. According to a long philosophical tradition,
reasoning is what enables the human mind to go beyond
mere perception, habit, and instinct. In the first, theoretical section of this article we sketch a tentative answer to
the how-question and then focus on the why-question:
We outline an approach to reasoning based on the idea
that the primary function for which it evolved is the production and evaluation of arguments in communication.
In sections 2 – 5, we consider some of the main themes
and findings in the experimental literature on reasoning
and show how our approach helps make better sense of
much of the experimental evidence and hence gains
empirical support from it.
1. Reasoning: Mechanism and function
1.1. Intuitive inference and argument

Since the 1960s, much work in the psychology of reasoning
has suggested that, in fact, humans reason rather poorly,
failing at simple logical tasks (Evans 2002), committing
egregious mistakes in probabilistic reasoning (Kahneman
& Tversky 1972; Tversky & Kahneman 1983), and being
subject to sundry irrational biases in decision making
(Kahneman et al. 1982). This work has led to a rethinking
of the mechanisms for reasoning, but not – or at least, not
to the same degree – of its assumed function of enhancing
human cognition and decision making. The most important development has been the emergence of dualprocess models that distinguish between intuitions and
reasoning (or system 1 and system 2 reasoning) (Evans
2007; Johnson-Laird 2006; Kahneman 2003; Kahneman
& Frederick 2002; 2005; Sloman 1996; Stanovich 2004).
Here we outline our own dual-process approach: We
contend in particular that the arguments used in reasoning
are the output of a mechanism of intuitive inference
(Mercier & Sperber 2009; Sperber 1997; 2001).
A process of inference is a process, the representational
output of which necessarily or probabilistically follows
from its representational input. The function of an inferential process is to augment and correct the information
available to cognitive system. An evolutionary approach
suggests that inferential processes, rather than being
based on a single inferential mechanism or constituting a
single integrated system, are much more likely to be performed by a variety of domain-specific mechanisms, each
attuned to the specific demands and affordances of its
domain (e.g., see Barkow et al. 1992). The inferential processes carried out by these mechanisms are unconscious:
They are not mental acts that individuals decide to
perform, but processes that take place inside their brain,
at a “sub-personal” level (in the sense of Dennett 1969).
People may be aware of having reached a certain conclusion – be aware, that is, of the output of an inferential
process – but we claim that they are never aware of the
process itself. All inferences carried out by inferential
mechanisms are in this sense intuitive. They generate
intuitive beliefs; that is, beliefs held without awareness of
reasons to hold them.
The claim that all inferential processes carried out by
specialized inferential mechanisms are unconscious and
result in intuitive inferences may seem to contradict the
common experience of forming a belief because one has
reflected on reasons to accept it – and not, or not only,
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because of its intuitive force. Such beliefs, held with
awareness of one’s reasons to hold them, are better
described not as intuitive but as reflective beliefs
(Sperber 1997). Our consciously held reason for accepting
a reflective belief may be trust in its source (the professor,
the doctor, the priest). Our reasons may also have to do
with the content of the belief: We realize, for example,
that it would be inconsistent on our part to hold to our previous beliefs and not accept some given new claim. Far
from denying that we may arrive at a belief through
reflecting on our reasons to accept it, we see this as reasoning proper, the main topic of this article. What characterizes reasoning proper is indeed the awareness not just of a
conclusion but of an argument that justifies accepting that
conclusion. We suggest, however, that arguments
exploited in reasoning are the output of an intuitive inferential mechanism. Like all other inferential mechanisms,
its processes are unconscious (as also argued by
Johnson-Laird 2006, p. 53; and Jackendoff 1996) and its
conclusions are intuitive. However, these intuitive conclusions are about arguments; that is, about representations of relationships between premises and conclusions.
The intuitive inferences made by humans are not only
about ordinary objects and events in the world. They can
also be about representations of such objects or events
(or even about higher-order representations of representations). The capacity to represent representations, and
to draw inferences about them, is a metarepresentational
capacity with formal properties relevant to the mental
computations involved (Recanati 2000; Sperber 2000b).
Several mental mechanisms use this metarepresentational
capacity. In particular, humans have a mechanism for
representing mental representations and for drawing
intuitive inferences about them. This Theory of Mind
mechanism is essential to our understanding of others
and of ourselves (Leslie 1987; Premack & Woodruff
1978). Humans also have a mechanism for representing
verbal representations and for drawing intuitive inferences
about them. This pragmatic mechanism is essential to our
understanding of communicated meaning in context
(Grice 1975; Sperber & Wilson 2002).
We want to argue that there is yet another intuitive
metarepresentational mechanism, a mechanism for representing possible reasons to accept a conclusion – that is,
for representing arguments – and for evaluating their
strength. Arguments should be sharply distinguished
from inferences. An inference is a process the output of
which is a representation. An argument is a complex representation. Both an inference and an argument have what
can be called a conclusion, but in the case of an inference,
the conclusion is the output of the inference; in the case of
an argument, the conclusion is a part – typically the last
part – of the representation. The output of an inference
can be called a “conclusion” because what characterizes
an inferential process is that its output is justified by its
input; the way however in which the input justifies the
output is not represented in the output of an intuitive
inference. What makes the conclusion of an argument a
“conclusion” (rather than simply a proposition) is that
the reasons for drawing this conclusion on the basis of
the premises are (at least partially) spelled out. As
Gilbert Harman (1986) has justly argued, it is a common
but costly mistake to confuse the causally and temporally
related steps of an inference with the logically related
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steps of an argument. The causal steps of an inference
need not recapitulate the logical step of any argument
for it to be an inference, and the logical step of an argument need not be followed in any inference for it to be
an argument.
Descartes’s famous Cogito argument, “I think therefore
I am,” illustrates the manner in which an argument can be
the output of an intuitive inference. Most people believe
intuitively that they exist and are not looking for reason
to justify this belief. But should you look for such
reasons – that is, should you take a reflective stance
towards the proposition that you exist – Descartes’s argument would probably convince you: It is intuitively evident
that the fact that you are thinking is a good enough reason
to accept that you exist, or, in other terms, that it would be
inconsistent to assert “I think” and to deny “I am.” What is
not at all obvious in this particular case are the reasons for
accepting that this intuitively good argument is truly a
good argument, and philosophers have been hotly debating the issue (e.g., Katz 1986).
As simple as the Cogito or more complex, all arguments
must ultimately be grounded in intuitive judgments that
given conclusions follow from given premises. In other
words, we are suggesting that arguments are not the
output of a system 2 mechanism for explicit reasoning,
that would be standing apart from, and in symmetrical
contrast to, a system 1 mechanism for intuitive inference.
Rather, arguments are the output of one mechanism of
intuitive inference among many that delivers intuitions
about premise-conclusion relationships. Intuitions about
arguments have an evaluative component: Some arguments are seen as strong, others as weak. Moreover,
there may be competing arguments for opposite conclusions and we may intuitively prefer one to another.
These evaluation and preferences are ultimately grounded
in intuition.
If we accept a conclusion because of an argument in its
favor that is intuitively strong enough, this acceptance is an
epistemic decision that we take at a personal level. If we
construct a complex argument by linking argumentative
steps, each of which we see as having sufficient intuitive
strength, this is a personal-level mental action. If we verbally produce the argument so that others will see its intuitive force and will accept its conclusion, it is a public action
that we consciously undertake. The mental action of
working out a convincing argument, the public action of
verbally producing this argument so that others will be
convinced by it, and the mental action of evaluating and
accepting the conclusion of an argument produced by
others correspond to what is commonly and traditionally
meant by reasoning (a term that can refer to either a
mental or a verbal activity).
Why should the reflective exploitation of one mechanism for intuitive inference among many stand out as so
important that it has been seen as what distinguishes
humans from beasts? Why, in dual-process theories of
reasoning, should it be contrasted on its own with all the
mechanisms for intuitive inference taken together? We
see three complementary explanations for the saliency of
reasoning. First, when we reason, we know that we are
reasoning, whereas the very existence of intuitive inference was seen as controversial in philosophy before its discovery in cognitive science. Second, while an inferential
mechanism that delivers intuitions about arguments is,

strictly speaking, highly domain specific, the arguments
that it delivers intuitions about can be representations of
anything at all. Thus, when we reason on the basis of
these intuitions, we may come to conclusions in all theoretical and practical domains. In other words, even though
inferences about arguments are domain specific (as evolutionary psychologists would expect), they have domain
general consequences and provide a kind of virtual
domain generality (without which traditional and dualprocess approaches to reasoning would make little
sense). Third, as we will now argue, the very function of
reasoning puts it on display in human communication.
1.2. The function of reasoning

We use function here in its biological sense (see Allen et al.
1998). Put simply, a function of a trait is an effect of that
trait that causally explains its having evolved and persisted
in a population: Thanks to this effect, the trait has been
contributing to the fitness of organisms endowed with it.
In principle, several effects of a trait may contribute to
fitness, and hence a trait may have more than a single function. Even then, it may be possible to rank the importance
of different functions, and in particular to identify a function for which the trait is best adapted as its main function.
For instance, human feet have the functions of allowing us
both to run and to walk, but their plantigrade posture is
better adapted for walking than for running, and this
is strong evidence that walking is their main function
(Cunningham et al. 2010). In the same vein, we are not
arguing against the view that our reasoning ability may
have various advantageous effects, each of which may
have contributed to its selection as an important capacity
of the human mind. We do argue, however, that reasoning
is best adapted for its role in argumentation, which should
therefore be seen as its main function.
There have been a few tentative attempts in dualprocess approaches to explain the function and evolution
of reasoning. The majority view seems to be that the
main function of reasoning is to enhance individual cognition. This is expressed, for instance, by Kahneman (2003,
p. 699), Gilbert (2002), Evans and Over (1996, p. 154),
Stanovich (2004, p. 64), and Sloman (1996, p. 18). This
classical view of reasoning – it goes back to Descartes
and to ancient Greek philosophers – faces several problems that become apparent when its functional claims
are laid out in slightly greater detail. It is sometimes
claimed (e.g., by Kahneman 2003) that the meliorative
function of system 2 reasoning is achieved by correcting
mistakes in system 1 intuitions. However, reasoning itself
is a potential source of new mistakes. Moreover, there is
considerable evidence that when reasoning is applied to
the conclusions of intuitive inference, it tends to rationalize them rather than to correct them (e.g., Evans & Wason
1976).
According to another hypothesis, conscious reasoning
“gives us the possibility to deal with novelty and to anticipate the future” (Evans & Over 1996, p. 154). But giving
an organism the possibility to deal with novelty and to
anticipate the future is less a characterization of reasoning
than it is of learning (or even, it could be argued, of cognition in general). After all, learning can be defined as “the
process by which we become able to use past and
current events to predict what the future holds” (Niv &
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2
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Schoenbaum 2008, p. 265). The issue is not whether, on
occasion, reasoning can help correct intuitive mistakes or
better adapt us to novel circumstances. No doubt, it can.
The issue is how far these occasional benefits explain the
costs incurred, and hence the very existence of reasoning
among humans, and also explain its characteristic features.
In any case, evolutionary hypotheses are of little help
unless precise enough to yield testable predictions and
explanations. To establish that reasoning has a given function, we should be able at least to identify signature effects
of that function in the very way reasoning works.
Here we want to explore the idea that the emergence of
reasoning is best understood within the framework of the
evolution of human communication. Reasoning enables
people to exchange arguments that, on the whole, make
communication more reliable and hence more advantageous. The main function of reasoning, we claim, is argumentative (Sperber 2000a; 2001; see also Billig 1996;
Dessalles 2007; Kuhn 1992; Perelman & OlbrechtsTyteca 1969; for a very similar take on the special case of
moral reasoning, see Gibbard 1990 and Haidt 2001).
For communication to be stable, it has to benefit both
senders and receivers; otherwise they would stop
sending or stop receiving, putting an end to communication itself (Dawkins & Krebs 1978; Krebs & Dawkins
1984). But stability is often threatened by dishonest
senders who may gain by manipulating receivers and
inflicting too high of a cost on them. Is there a way to
ensure that communication is honest? Some signals are
reliable indicators of their own honesty. Costly signals
such as a deer antlers or a peacock tail both signal and
show evidence that the individual is strong enough to
pay that cost (Zahavi & Zahavi 1997). Saying “I am not
mute” is proof that the speaker is indeed not mute.
However, for most of the rich and varied informational
contents that humans communicate among themselves,
there are no available signals that would be proof of
their own honesty. To avoid being victims of misinformation, receivers must therefore exercise some degree of
what may be called epistemic vigilance (Sperber et al.
2010). The task of epistemic vigilance is to evaluate communicator and the content of their messages in order to
filter communicated information.
Several psychological mechanisms may contribute to
epistemic vigilance. The two most important of these
mechanisms are trust calibration and coherence checking.
People routinely calibrate the trust they grant different
speakers on the basis of their competence and benevolence (Petty & Wegener 1998). Rudiments of trust calibration based on competence have been demonstrated
in 3-year-old children (for reviews, see Clément 2010;
Harris 2007). The ability to distrust malevolent informants
has been shown to develop in stages between the ages of 3
and 6 (Mascaro & Sperber 2009).
The interpretation of communicated information
involves activating a context of previously held beliefs
and trying to integrate the new with old information.
This process may bring to the fore incoherencies
between old and newly communicated information.
Some initial coherence checking thus occurs in the
process of comprehension. When it uncovers some incoherence, an epistemically vigilant addressee must choose
between two alternatives. The simplest is to reject communicated information, thus avoiding any risk of being
60
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misled. This may, however, deprive the addressee of valuable information and of the opportunity to correct or
update earlier beliefs. The second, more elaborate,
alternative consists in associating coherence checking
and trust calibration and allowing for a finer-grained
process of belief revision. In particular, if a highly
trusted individual tells us something that is incoherent
with our previous beliefs, some revision is unavoidable:
We must revise either our confidence of the source or
our previous beliefs. We are likely to choose the revision
that reestablishes coherence at the lesser cost, and this
will often consist in accepting the information communicated and revising our beliefs.
What are the options of a communicator wanting to
communicate a piece of information that the addressee
is unlikely to accept on trust? One option may be for the
communicator to provide evidence of her reliability in
the matter at hand (for instance, if the information is
about health issues, she might inform the addressee that
she is a doctor). But what if the communicator is not in
a position to boost her own authority? Another option is
to try to convince her addressee by offering premises the
addressee already believes or is willing to accept on
trust, and showing that, once these premises are accepted,
it would be less coherent to reject the conclusion than to
accept it. This option consists in producing arguments
for one’s claims and in encouraging the addressee to
examine, evaluate, and accept these arguments. Producing
and evaluating arguments is, of course, a use of reasoning.
Reasoning contributes to the effectiveness and
reliability of communication by allowing communicators
to argue for their claim and by allowing addressees to
assess these arguments. It thus increases both in quantity
and in epistemic quality the information humans are able
to share. Claiming as we do that this role of reasoning in
social interaction is its main function fits well with much
current work stressing the role of sociality in the unique
cognitive capacities of humans (Byrne & Whiten 1988;
Dunbar 1996; Dunbar & Shultz 2003; Hrdy 2009; Humphrey 1976; Tomasello et al. 2005; Whiten & Byrne
1997). In particular, the evolutionary role of small group
cooperation has recently been emphasized (Dubreuil
2010; Sterelny, in press). Communication plays an obvious
role in human cooperation both in the setting of common
goals and in the allocation of duties and rights. Argumentation is uniquely effective in overcoming disagreements that
are likely to occur, in particular in relatively equalitarian
groups. While there can hardly be any archaeological
evidence for the claim that argumentation already played
an important role in early human groups, we note that
anthropologists have repeatedly observed people arguing
in small-scale traditional societies (Boehm et al. 1996;
Brown 1991; Mercier, in press a).
The main function of reasoning is argumentative:
Reasoning has evolved and persisted mainly because it
makes human communication more effective and advantageous. As most evolutionary hypotheses, this claim
runs the risk of being perceived as another “just so
story.” It is therefore crucial to show that it entails falsifiable predictions. If the main function of reasoning is
indeed argumentative, then it should exhibit as signature
effects strengths and weaknesses related to the relative
importance of this function compared to other potential
functions of reasoning. This should be testable through
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experimental work done here and now. Our goal now is to
spell out and explain what signature effects we predict, to
evaluate these predictions in light of the available evidence, and to see whether they help make better sense
of a number of well-known puzzles in the psychology of
reasoning and decision making. Should one fail, on the
other hand, to find such signature of the hypothesized
argumentative function of reasoning, and even more
should one find that the main features of reasoning
match some other function, then our hypothesis should
be considered falsified.2
Several predictions can be derived from the argumentative theory of reasoning. The first and most straightforward
is that reasoning should do well what it evolved to do; that
is, produce and evaluate arguments (sects. 2.1 and 2.2). In
general, adaptations work best when they are used to
perform the task they evolved to perform. Accordingly,
reasoning should produce its best results when used in
argumentative contexts, most notably in group discussions
(sect. 2.3). When we want to convince an interlocutor with
a different viewpoint, we should be looking for arguments
in favor of our viewpoint rather than in favor of hers.
Therefore, the next prediction is that reasoning used to
produce argument should exhibit a strong confirmation
bias (sect. 3). A further related prediction is that, when
people reason on their own about one of their opinions,
they are likely to do so proactively, that is, anticipating a
dialogic context, and mostly to find arguments that
support their opinion. Evidence of the existence of such
motivated reasoning is reviewed in section 4. Finally, we
want to explore the possibility that, even in decision
making, the main function of reasoning is to produce arguments to convince others rather than to find the best
decision. Thus, we predict that reasoning will drive
people towards decisions for which they can argue –
decisions that they can justify – even if these decisions
are not optimal (sect. 5).
2. Argumentative skills
2.1. Understanding and evaluating arguments

In this section, we review evidence showing that people
are skilled arguers, using reasoning both to evaluate and
to produce arguments in argumentative contexts. This, in
itself, is compatible with other accounts of the main function of reasoning. However, this evidence is relevant
because the idea that people are not very skilled arguers
is relatively common; if it were true, then the argumentative theory would be a nonstarter. It is therefore crucial to
demonstrate that this is not the case and that people have
good argumentative skills, starting with the ability to
understand and evaluate arguments.
The understanding of arguments has been studied in
two main fields of psychology: persuasion and attitude
change, on the one hand, and reasoning, on the other.
The aims, methods, and results are different in the two
fields. Within social psychology, the study of persuasion
and attitude change has looked at the effects of arguments
on attitudes. In a typical experiment, participants hear or
read an argument (a “persuasive message”), and the evolution of their attitude on the relevant topic is measured.
For instance, in a classic study by Petty and Cacioppo
(1979), participants were presented with arguments

supporting the introduction of a comprehensive senior
exam. Some participants heard strong arguments (such
as data showing that “graduate and professional schools
show a preference for undergraduates who have passed
a comprehensive exam”), while others heard much
weaker arguments (such as a quote from a graduate
student saying that “since they have to take comprehensives, undergraduates should take them also”). In this
experiment, it was shown that participants who would be
directly affected by the setting up of a comprehensive
exam were much more influenced by strong arguments
than by weak ones. This experiment illustrates the more
general finding stemming from this literature that, when
they are motivated, participants are able to use reasoning
to evaluate arguments accurately (for a review, see Petty &
Wegener 1998).
The demonstration that people are skilled at assessing
arguments seems to stand in sharp contrast with findings
from the psychology of reasoning. In a typical reasoning
experiment, participants are presented with premises
and asked either to produce or to evaluate a conclusion
that should follow logically. Thus, they may have to determine what, if anything, follows from premises such as “If
there is a vowel on the card, then there is an even
number on the card. There is not an even number on
the card.” In such tasks, Evans (2002) recognizes that
“logical performance . . . is generally quite poor” (p.
981). To give just one example, it was found in a review
that an average of 40% of participants fail to draw the
simple modus tollens conclusion that was used as an
example (if p then q, not q, therefore not p) (Evans et al.
1993). However, reasoning, according to the present
view, should mostly provide a felicitous evaluation in dialogic contexts – when someone is genuinely trying to convince us of something. This is not the case in these
decontextualized tasks that involve no interaction or in
abstract problems. In fact, as soon as these logical problems can be made sense of in an argumentative context,
performance improves. For instance, participants can
easily understand a modus tollens argument when it is of
use not simply to pass some test but to evaluate communicated information (see Thompson et al. 2005b); the
production of valid modus tollens arguments in argumentative contexts is also “surprisingly common” (Pennington &
Hastie 1993, p. 155).
While students of reasoning focus on logical fallacies,
other scholars have turned to the study of the fallacies of
argumentation. Unlike logical fallacies, fallacies of argumentation come in degrees: Depending on their content
and context, they can be more or less fallacious. For
instance, a slippery-slope fallacy (where a claim is criticized for being a step on a slope that ends up with a
blatant mistake) is in fact valid to the extent that, having
made the first step on the slope, it is probable that one
will continue all the way down (Corner et al. 2006).
Various experiments have shown that participants are
generally able to spot other argumentative fallacies
(Hahn & Oaksford 2007, experiment 3; Neuman 2003;
Neuman et al. 2006; Weinstock et al. 2004; see also
Corner & Hahn 2009). Not only do they spot them, but
they tend to react appropriately: rejecting them when
they are indeed fallacious, or being convinced to the
degree that they are well grounded (Corner et al. 2006;
Hahn & Oaksford 2007; Hahn et al. 2005; Oaksford &
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2
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Hahn 2004; Rips 2002). When researchers have studied
other skills specific to argumentation, performance has
proved to be satisfactory. Thus, participants are able to
recognize the macrostructure of arguments (Ricco 2003),
to follow the commitments of different speakers (Rips
1998), and to attribute the burden of proof appropriately
(Bailenson & Rips 1996; see also Rips 1998, experiment
3). On the whole, the results reviewed in this section
demonstrate that people are good at evaluating arguments
both at the level of individual inferences and at the level of
whole discussions.
2.2. Producing arguments

The first studies that systematically investigated argument
production used the following methodology.3 Participants
were asked to think about a given topic, such as “Would
restoring the military draft significantly increase America’s
ability to influence world events?” (Perkins 1985) or “What
are the causes of school failure?” (Kuhn 1991). After being
left to think for a few minutes, they had to state and defend
their view to the experimenter. The conclusions of these
studies were quite bleak and highlighted three main
flaws. The first is that people resort to mere explanations
(“make sense” causal theories) instead of relying on
genuine evidence (data) to support their views.
However, later research has shown that this is mostly an
artifact of the lack of evidence available to the participants:
When evidence is made available, participants will favor it
(in both production and evaluation) (Brem & Rips 2000;
see also Hagler & Brem 2008; Sá et al. 2005). A second
flaw noted by Perkins and Kuhn is the relative superficiality of the arguments used by participants. This can be
explained by a feature of the tasks: Unlike in a real
debate, the experimenter didn’t challenge the arguments
of the participants, however weak they were. In a normal
argumentative setting, a good argument is an argument
that is not refuted. As long as they are not challenged, it
makes sense to be satisfied with seemingly superficial
arguments. On the other hand, people should be able to
generate better arguments when engaged in a real
debate. This is exactly what Kuhn and her colleagues
observed: Participants who had to debate on a given
topic showed a significant improvement in the quality of
the arguments they used afterwards (Kuhn et al. 1997;
for similar results with analogical reasoning, see Blanchette & Dunbar 2001).
The third flaw, according to Perkins and Kuhn, is the
most relevant one here. Participants had generally failed
to anticipate counterarguments and generate rebuttals.
For these two authors, and indeed the critical thinking tradition, this is a very serious failing. Seen from an argumentative perspective, however, this may not be a simple flaw
but rather a feature of argumentation that contributes to
its effectiveness in fulfilling its function. If one’s goal is
to convince others, one should be looking first and foremost for supportive arguments. Looking for counterarguments against one’s own claims may be part of a more
sophisticated and effortful argumentative strategy geared
to anticipating the interlocutor’s response, but, in the
experimental setting, there was no back-and-forth to
encourage such an extra effort (and participants knew
not to expect such a back-and-forth). If this is a correct
explanation of what need not be a flaw after all, then the
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difficulty that people seem to have in coming up with
counterarguments should be easily overcome by having
them challenge someone else’s claims rather than defending their own. Indeed, when mock jurors were asked to
reach a verdict and were then presented with an alternative verdict, nearly all of them were able to find counterarguments against it (Kuhn et al. 1994). In another
experiment, all participants were able to find counterarguments against a claim (which was not theirs) and to do so
very quickly (Shaw 1996).
When people have looked at reasoning performance in
felicitous argumentative settings, they have observed good
results. Resnick and her colleagues (1993) created groups
of three participants who disagreed on a given issue. Analyzing the debates, the researchers were “impressed by the
coherence of the reasoning displayed. Participants . . .
appear to build complex arguments and attack structure.
People appear to be capable of recognizing these structures and of effectively attacking their individual components as well as the argument as a whole” (pp. 362 –
63; see also Blum-Kulka et al. 2002; Hagler & Brem
2008; Stein et al. 1996; 1997). It is worth noting that a strikingly similar pattern emerges from developmental studies
(see Mercier, in press b).
To sum up, people can be skilled arguers, producing
and evaluating arguments felicitously. This good performance stands in sharp contrast with the abysmal results
found in other, nonargumentative, settings, a contrast
made particularly clear by the comparison between individual and group performance.
2.3. Group reasoning

If people are skilled at both producing and evaluating arguments, and if these skills are displayed most easily in argumentative settings, then debates should be especially
conducive to good reasoning performance. Many types of
tasks have been studied in group settings, with very mixed
results (for recent reviews,4 see Kerr & Tindale 2004;
Kerr et al. 1996). The most relevant findings here are
those pertaining to logical or, more generally, intellective
tasks “for which there exists a demonstrably correct
answer within a verbal or mathematical conceptual
system” (Laughlin & Ellis 1986, p. 177). In experiments
involving this kind of task, participants in the experimental
condition typically begin by solving problems individually
(pretest), then solve the same problems in groups of four
or five members (test), and then solve them individually
again (posttest), to ensure that any improvement does not
come simply from following other group members. Their
performance is compared with those of a control group of
participants who take the same tests but always individually.
Intellective tasks allow for a direct comparison with results
from the individual reasoning literature, and the results
are unambiguous. The dominant scheme (Davis 1973) is
truth wins, meaning that, as soon as one participant has
understood the problem, she will be able to convince the
whole group that her solution is correct (Bonner et al.
2002; Laughlin & Ellis 1986; Stasson et al. 1991).5 This
can lead to big improvements in performance. Some experiments using the Wason selection task dramatically illustrate
this phenomenon (Moshman & Geil 1998; see also Augustinova 2008; Maciejovsky & Budescu 2007). The Wason
selection task is the most widely used task in reasoning,
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and the performance of participants is generally very poor,
hovering around 10% of correct answers (Evans 1989;
Evans et al. 1993; Johnson-Laird & Wason 1970).
However, when participants had to solve the task in
groups, they reached the level of 80% of correct answers.
Several challenges can be leveled against this interpretation of the data. It could be suggested that the person
who has the correct solution simply points it out to the
others, who immediately accept it without argument,
perhaps because they have recognized this person as the
“smartest” (Oaksford et al. 1999). The transcripts of the
experiments show that this is not the case: Most participants
are willing to change their mind only once they have been
thoroughly convinced that their initial answer was wrong
(e.g., see Moshman & Geil 1998; Trognon 1993). More generally, many experiments have shown that debates are
essential to any improvement of performance in group settings (for a review and some new data, see Schulz-Hardt
et al. 2006; for similar evidence in the development and education literature, see Mercier, in press b). Moreover, in
these contexts, participants decide that someone is smart
based on the strength and relevance of her arguments and
not the other way around (Littlepage & Mueller 1997).
Indeed, it would be very hard to tell who is “smart” in
such groups – even if general intelligence were easily perceptible, it correlates only .33 with success in the Wason
selection task (Stanovich & West 1998). Finally, in many
cases, no single participant had the correct answer to
begin with. Several participants may be partly wrong and
partly right, but the group will collectively be able to
retain only the correct parts and thus converge on the
right answer. This leads to the assembly bonus effect, in
which the performance of the group is better than that of
its best member (Blinder & Morgan 2000; Laughlin et al.
2002; 2003; 2006; Lombardelli et al. 2005; Michaelsen
et al. 1989; Sniezek & Henry 1989; Stasson et al. 1991;
Tindale & Sheffey 2002). Once again there is a striking convergence here, with the developmental literature showing
how groups – even when no member had the correct
answer initially – can facilitate learning and comprehension
of a wide variety of problems (Mercier, in press b).
According to another counterargument, people are
simply more motivated, generally, when they are in groups
(Oaksford et al. 1999). This is not so.6 On the contrary,
“the ubiquitous finding across many decades of research
(e.g., see Hill 1982; Steiner 1972) is that groups usually
fall short of reasonable potential productivity baselines”
(Kerr & Tindale 2004, p. 625). Moreover, other types of
motivation have no such beneficial effect on reasoning. By
and large, monetary incentives, even substantial ones, fail
to improve performance in reasoning and decision-making
tasks (Ariely et al., 2009; Bonner & Sprinkle 2002; Bonner
et al. 2000; Camerer & Hogarth 1999; and, in the specific
case of the Wason selection task, see Johnson-Laird &
Byrne 2002; Jones & Sugden, 2001). Thus, not any incentive
will do: Group settings have a motivational power to which
reasoning responds specifically.7
The argumentative theory also helps predict what will
happen in nonoptimal group settings. If all group
members share an opinion, a debate should not arise spontaneously. However, in many experimental and institutional settings (juries, committees), people are forced
to discuss, even if they already agree. When all group
members agree on a certain view, each of them can find

arguments in its favor. These arguments will not be critically examined, let alone refuted, thus providing other
group members with additional reasons to hold that
view. The result should be a strengthening of the opinions
held by the group (for a review, see Sunstein 2002; for a
recent illustration, see Hinsz et al. 2008). Contra Sunstein’s law of group polarization, it is important to bear
in mind that this result is specific to artificial contexts in
which people debate even though they tend to agree in
the first place. When group members disagree, discussions
often lead to depolarization (Kogan & Wallach 1966;
Vinokur & Burnstein 1978). In both cases, the behavior
of the group can be predicted on the basis of the direction
and strength of the arguments accessible to group
members, as demonstrated by research carried out in
the framework of the Persuasive Argument Theory
(Vinokur 1971), which ties up with the prediction of the
present framework (Ebbesen & Bowers 1974; Isenberg
1986; Kaplan & Miller 1977; Madsen 1978).
The research reviewed in this section shows that people
are skilled arguers: They can use reasoning both to evaluate and to produce arguments. This good performance
offers a striking contrast with the poor results obtained
in abstract reasoning tasks. Finally, the improvement in
performance observed in argumentative settings confirms
that reasoning is at its best in these contexts. We will now
explore in more depth a phenomenon already mentioned
in this section: the confirmation bias.
3. The confirmation bias: A flaw of reasoning
or a feature of argument production?
The confirmation bias consists in the “seeking or interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs,
expectations, or a hypothesis in hand” (Nickerson 1998,
p. 175). It is one of the most studied biases in psychology
(for review, see Nickerson 1998). While there is some individual variation, it seems that everybody is affected to
some degree, irrespective of factors like general intelligence or open mindedness (Stanovich & West 2007;
2008a; 2008b). For standard theories of reasoning, the
confirmation bias is no more than a flaw of reasoning.
For the argumentative theory, however, it is a consequence of the function of reasoning and hence a feature
of reasoning when used for the production of arguments.
In fact, we suggest, the label confirmation bias has been
applied to two distinct types of case, both characterized by
a failure to look for counterevidence or counterarguments
to an existing belief, both consistent with the argumentative
approach but brought about in different ways. In cases that
deserve the label of confirmation bias, people are trying to
convince others. They are typically looking for arguments
and evidence to confirm their own claim, and ignoring negative arguments and evidence unless they anticipate having to
rebut them. While this may be seen as a bias from a normative epistemological perspective, it clearly serves the goal of
convincing others. In another type of case, we are dealing
not with biased reasoning but with an absence of reasoning
proper. Such an absence of reasoning is to be expected
when people already hold some belief on the basis of perception, memory, or intuitive inference, and do not have
to argue for it. Say, I believe that my keys are in my trousers
because that is where I remember putting them. Time has
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passed, and they could now be in my jacket, for example.
However, unless I have some positive reason to think otherwise, I just assume that they are still in my trousers, and
I don’t even make the inference (which, if I am right,
would be valid) that they are not in my jacket or any of
the other places where, in principle, they might be. In
such cases, people typically draw positive rather than negative inferences from their previous beliefs. These positive
inferences are generally more relevant to testing these
beliefs. For instance, I am more likely to get conclusive evidence that I was right or wrong by looking for my keys in
my trousers rather than in my jacket (even if they turn
out not to be in my jacket, I might still be wrong in thinking
that they are in my trousers). We spontaneously derive
positive consequences from our intuitive beliefs. This is
just a trusting use of our beliefs, not a confirmation bias
(see Klayman & Ha 1987).
The theory we are proposing makes three broad predictions. The first is that the genuine confirmation bias (as
opposed to straightforward trust in one’s intuitive beliefs
and their positive consequences) should occur only in
argumentative situations. The second is that it should
occur only in the production of arguments. The rationale
for a confirmation bias in the production of arguments to
support a given claim does not extend to the evaluation
of arguments by an audience that is just aiming to be
well informed. The third prediction is that the confirmation bias in the production of arguments is not a bias
in favor of confirmation in general and against disconfirmation in general: It is a bias in favor of confirming
one’s own claims, which should be naturally complemented by a bias in favor of disconfirming opposing claims
and counterarguments.
3.1. Hypothesis testing: No reasoning, no reasoning
bias

One of the areas in which the confirmation bias has been
most thoroughly studied is that of hypothesis testing, often
using Wason’s rule discovery task (Wason 1960). In this
task, participants are told that the experimenter has in
mind a rule for generating number triples and that they
have to discover it. The experimenter starts by giving participants a triple that conforms to the rule (2, 4, 6). Participants can then think of a hypothesis about the rule and test
it by proposing a triple of their own choice. The experimenter says whether or not this triple conforms to the
rule. Participants can repeat the procedure until they
feel ready to put forward their hypothesis about the rule.
The experimenter tells them whether or not their hypothesis is true. If it is not, they can try again or give up.
Participants overwhelmingly propose triples that fit with
the hypothesis they have in mind. For instance, if a participant has formed the hypothesis “three even numbers in
ascending order,” she might try 8, 10, 12. As argued by
Klayman and Ha (1987), such an answer corresponds to
a “positive test strategy” of a type that would be quite
effective in most cases. This strategy is not adopted in a
reflective manner, but is rather, we suggest, the intuitive
way to exploit one’s intuitive hypotheses, as when we
check that our keys are where we believe we left them
as opposed to checking that they are not where it follows
from our belief that they should not be. What we see
here, then, is a sound heuristic rather than a bias.
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This heuristic misleads participants in this case only
because of some very peculiar (and expressly designed)
features of the task. What is really striking is the failure
of attempts to get participants to reason in order to
correct their ineffective approach. It has been shown
that, even when instructed to try to falsify the hypotheses
they generate, fewer than one participant in ten is able to
do so (Poletiek 1996; Tweney et al. 1980). Since the
hypotheses are generated by the participants themselves,
this is what we should expect in the current framework:
The situation is not an argumentative one and does not
activate reasoning. However, if a hypothesis is presented
as coming from someone else, it seems that more participants will try to falsify it and will give it up much more
readily in favor of another hypothesis (Cowley & Byrne
2005). The same applies if the hypothesis is generated
by a minority member in a group setting (Butera et al.
1992). Thus, falsification is accessible provided that the
situation encourages participants to argue against a
hypothesis that is not their own.
3.2. The Wason selection task

A similar interpretation can be used to account for results
obtained with the Wason selection task (Wason 1966). In
this task, participants are given a rule describing four
cards. In the original version, the cards have a number
on one side and a letter on the other, although only one
side is visible – they might see, for instance, 4, E, 7, and
K. The rule might read, “If there is a vowel on one side,
then there is an even number on the other side.” The
task is to say what cards need to be turned over to determine whether the rule is true. In this task, too, it is
useful to distinguish the effects of intuitive mechanisms
from those of reasoning proper (as has long been
suggested by Wason & Evans 1975). Intuitive mechanisms
involved in understanding utterances will draw the participants’ attention to the cards that are made most relevant
by the rule and the context (Girotto et al. 2001; Sperber
et al. 1995). In the standard case, these will simply be
the cards mentioned in the rule (the vowel E and the
even number 4), as opposed to those that would yield
the correct answer (the E and the 7). Given that the 4
can only confirm the rule but not falsify it, the behavior
of participants who select this card could be interpreted
as showing a confirmation bias. However, as first discovered by Evans (Evans & Lynch 1973), the simple addition
of a negation in the rule (“if there is a vowel on one side,
then there is not an even number on the other side”)
leaves the answers unchanged (the E and 4 are still
made relevant), but in this case these cards correspond
to the correct, falsifying, response. So these intuitive
mechanisms are not intrinsically linked to either confirmation or falsification: They just happen to point to
cards that in some cases might confirm the rule and, in
other cases, might falsify it.
Confirmation bias does occur in the selection task but at
another level. Once the participants’ attention has been
drawn to some of the cards, and they have arrived at an
intuitive answer to the question, reasoning is used not to
evaluate and correct their initial intuition but to find justifications for it (Evans 1996; Lucas & Ball 2005; Roberts &
Newton 2001). This is a genuine confirmation bias. As with
hypothesis testing, this does not mean that participants are
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simply unable to understand the task or to try to falsify the
rule – only that an appropriate argumentative motivation
is lacking. That participants can understand the task is
shown by the good performance in group settings, as mentioned earlier. Participants should also be able to try to
falsify the rule when their first intuition is that the rule is
false and they want to prove it wrong. Researchers have
used rules such as “all members of group A are Y,”
where Y is a negative or positive stereotype (Dawson
et al. 2002). Participants who were most motivated to
prove the rule wrong – those belonging to group A when
Y was negative – were able to produce more than 50%
of correct answers, whereas participants from all the
other conditions (groups other than A and/or positive
stereotype) remained under 20%.
3.3. Categorical syllogisms

Categorical syllogisms are one of the most studied types of
reasoning. Here is a typical example: “No C are B; All B are
A; therefore some A are not C.” Although they are solvable
by very simple programs (e.g., see Geurts 2003), syllogisms
can be very hard to figure out – the one just offered by way
of illustration, for instance, is solved by less than 10% of participants (Chater & Oaksford 1999). In terms of the mental
model theory, what the participants are doing is constructing a model of the premises and deriving a possible conclusion from it (Evans et al. 1999). This constitutes the
participants’ initial intuition. To correctly solve the
problem, participants should then try to construct counterexamples to this initial conclusion. But this would mean
trying to falsify their own conclusion. The present theory
predicts that they will not do so spontaneously. And
indeed, “any search for counterexample models is weak . . .
participants are basing their conclusions on the first model
that occurs to them” (Evans et al. 1999, p. 1505; see also
Klauer et al. 2000; Newstead et al. 1999).
Again, we suggest, this should not be interpreted as
revealing a lack of ability but only a lack of motivation.
When participants want to prove a conclusion wrong,
they will find ways to falsify it.
This happens with normal conclusions presented by
someone else (Sacco & Bucciarelli 2008) or when participants are faced with so-called unbelievable conclusions
such as “All fish are trout.” In this case, they will try to
prove that the premises lead to the logical opposite of the
conclusion (“Not all fish are trout”) (Klauer et al. 2000).
Given that falsification leads to better answers on these
tasks, this explains why participants actually perform
much better when the conclusion is unbelievable (e.g.,
see Evans et al. 1983). It is not that they reason more in
this case – they spend as much time trying to solve problems with believable conclusions as with unbelievable
ones (Thompson et al. 2003). It is just that the direction
reasoning takes is mostly determined by the participants’
initial intuitions. If they have arrived at the conclusion
themselves, or if they agree with it, they try to confirm it.
If they disagree with it, they try to prove it wrong. In all
cases, what they do is try to confirm their initial intuition.
3.4. Rehabilitating the conﬁrmation bias

In all three cases just reviewed – hypothesis testing, the
Wason selection task, and syllogistic reasoning – a

similar pattern can be observed. Participants have intuitions that lead them towards certain answers. If reasoning
is used at all, it is mostly used to confirm these initial intuitions. This is exactly what one should expect of an argumentative skill, and so these results bolster our claim
that the main function of reasoning is argumentative. By
contrast, if people were easily able to abstract from this
bias, or if they were subject to it only in argumentative settings, then this would constitute evidence against the
present theory.
According to a more standard explanation of the confirmation bias, it is an effect of limitations in cognitive
resources and in particular in working memory (e.g.,
Johnson-Laird 2006). But it is hard to reconcile this explanation with the fact that people are very good at falsifying
propositions when they are inclined to disagree with them.
In those cases, people are not held back by limited
resources even though the tasks are not cognitively easier.
However, the idea that the confirmation bias is a normal
feature of reasoning that plays a role in the production of
arguments may seem surprising in light of the poor outcomes it has been claimed to cause. Conservatism in
science is one example (see Nickerson 1998 and references therein). Another is the related phenomenon of
groupthink, which has been held responsible for many disasters, from the Bay of Pigs fiasco (Janis 1982) to the
tragedy of the Challenger shuttle (Esser & Lindoerfer
1989; Moorhead et al. 1991) (for review, see Esser
1998). In such cases, reasoning tends not to be used in
its normal context: that is, the resolution of a disagreement
through discussion. When one is alone or with people who
hold similar views, one’s arguments will not be critically
evaluated. This is when the confirmation bias is most
likely to lead to poor outcomes. However, when reasoning
is used in a more felicitous context – that is, in arguments
among people who disagree but have a common interest in
the truth – the confirmation bias contributes to an efficient form of division of cognitive labor.
When a group has to solve a problem, it is much more
efficient if each individual looks mostly for arguments supporting a given solution. They can then present these arguments to the group, to be tested by the other members. This
method will work as long as people can be swayed by good
arguments, and the results reviewed in section 2 show that
this is generally the case. This joint dialogic approach is
much more efficient than one where each individual on
his or her own has to examine all possible solutions carefully.8 The advantages of the confirmation bias are even
more obvious given that each participant in a discussion is
often in a better position to look for arguments in favor of
his or her favored solution (situations of asymmetrical information). So group discussions provide a much more efficient way of holding the confirmation bias in check. By
contrast, the teaching of critical thinking skills, which is supposed to help us overcome the bias on a purely individual
basis, does not seem to yield very good results (Ritchart &
Perkins 2005; Willingham 2008).
For the confirmation bias to play an optimal role in discussions and group performance, it should be active only
in the production of arguments and not in their evaluation.
Of course, in the back-and-forth of a discussion, the production of one’s own arguments and the evaluation of
those of the interlocutor may interfere with each other,
making it hard to properly assess the two processes
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independently. Still, the evidence reviewed in section 2.1
on the understanding of arguments strongly suggests that
people tend to be more objective in evaluation than in production. If this were not the case, the success of group
reasoning reviewed in section 2.3 would be very hard to
explain.
4. Proactive reasoning in belief formation
According to the argumentative theory, reasoning is most
naturally used in the context of an exchange of arguments
during a discussion. But people can also be proactive and
anticipate situations in which they might have to argue to
convince others that their claims are true or that their
actions are justified. We would say that much reasoning
anticipates the need to argue. In this section, we will
show that work on motivated reasoning can be usefully
reinterpreted in this perspective, and, in the next
section, we will show that the same applies to work on
reason-based choice.
Many of our beliefs are likely to remain unchallenged
because they are relevant only to ourselves and we don’t
share them or because they are uncontroversial among
the people we interact with or because we have sufficient
authority to be trusted when we assert them. While we
think of most of our beliefs – to the extent that we think
about them at all – not as beliefs but just as pieces of
knowledge, we are also aware that some of them are unlikely to be universally shared, or to be accepted on trust
just because we express them. When we pay attention to
the contentious nature of these beliefs, we typically think
of them as opinions. Opinions are likely to be challenged
and may have to be defended. It makes sense to look for
arguments for our opinions before we find ourselves
called upon to state them. If the search for arguments is
successful, we will be ready. If not, then perhaps it
might be better to adopt a weaker position, one that is
easier to defend. Such uses of reasoning have been intensively studied under the name of motivated reasoning 9
(Kunda 1990; see also Kruglanski & Freund 1983; Pyszczynski & Greenberg 1987; for a recent review, see
Molden & Higgins 2005).
4.1. Motivated reasoning

A series of experiments by Ditto and his colleagues, involving reasoning in the context of a fake medical result, illustrate the notion of motivated reasoning (Ditto & Lopez
1992; Ditto et al. 1998; 2003). Participants had to put
some saliva on a strip of paper and were told that, if the
strip changed color or did not change color, depending
on the condition, this would be an indication of an
unhealthy enzyme deficiency. Participants, being motivated to believe they were healthy, tried to garner arguments for this belief. In one version of the experiment,
participants were told the rate of false positives, which
varied across conditions. The use they made of this information reflects motivated reasoning. When the rate of
false positives was high, participants who were motivated
to reject the conclusion used it to undermine the validity
of the test. This same high rate of false positives was discounted by participants who were motivated to accept
the conclusion. In another version of the experiment,
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participants were asked to mention events in their
medical history that could have affected the results of
the test, which gave them an opportunity to discount
these results. Participants motivated to reject the conclusion listed more such events, and the number of
events listed was negatively correlated with the evaluation
of the test. In these experiments, the very fact that the participant’s health is being tested indicates that it cannot be
taken for granted. The reliability of the test itself is being
discussed. This experiment, and many others to be
reviewed in this article, demonstrate also that motivated
reasoning is not mere wishful thinking (a form of thinking
that, if it were common, would in any case be quite deleterious to fitness and would not be coherent with the
present theory). If desires did directly affect beliefs in
this way, then participants would simply ignore or
dismiss the test. Instead, what they do is look for evidence
and arguments to show that they are healthy or at least for
reasons to question the value of the test.
Other studies have demonstrated the use of motivated
reasoning to support various beliefs that others might challenge. Participants dig in and occasionally alter their memories to preserve a positive view of themselves (Dunning
et al. 1989; Ross et al. 1981; Sanitioso et al. 1990). They
modify their causal theories to defend some favored
belief (Kunda 1987). When they are told the outcome of
a game on which they had made a bet, they use events
in the game to explain why they should have won when
they lost (Gilovich 1983). Political experts use similar strategies to explain away their failed predictions and bolster
their theories (Tetlock 1998). Reviewers fall prey to motivated reasoning and look for flaws in a paper in order to
justify its rejection when they don’t agree with its conclusions (Koehler 1993; Mahoney 1977). In economic settings, people use information flexibly so as to be able to
justify their preferred conclusions or arrive at the decision
they favor (Boiney et al. 1997; Hsee 1995; 1996a; Schweitzer & Hsee 2002).
All these experiments demonstrate that people sometimes look for reasons to justify an opinion they are
eager to uphold. From an argumentative perspective,
they do this not to convince themselves of the truth of
their opinion but to be ready to meet the challenges of
others. If they find themselves unprepared to meet such
challenges, they may become reluctant to express an
opinion they are unable to defend and less favorable to
the opinion itself, but this is an indirect individual effect
of an effort that is aimed at others. In a classical framework, where reasoning is seen as geared to achieving epistemic benefits, the fact that it may be used to justify an
opinion already held is hard to explain, especially since,
as we will now show, motivated reasoning can have dire
epistemic consequences.
4.2. Consequences of motivated reasoning
4.2.1. Biased evaluation and attitude polarization. In a

landmark experiment, Lord and colleagues (1979) asked
participants who had been previously selected as being
either defenders or opponents of the death penalty to
evaluate studies relating to its efficiency as a deterrent.
The studies given to the participants had different conclusions: While one seemed to show that the death
penalty had a significant deterrent effect, the other
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yielded the opposite result. Even though the methodologies of the two studies were almost identical, the
studies that yielded a conclusion not in line with the participants’ opinions were consistently rated as having been
much more poorly conducted. In this case, participants
used reasoning not so much to assess the studies objectively as to confirm their initial views by finding either
flaws or strengths in similar studies, depending on their
conclusion. This phenomenon is known as biased assimilation or biased evaluation. This second description is somewhat misleading. In this experiment – and the many related
experiments that have followed it – participants are indeed
asked to evaluate an argument. However, what they do is
mostly produce arguments to support or rebut the argument they are evaluating, depending on whether they
agree with its conclusion or not. Participants are not
trying to form an opinion: They already have one. Their
goal is argumentative rather than epistemic, and it ends
up being pursued at the expense of epistemic soundness.
That participants engage in this biased search for arguments
even when their task is to evaluate an argument has been
demonstrated by the experiments we now describe.
Several other experiments have studied the way people
evaluate arguments depending on whether they agree or
disagree with the conclusions. When people disagree
with the conclusion of an argument, they often spend
more time evaluating it (Edwards & Smith 1996). This
asymmetry arises from the trivial fact that rejecting what
we are told generally requires some justification,
whereas accepting it does not. Moreover, the time spent
on these arguments is mostly devoted to finding counterarguments (Edwards & Smith 1996; see also Brock 1967;
Cacioppo & Petty 1979; Eagly et al. 2000). Participants
tend to comb through arguments for flaws and end up
finding some, whether they are problems with the design
of a scientific study (Klaczynski & Gordon 1996b; Klaczynski & Narasimham 1998; Klaczynski & Robinson
2000), issues with a piece of statistical reasoning (Klaczynski & Gordon 1996a; Klaczynski & Lavallee 2005; Klaczynski et al. 1997), or argumentative fallacies (Klaczynski
1997). In all these cases, motivated reasoning leads to a
biased assessment: Arguments with unfavored conclusions
are rated as less sound and less persuasive than arguments
with favored conclusions.
Sometimes the evaluation of an argument is biased to
the point where it has an opposite effect to the one
intended by the arguer: On reading an argument with a
counterattitudinal conclusion (one that goes against their
own beliefs or preferences), interlocutors may find so
many flaws and counterarguments that their initial unfavorable attitude is in fact strengthened. This is the
phenomenon of attitude polarization, which has been
studied extensively since it was first demonstrated by
(Lord et al. 1979; see also Greenwald 1969; Pomerantz
et al. 1995).10 Taber and Lodge (2006) have demonstrated
that, in the domain of politics, attitude polarization is most
easily observed in participants who are most knowledgeable (see also Braman 2009; Redlawsk 2002). Their knowledge makes it possible for these participants to find more
counterarguments, leading to more biased evaluations.
4.2.2. Polarization, bolstering, and overconfidence.

Attitude polarization can also occur in simpler circumstances. Merely thinking about an object may be enough

to strengthen attitudes towards it ( polarization). This
phenomenon has been repeatedly demonstrated. Sadler
and Tesser (1973) had participants listen to a recording
of a very pleasant-sounding or unpleasant-sounding individual. They then had to give their opinion of this individual, either after having to think about him or her or after
performing a distraction task. As expected, the opinions
were more extreme (in both directions) when participants
had to think about the individual. Tesser and Conlee
(1975) showed that polarization increases with the time
spent thinking about an item, and Jellison and Mills
(1969) showed that it increases with the motivation to
think. As in the case of polarization following biased evaluation, such polarization occurs only when participants are
knowledgeable (Tesser & Leone 1977; see also Millar &
Tesser 1986). And the effect can be mitigated by providing
a reality check: The simple presence of the target object
will dramatically decrease polarization (Tesser 1976).
Some later experiments used a slightly different methodology (Chaiken & Yates 1985; Liberman & Chaiken
1991). Instead of simply thinking about the target object,
participants had to write a small essay about it. Not only
was polarization observed in this case, but it was correlated
with the direction and number of the arguments put
forward in the essay. These results demonstrate that
reasoning contributes to attitude polarization and strongly
suggest that it may be its main factor. When people are
asked to think about a given item toward which they intuitively have a positive or negative attitude, what happens,
we suggest, is that they reflect less on the item itself
than on how to defend their initial attitude. Many other
experiments have shown that, once people have formed
an attitude to a target, they will look for information that
supports this attitude (a phenomenon known as selective
exposure; see Hart et al. 2009; Smith et al. 2008) and try
to put any information they are given to the same use
(Bond et al. 2007; Brownstein 2003), which leads them
to choose inferior alternatives (Russo et al. 2006).
According to the argumentative theory, reasoning
should be even more biased once the reasoner has
already stated her opinion, thereby increasing the pressure
on her to justify it rather than moving away from it. This
phenomenon is called bolstering (McGuire 1964). Thus,
when participants are committed to an opinion, thinking
about it will lead to a much stronger polarization
(Lambert et al. 1996; Millar & Tesser 1986). Accountability (the need to justify one’s decisions) will also increase
bolstering (Tetlock et al. 1989; for review, see Lerner &
Tetlock 1999).
Finally, motivated reasoning should also affect confidence. When participants think of an answer to a given
question, they will be spontaneously tempted to generate
reasons supporting that answer. This may then cause
them to be overconfident in the answer. Koriat and his colleagues (1980) have tested this hypothesis by using general
knowledge questions such as “the Sabines were part of (a)
ancient India or (b) ancient Rome.” After answering the
question, participants had to produce reasons relevant to
their answers. Some participants were asked to generate
reasons supporting their answer, while others were asked
for reasons against it. The results for people who were
explicitly asked to generate reasons supporting their
answer were no different from those in a control condition
where no reasons were asked for. This suggests that
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thinking of reasons to support their answer is what people
do spontaneously anyhow when they regard their answer
not as an obvious piece of knowledge but as an opinion
that might be challenged. By contrast, participants in the
other group were much less overconfident. Having to
think of arguments against their answer enabled them to
see its limitations – something they would not do on
their own (for replications and extensions to the phenomenon of hindsight bias and the fundamental attribution
error, see Arkes et al. 1988; Davies 1992; Griffin &
Dunning 1990; Hirt & Markman 1995; Hoch 1985; Yates
et al. 1992). It is then easy to see that overconfidence
would also be reduced by having participants discuss
their answers with people who favor different conclusions.
4.2.3. Belief perseverance. Motivated reasoning can also
be used to hang on to beliefs even when they have been
proved to be ill-founded. This phenomenon, known as
belief perseverance, is “one of social psychology’s most
reliable phenomena” (Guenther & Alicke 2008, p. 706;
for an early demonstration, see Ross et al. 1975). The
involvement of motivated reasoning in this effect can be
demonstrated by providing participants with evidence
both for and against a favored belief. If belief perseverance
were a simple result of some degree of psychological
inertia, then the first evidence presented should be the
most influential, whether it supports or disconfirms the
favored belief. On the other hand, if evidence can be
used selectively, then only evidence supporting the
favored belief should be retained, regardless of the order
of presentation. Guenther and Alicke 2008 tested this
hypothesis in the following way. Participants first had to
perform a simple perceptual task. This task, however,
was described as testing for “mental acuity,” a made-up
construct that was supposed to be related to general intelligence, making the results of the test highly relevant to
participant’s self-esteem. Participants were then given
positive or negative feedback, but a few minutes later
they were told that the feedback was actually bogus and
the real aim of the experiment was explained. At three
different points, the participants also had to evaluate
their performance: right after the task, after the feedback,
and after the debriefing. In line with previous results, the
participants who had received positive feedback showed a
classic belief-perseverance effect and discounted the
debriefing, which allowed them to preserve a positive
view of their performance. By contrast, those who had
received negative feedback did the opposite: They took
the debriefing fully into account, which allowed them to
reject the negative feedback and restore a positive view
of themselves. This strongly suggests that belief perseverance of the type just described is an instance of motivated
reasoning (for applications to the domain of political
beliefs, see Prasad et al. 2009).11
4.2.4. Violation of moral norms. The results reviewed so
far have shown that motivated reasoning can lead to
poor epistemic outcomes. We will now see that our
ability to “find or make a reason for everything one has a
mind to do” (Franklin 1799) can also allow us to violate
our moral intuitions and behave unfairly. In a recent
experiment, Valdesolo and DeSteno (2008) have demonstrated the role reasoning can play in maintaining moral
hypocrisy (when we judge someone else’s action by
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using tougher moral criteria than we use to judge our
own actions). Here is the basic setup. On arriving at the
laboratory, participants were told that they would be performing one of two tasks: a short and fun task or a long and
hard task. Moreover, they were given the possibility of
choosing which task they would be performing, knowing
that the other task would be assigned to another participant. They also had the option of letting a computer
choose at random how the tasks would be distributed.
Once they were done assigning the tasks, participants
had to rate how fair they had been. Other participants,
instead of having to make the assignment themselves,
were at the receiving end of the allocation and had no
choice whatsoever; they had to rate the fairness of the participant who had done the allocation, knowing the exact
conditions under which this had been done. It is then possible to compare the fairness ratings of participants who
have assigned themselves the easy task with the ratings
of those who have been assigned the hard task. The difference between these two ratings is a mark of moral hypocrisy. The authors then hypothesized that reasoning, since it
allows participants to find excuses for their behavior, was
responsible for this hypocrisy. They tested this hypothesis
by replicating the above conditions with a twist: The fairness judgments were made under cognitive load, which
made reasoning close to impossible. This had the predicted result: Without the opportunity to reason, the
ratings were identical and showed no hint of hypocrisy.
This experiment is just one illustration of a more general
phenomenon. Reasoning is often used to find justifications
for performing actions that are otherwise felt to be unfair
or immoral (Bandura 1990; Bandura et al. 1996; Bersoff
1999; Crandall & Eshleman 2003; Dana et al. 2007; Diekmann et al. 1997; Haidt 2001; Mazar et al. 2008; Moore
et al. 2008; Snyder et al. 1979; for children, see Gummerum et al. 2008). Such uses of reasoning can have
dire consequences. Perpetrators of crimes will be
tempted to “blame the victim” or find other excuses to
mitigate the effects of violating their moral intuitions
(Ryan 1971; for a review, see Hafer & Begue 2005),
which can in turn make it easier to commit new crimes
(Baumeister 1997). This view of reasoning dovetails with
recent theories of moral reasoning that see it mostly as a
tool for communication and persuasion (Gibbard 1990;
Haidt 2001; Haidt & Bjorklund 2007).
These results raise a problem for the classical view of
reasoning. In all these cases, reasoning does not lead to
more accurate beliefs about an object, to better estimates
of the correctness of one’s answer, or to superior moral
judgments. Instead, by looking only for supporting arguments, reasoning strengthens people’s opinions, distorts
their estimates, and allows them to get away with violations
of their own moral intuitions. In these cases, epistemic or
moral goals are not well served by reasoning. By contrast,
argumentative goals are: People are better able to support
their positions or to justify their moral judgments.
5. Proactive reasoning in decision making
In the previous section, we argued that much reasoning is
done in anticipation of situations where an opinion might
have to be defended, and we suggested that work on
motivated reasoning can be fruitfully reinterpreted in
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this light. It is not just opinions that may have to be
defended: People may also have to put forward arguments
to defend their decisions and actions, and they may reason
proactively to that end. We want to argue that this is the
main role of reasoning in decision making. This claim
stands in sharp contrast to the classical view that reasoning
about possible options and weighing up their pros and
cons is the most reliable way – if not the only reliable
way – to arrive at sound decisions (Janis & Mann 1977;
Kahneman 2003; Simon 1955). This classical view has in
any case been vigorously challenged in much recent
research. Some argue that the best decisions are based
on intuition and made in split seconds (e.g., see Klein
1998), a view rendered popular by Gladwell (2005).
Others maintain that the solution lies with the unconscious
and advise us to “sleep on it” (Claxton 1997; Dijksterhuis
2004; Dijksterhuis & van Olden 2006; Dijksterhuis et al.
2006b). We briefly review these challenges to the classical
view before considering the substantial literature on
reason-based choice and interpreting it in the light of
the argumentative theory of reasoning.

5.1. To what extent does reasoning help in deciding?

In an initial series of studies, Wilson and his colleagues
looked at the effect of reasoning on the consistency
between attitudes and behavior (for review, see Wilson
et al. 1989a; see also Koole et al. 2001; Millar & Tesser
1989; Sengupta & Fitzsimons 2000; 2004; Wilson &
LaFleur 1995; Wilson et al. 1984; 1989b). The basic paradigm is as follows: Participants are asked to state their attitude to a given object. In one condition, they have to
provide reasons for these attitudes. It has been consistently
observed that attitudes based on reasons were much less
predictive of future behaviors (and often not predictive at
all) than were attitudes stated without recourse to reasons.
This lack of correlation between attitude and behavior
resulting from too much reasoning can even lead participants to form intransitive preferences (Lee et al. 2008).
Using similar paradigms in which some participants are
asked for reasons, it was found that providing reasons led
participants to choose items that they were later less satisfied
with (Wilson et al. 1993) or that were less in line with the
ratings of experts (McMackin & Slovic 2000; Wilson &
Schooler 1991). Participants got worse at predicting the
results of basketball games (Halberstadt & Levine 1999).
People who think too much are also less likely to understand
other people’s behavior (Albrechtsen et al. 2009; Ambady &
Gray 2002; Ambady et al. 2000). This stream of experiments
was later followed up by Dijksterhuis and his colleagues,
who introduced a modified paradigm. Here, participants
are given lists of features describing different items (such
as flats and cars) designed in such a way that some items
have more positive features. In the baseline condition, participants had to say which item they preferred immediately
after they had been exposed to these features. In the conscious thought condition, they were left to think about the
items for a few minutes. Finally, in the unconscious
thought condition, participants spent the same amount of
time doing a distraction task. Across several experiments,
it was found that the best performance was obtained in
this last condition: Unconscious thought was superior to
conscious thought (and to immediate decision) (Dijksterhuis

2004; Dijksterhuis & van Olden 2006; Dijksterhuis et al.
2006b; 2009).
However, some of Dijksterhuis’s results have proven
hard to replicate (Acker 2008; Newell et al. 2009; Thorsteinson & Withrow 2009), and alternative interpretations have
been proposed in some cases (Lassiter et al. 2009). In a
meta-analysis of this literature, Acker (2008) observed
that in only a few experiments was unconscious thought significantly superior to conscious thought, amounting to a null
result when all the experiments were taken into account.
Even so, there was no significant advantage of conscious
thought over immediate choice. This is typically the kind
of situation where, according to classical theories, reasoning
should help: A new choice has to be made, with the options
well delimited and the pros and cons exposed. It is therefore
quite striking that reasoning (at least for a few minutes) does
not bring any advantage and is sometimes inferior to intuitive, unconscious processes. Finally, studies of decision
making in natural environments converge on similar conclusions: Not only are most decisions made intuitively, but
when conscious decision-making strategies are used, they
often result in poor outcomes (Klein 1998). In the next subsection, we explore a framework designed to explain such
findings by showing that reasoning pushes people not
towards the best decisions but towards decisions that are
easier to justify.
5.2. Reason-based choice

Starting in the late 1980s, a group of leading researchers in
decision making developed the framework of reason-based
choice (for an early review, see Shafir et al. 1993). According
to this theory, people often make decisions because they
can find reasons to support them. These reasons will not
favor the best decisions or decisions that satisfy some criterion of rationality, but decisions that can be easily justified
and are less at risk of being criticized. According to the
argumentative theory, this is what should happen when
people are faced with decisions where they only have
weak intuitions. In this case, reasoning can be used to tip
the scales in favor of the choice for which reasons are
most easily available. One will then at least be able to
defend the decision if its outcome proves unsatisfactory.
Reason-based choice is well illustrated in a landmark
article by Simonson (1989) in which he studied, in particular, the attraction effect (Huber et al. 1982; for a cross-cultural variation, see Briley et al. 2000). The attraction effect
occurs when, given a set of two equally valuable alternatives, a third alternative is added that is just as good as
another one of the first alternatives on one trait but
inferior on the second trait. This addition tends to increase
the rate of choice of the dominating option in a manner not
warranted by rational models. Here is one example used in
Simonson’s experiments. Participants had to choose
between packs of beer that varied along the two dimensions of price and quality. Beer A was of lower quality
than beer B but was also cheaper, and the two attributes
balanced in such a way that both beers were regularly
chosen in a direct comparison. However, some participants had to choose between these two beers plus beer
C, which was more expensive than beer B but not
better. When this beer was introduced, participants
tended to pick beer B more often. It is easy to account
for this finding within the framework of reason-based
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choice: The poorer alternative makes the choice of the
dominating one easy to justify. (“Beer B is of the same
quality as but cheaper than this other beer!”) To confirm
this intuition, Simonson made and tested the three following predictions: (1) a choice based on reasons should be
reinforced when participants have to justify themselves,
(2) a choice based on reasons will be perceived as easier
to justify and less likely to be criticized, and (3) a choice
based on reasons should give rise to more elaborate explanations. The results of three experiments supported these
predictions. Moreover, these results also showed that participants who made choices based on reasons tended to
make choices that fitted less well with their own preferences as stated before the choice was made. Finally,
another set of experiments demonstrated that, when participants were able to use their intuitions more, because
they were familiar with the alternatives or because the
descriptions of these alternatives were more detailed,
they were less prone to the attraction effect (Ratneshwar
et al. 1987). Several well-known challenges to the view
of humans as making rational decisions thanks to their
reasoning abilities have been, or can be, reinterpreted as
cases of reason-based choice.
5.3. What reason-based choice can explain
5.3.1. Disjunction effect. The sure-thing principle
(Savage 1954) states that, when someone favors A over B
if event E happens and keeps the same preference ordering if E does not happen, then her choices should not be
influenced by any uncertainty about the occurrence of
E. Shafir and Tversky (1992; Tversky & Shafir 1992)
have recorded several violations of this principle. For
instance, we can compare the reaction of participants to
the following problems (Tversky & Shafir 1992):
Win/lose versions
Imagine that you have just played a game of chance that gave
you a 50% chance to win $200 and a 50% chance to lose $100.
The coin was tossed and you have either won $200 or lost $100.
You are now offered a second identical gamble: 50% chance to
win $200 and 50% chance to lose $100. Would you?: (a) accept
the second gamble. (b) reject the second gamble. (Tversky &
Shafir 1992, p. 306)

Whether they have won or lost in the first gamble, a
majority of participants accept the second gamble.
However, they are likely to do so for different reasons:
In the win scenario, they reason that they can easily risk
losing half of the $200 they have just won. In the lose scenario, however, they might take the second gamble as an
opportunity to make up for their previous loss. In these
two cases, while the choice is the same, the reasons for
making it are incompatible. Thus, when participants do
not know what is going to be the outcome of the first
bet, they have more trouble justifying the decision to
accept the second gamble: The reasons seem to contradict
each other. As a result, a majority of participants who do
not know the result of the first gamble reject the second
gamble even though they would have accepted it whatever
the result of the first gamble. The authors tested this explanation further by devising a comparison that had the same
properties as the one just described, except that the
reasons for making the “accept” decision were the same
irrespective of the outcome of the first gamble. In this
case, participants made exactly the same choices
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whether or not they knew the result of the first gamble
(for a similar experiment with a variant of the prisoner’s
dilemma, see Croson 1999).
5.3.2. Sunk-cost fallacy. The sunk-cost fallacy is the
“greater tendency to continue an endeavor once an investment in money, effort, or time has been made” (Arkes &
Blumer 1985, p. 124). A well-known real-life example is
that of the Concorde: The British and French governments decided to keep paying for a plane that they knew
would never turn a profit. Arkes and Ayton (1999) have
argued that such mistakes result from an unsatisfactory
use of explicit reasons such as “do not waste.” We will
briefly review the evidence they presented, and add more.
First of all, Arkes and Ayton (1999) contrast the robust
sunk-cost effects observed in humans (Arkes & Blumer
1985; Garland 1990; Staw 1981) with the absence of
such mistakes among animals.12 They also point out that
children do not seem prone to this error (for more
recent, convergent evidence, see Klaczynski & Cottrell
2004; Morsanyi & Handley 2008). If reasoning were not
the cause of this phenomenon but the cure for it, the opposite would be expected. Finally, some experiments have
varied the availability of justifications – a factor that
should not be relevant for standard models of decision
making. Thus, when participants can justify the waste,
they are less likely to be trapped by sunk costs (Soman
& Cheema 2001). By contrast, when participants find it
harder to justify changing their course of actions, they
are more likely to commit the fallacy (Bragger et al.
1998; 2003).
5.3.3. Framing. Framing effects occur when people give

different answers to structurally similar problems depending
on their wording – their “frame” (Tversky & Kahneman
1981). Our intuitions are generally blamed for these
effects (Kahneman 2003). Another explanation that can be
seen as either complementary or alternative to this one is
that different frames make some reasons more or less available, thus modifying the way reasoning affects our decisions.
Several results support this interpretation (see McKenzie
2004; McKenzie & Nelson 2003). First, as mentioned
earlier, participants who reason more about the tasks are
more influenced by framing effects (Igou & Bless 2007).
Second, when groups make decisions on framed problems,
the groups tend to converge on the answer that is supported
by the strongest reasons (McGuire et al. 1987; Milch et al.
2009; Paese et al. 1993). If the participants’ answers were
truly based on their intuitions, the answer proposed by the
group would tend to be the mean of these different intuitions (Allport 1924; Farnsworth & Behner 1931). Instead,
these findings have to be explained within the framework
of the Persuasive Argument Theory (Vinokur 1971;
Vinokur & Burnstein 1978), showing that the decisions are
based on reasons.
5.3.4. Preference inversion. The ability to evaluate pre-

ferences correctly is necessary for economic models of
decision making, but preferences can vary dramatically
depending on the way they are measured. Someone may
rate A higher than B and still choose B over A (Bazerman
et al. 1992; Irwin et al. 1993; Kahneman & Ritov 1994;
Slovic 1975; Tversky et al. 1988). For example, the relative
rating of two objects can vary or even be reversed,
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depending on whether they are rated separately or jointly
(Hsee 1996b; 1998; Hsee et al. 1999). Thus, when the following two objects are presented in isolation – a music
dictionary with 10,000 entries that is “like new,” and one
with 20,000 entries and a torn cover – people rate the
one with 10,000 entries more highly. However, when
people have to choose between the two, they favor the
one that has more entries, despite the torn cover (Hsee
1996b). Such effects fit perfectly in the current framework:
People choose an alternative because they can provide “a
compelling argument for choice that can be used to justify
the decision to oneself as well as to others” (Tversky et al.
1988, p. 372). In the foregoing example, people lack
reliable intuitions – they cannot tell how many entries a
good music dictionary should have. Lacking such intuitions, they fall back on reasoning and let their judgments
be guided by ease of justification – in this case, the condition of the dictionary that easily justifies a high or low
price. On the other hand, dimensions with numerical
values will often provide compelling justifications when
options are presented jointly. This bias can lead to suboptimal decisions (Hsee & Zhang 2004).
More generally, “decision-makers have a tendency to
resist affective influence, and to rely on rationalistic attributes to make their decisions” (Hsee et al. 2003, p. 16;
see also Okada 2005). Indeed, rationalistic attributes
make for easy justifications. For instance, in one experiment, participants had either to choose between the following two options or to rate them: A roach-shaped
chocolate weighing 2 ounces and worth 2 dollars, and a
heart-shaped chocolate weighing half an ounce and
worth 50 cents (Hsee 1999). A majority (68%) of participants chose the roach-shaped chocolate, even though
more than half (54%) thought they would enjoy the
other more. The participants who chose the bigger,
roach-shaped chocolate did so because the feeling of
disgust, being “irrational,” was hard to justify, especially
compared with the difference in price and size.
However, in the light of the results from the psychology
of disgust (e.g., Rozin et al. 1986), we can tell that their
choice was certainly the wrong one.
5.3.5. Other inappropriate uses of reasons. Many other

inappropriate uses of reasons have been empirically demonstrated. Investors’ decisions are guided by reasons that seem
good but are unrelated to real performance (Barber et al.
2003). People will use a rule such as “more variety is
better” or “don’t pick the same things as others” to guide
their decisions, even when less variety or more conformity
would actually be more in line with their preferences
(Ariely & Levav 2000; Berger & Heath 2007; Simonson
1990). Use of a rule such as “don’t pay for delays” will lead
to behaviors that go against one’s own interest (Amir &
Ariely 2003). When forecasting their affective states,
people rely on explicit lay theories (Igou 2004), which will
often lead them astray (Hsee & Hastie 2006). Because “it’s
better to keep options open,” people will be reluctant to
make an unalterable decision even when they would be
better off making it (Gilbert & Ebert 2002). When indulging
in a hedonic act, people feel they need a reason for such
indulgence, even though this does not actually change the
quality of the experience (Xu & Schwarz 2009). Reasonbased choice has also been used to explain effects related
to loss aversion (Simonson & Nowlis 2000), the effect of

attribute balance (Chernev 2005), the tendency to be overwhelmed by too much choice (Scheibehenne et al. 2009;
Sela et al. 2009), the feature creep effect (Thompson et al.
2005a), the endowment effect (Johnson et al. 2007),
aspects of time discounting (Weber et al. 2007), and
several other departures from the norms of rationality
(Shafir et al. 1993).
Another sign that reason-based choice can lead to nonnormative outcomes is that sometimes reasons that are not
relevant to the decision will nonetheless play a role. For
instance, the same irrelevant attribute will sometimes be
used as a reason for choosing an item (Carpenter et al.
1994) and sometimes as a reason for rejecting it (Simonson
et al. 1993; 1994), depending on what decision it makes
easier to justify (Brown & Carpenter 2000). People will
also be influenced by irrelevant pieces of information
because they find it hard to justify ignoring them
(Tetlock & Boettger 1989; Tetlock et al. 1996).
All of these experiments demonstrate cognitively
unsound uses of reasoning. There are two ways to explain
these findings. One could argue that these are instances
of a mechanism designed for individual cognition, and in
particular for decision making, that sometimes gets
misused. According to the argumentative theory, however,
the function of reasoning is primarily social: In particular,
it allows people to anticipate the need to justify their
decisions to others. This predicts that the use of reasoning
in decision making should increase the more likely one is
to have to justify oneself. This prediction has been borne
out by experiments showing that people will rely more on
reasons when they know that their decisions will later be
made public (Thompson & Norton 2008) or when they
are giving advice (in which case one has to be able to
justify oneself [see Kray & Gonzalez 1999]). By contrast,
when they are choosing for others rather than for themselves, they are less prone to these effects because there
is then less need for a utilitarian, justifiable decision (Hamilton & Thompson 2007). Finally, it should be stressed that
the picture of reasoning painted in these studies may be
overly bleak: Demonstrations that reasoning leads to
errors are much more publishable than reports of its successes (Christensen-Szalanski & Beach 1984). Indeed, in
most cases, reasoning is likely to drive us toward good
decisions. This, we would suggest, is mostly because
better decisions tend to be easier to justify. The reasons
we use to justify our decisions have often been transmitted
culturally and are likely to point in the right direction – as
when people justify their avoidance of sunk-cost mistakes
by using the rule they have learned in class (Simonson &
Nye 1992). In such cases, the predictions of the argumentative theory coincide with those of more classical theories.
However, what the results just reviewed show is that,
when a more easily justifiable decision is not a good one,
reasoning still drives us in the direction of ease of justification. Even if they are rare, such cases are crucial to comparing the present theory (reasoning drives us to justifiable
decisions) with more classical ones (reasoning drives us to
good decisions).
6. Conclusion: Reasoning and rationality
Reasoning contributes to the effectiveness and reliability
of communication by enabling communicators to argue
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for their claim and by enabling addressees to assess
these arguments. It thus increases both in quantity and
in epistemic quality the information humans are able to
share.
We view the evolution of reasoning as linked to that of
human communication. Reasoning, we have argued,
enables communicators to produce arguments to convince
addressees who would not accept what they say on trust; it
enables addressees to evaluate the soundness of these
arguments and to accept valuable information that they
would be suspicious of otherwise. Thus, thanks to reasoning, human communication is made more reliable and
more potent. From the hypothesis that the main function
of reasoning is argumentative, we derived a number of
predictions that, we tried to show, are confirmed by existing evidence. True, most of these predictions can be
derived from other theories. We would argue, however,
that the argumentative hypothesis provides a more principled explanation of the empirical evidence (in the case
of the confirmation bias, for instance). In our discussion
of motivated reasoning and of reason-based choice, not
only did we converge in our prediction with existing theories, but we also extensively borrowed from them. Even
in these cases, however, we would argue that our approach
has the distinctive advantage of providing clear answers to
the why-questions: Why do humans have a confirmation
bias? Why do they engage in motivated reasoning? Why
do they base their decisions on the availability of justificatory reasons? Moreover, the argumentative theory of
reasoning offers a unique integrative perspective: It
explains wide swaths of the psychological literature
within a single overarching framework.
Some of the evidence reviewed here shows not only that
reasoning falls short of delivering rational beliefs and
rational decisions reliably, but also that, in a variety of
cases, it may even be detrimental to rationality. Reasoning
can lead to poor outcomes not because humans are bad at
it but because they systematically look for arguments to
justify their beliefs or their actions. The argumentative
theory, however, puts such well-known demonstrations
of “irrationality” in a novel perspective. Human reasoning
is not a profoundly flawed general mechanism; it is a
remarkably efficient specialized device adapted to a
certain type of social and cognitive interaction at which
it excels.
Even from a strictly epistemic perspective, the argumentative theory of reasoning does not paint a wholly disheartening picture. It maintains that there is an asymmetry
between the production of arguments, which involves an
intrinsic bias in favor of the opinions or decisions of the
arguer whether they are sound or not, and the evaluation
of arguments, which aims at distinguishing good arguments from bad ones and hence genuine information
from misinformation. This asymmetry is often obscured
in a debate situation (or in a situation where a debate is
anticipated). People who have an opinion to defend
don’t really evaluate the arguments of their interlocutors
in a search for genuine information but rather consider
them from the start as counterarguments to be rebutted.
Still, as shown by the evidence reviewed in section 2,
people are good at assessing arguments and are quite
able to do so in an unbiased way, provided they have no
particular axe to grind. In group reasoning experiments
where participants share an interest in discovering the
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right answer, it has been shown that truth wins (Laughlin
& Ellis 1986; Moshman & Geil 1998). While participants
in collective experimental tasks typically produce arguments in favor of a variety of hypotheses, most or even
all of which are false, they concur in recognizing sound
arguments. Since these tasks have a demonstrably valid
solution, truth does indeed win. If we generalize to problems that do not have a provable solution, we should at
least expect good arguments to win, even if this is not
always sufficient for truth to win (and, in sect. 2, we have
reviewed evidence that this is indeed the case). This may
sound trivial, but it is not. It demonstrates that, contrary
to common bleak assessments of human reasoning abilities, people are quite capable of reasoning in an unbiased
manner, at least when they are evaluating arguments
rather than producing them, and when they are after the
truth rather than trying to win a debate.
Couldn’t the same type of situation that favors sound
evaluation favor comparable soundness in the production
of arguments? Note, first, that situations where a shared
interest in truth leads participants in a group task to evaluate arguments correctly are not enough to make them
produce correct arguments. In these group tasks, individual participants come up with and propose to the group
the same inappropriate answers that they come up with
in individual testing. The group success is due to, first
and foremost, the filtering of a variety of solutions,
achieved through evaluation. When different answers are
initially proposed and all of them are incorrect, then all
of them are likely to be rejected, and wholly or partly
new hypotheses are likely to be proposed and filtered in
turn, thus explaining how groups may do better than any
of their individual members.
Individuals thinking on their own without benefiting
from the input of others can assess only their own hypotheses, but in doing so, they are both judge and party, or
rather judge and advocate, and this is not an optimal
stance for pursuing the truth. Wouldn’t it be possible, in
principle, for an individual to decide to generate a
variety of hypotheses in answer to some question and
then evaluate them one by one, on the model of Sherlock
Holmes? What makes Holmes such a fascinating character
is precisely his preternatural turn of mind operating in a
world rigged by Conan Doyle, where what should be
inductive problems in fact have deductive solutions.
More realistically, individuals may develop some limited
ability to distance themselves from their own opinion, to
consider alternatives and thereby become more objective.
Presumably this is what the 10% or so of people who pass
the standard Wason selection task do. But this is an
acquired skill and involves exercising some imperfect
control over a natural disposition that spontaneously
pulls in a different direction.
Here, one might be tempted to point out that, after all,
reasoning is responsible for some of the greatest achievements of human thought in the epistemic and moral
domains. This is undeniably true, but the achievements
involved are all collective and result from interactions
over many generations (on the importance of social interactions for creativity, including scientific creativity, see
Csikszentmihalyi & Sawyer 1995; Dunbar 1997; JohnSteiner 2000; Okada & Simon 1997). The whole scientific
enterprise has always been structured around groups,
from the Lincean Academy down to the Large Hadron
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Collider. In the moral domain, moral achievements such
as the abolition of slavery are the outcome of intense
public arguments. We have pointed out that, in group settings, reasoning biases can become a positive force and
contribute to a kind of division of cognitive labor. Still,
to excel in such groups, it may be necessary to anticipate
how one’s own arguments might be evaluated by others
and to adjust these arguments accordingly. Showing
one’s ability to anticipate objections may be a valuable culturally acquired skill, as in medieval disputationes (see
Novaes 2005). By anticipating objections, one may even
be able to recognize flaws in one’s own hypotheses and
go on to revise them. We have suggested that this
depends on a painstakingly acquired ability to exert
some limited control over one’s own biases. Even among
scientists, this ability may be uncommon, but those who
have it may have a great influence on the development
of scientific ideas. It would be a mistake, however, to
treat their highly visible, almost freakish, contributions
as paradigmatic examples of human reasoning. In most
discussions, rather than looking for flaws in our own arguments, it is easier to let the other person find them and
only then adjust our arguments, if necessary.
In general, one should be cautious about using the striking accomplishments of reasoning as proof of its overall
efficiency, since its failures are often much less visible
(see Ormerod 2005; Taleb 2007). Epistemic success may
depend to a significant extent on what philosophers have
dubbed epistemic luck (Pritchard 2005); that is, chance
factors that happen to put one on the right track. When
one happens to be on the right track and “more right”
than one could initially have guessed, some of the distorting effects of motivated reasoning and polarization may
turn into blessings. For instance, motivated reasoning
may have pushed Darwin to focus obsessively on the
idea of natural selection and explore all possible supporting arguments and consequences. But, for one Darwin,
how many Paleys?
To conclude, we note that the argumentative theory of
reasoning should be congenial to those of us who enjoy
spending endless hours debating ideas – but this, of
course, is not an argument for (or against) the theory.
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NOTES
1. Recently, reasoning has been used simply as a synonym of
inference and is then unproblematically attributed to infants
(Spelke & Kinzler 2007) or to nonhuman animals (Blaisdell
et al. 2006). In this article, however, we use “reasoning” in its
more common and narrower sense. The content of the article
should make it clear why we see this as a principled terminological choice.
2. Our functional hypothesis will be tested without reference
to specific mechanisms (as is common in evolutionary biology).
Even if one can ask to what extent attributing an argumentative
function to reasoning suggests or favors a specific algorithmic

account, this will not be the focus of this article. There is, in
any case, no obvious clash between our functional account and
various algorithmic accounts that have been offered, for instance,
by Evans (2007), Johnson-Laird (2006), or Rips (1994).
3. In the psychology of reasoning, some tasks can be described
as production tasks because participants have to produce a logically valid conclusion from a set of premises. However, these
tasks are very different from the production of arguments in a
debate. In a dialogic context, one starts from the conclusion
and tries to find premises that will convince one’s interlocutor.
It is this meaning of production that is relevant here.
4. It should be noted that this spotty record may be partly
explained by very artificial conditions: In the vast majority of
group experiments, participants are asked to interact with
people they don’t know and will never meet again, and to
perform tasks that have no bearing on their lives outside the laboratory. When any of these factors is made more natural, performance improves. Debates about political matters between
laypeople often lead to epistemic improvement (Landemore, in
press; Mercier & Landemore, in press). Groups that are used
to working together are much more efficient (Michaelsen et al.
1989). And collaborative learning is hugely successful in schools
(Slavin 1995).
5. Other, slightly weaker results are obtained for inductive
tasks (Laughlin et al. 1991; 2002; 2003; 2006). Debates are also
a well-known way of improving comprehension in many
domains (e.g., see Anderson et al. 1996; 2001; Foot et al. 1994;
Howe 1990; Johnson & Johnson 2007; 2009; Lao & Kuhn
2002; Nussbaum 2008; Nussbaum & Sinatra 2003; Slavin 1995;
Smith et al. 2009; Tolmie et al. 1993; van Boxtel et al. 2000;
Webb & Palinscar 1996).
6. Incidentally, another advantage of the theory suggested
here is that it makes testable predictions about the contexts
that should motivate the use of reasoning; namely, contexts in
which real or anticipated argumentation takes place. This contrasts with standard dual-process theories, which do not have a
principled and testable way of predicting when system 2 reasoning should be triggered.
7. It may be worth mentioning that what general motivation
fails to bring about is efficient or unbiased reasoning rather
than reasoning per se. If you pay people to get the right answer
in, say, the Wason selection task, they may reason more but
will still be as biased, and their answer will still be wrong.
8. The Delphi technique is a method of forecasting that can
be seen as trying to make the best of the confirmation bias by
having different experts critique one another’s predictions and
justify their own predictions. Its effectiveness shows that, in an
appropriate context, the confirmation bias can be conducive to
very good performance (Green et al. 2007; Keeney et al. 2001;
Powell 2003; Rowe & Wright 1999; Tichy 2004).
9. Note that motivated, or motivation, as used here do not
refer to conscious motivation based on reasons, as in “I’m
going to think of arguments supporting this opinion of mine in
case someone questions me later.” Instead, it refers to processes
that influence either the direction or the triggering of reasoning
in a mostly unconscious manner. Even though a lawyer, for
instance, can consciously trigger reasoning and influence its
direction, this is the exception and not the rule. Generally,
people (including lawyers) have limited control over the triggering of reasoning or the direction it takes.
10. Attitude polarization is most likely to occur in individuals
who hold a very strong attitude with a high degree of confidence.
The problem is, then, that these individuals will tend to fall at one
end of the attitude scale before reading the arguments, which
makes it close to impossible to detect any movement towards a
more extreme attitude. This can explain, at least in part, the
failed replications of Kuhn and Lao (1996) and Miller et al.
(1993).
11. Incidentally, this does not explain all forms of belief perseverance: Other mechanisms may be involved in some instances
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(e.g., see Anderson et al. 1980), but the availability of arguments
supporting the discredited belief may still be crucial (see Anderson et al. 1985).
12. It has been shown that pigeons fall prey to the fallacy
but only when no indication was given that they were in such
a situation (Navarro & Fantino 2005). The instructions
received by human participants always make this point clear,
so these experiments confirm the point made by Arkes and
Ayton (1999).
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Abstract: Our recent work suggests that (1) the purpose of human
conscious thought is participation in social and cultural groups, and (2)
logical reasoning depends on conscious thought. These mesh well with
the argument theory of reasoning. In broader context, the distinctively
human traits are adaptations for culture and inner processes serve
interpersonal functions.

A long tradition has regarded human thinking as a solitary, if not
solipsistic, exercise aimed at facilitating behavior. This has privileged the assumption that reasoning is mainly for enabling individuals to seek the truth. Mercier and Sperber (M&S) have
instead invoked an interpersonal dimension: Reasoning is for
arguing.
The idea M&S advance dovetails nicely with our own work,
which has endorsed the view that uniquely human forms of cognition serve interpersonal functions. One such function is the use
and accumulation of accurate knowledge in culture. To be sure,
to say that reasoning is for arguing does not mean reasoning is
irrelevant to seeking the truth, but people seek the truth collectively, not individually. Humans are cultural animals, which
means they use cultural systems as their strategy for improving
survival and reproduction (e.g., Baumeister 2005). Hence the
distinctively human traits, such as the capacity for reason, are
mainly for creating culture, sustaining it, and participating in it.
Culture accumulates knowledge across time, and huge swathes
of knowledge – from cooking and farming to mathematics,
science, and technology – can be mastered only by having
many individuals build on one another’s advances across generations. Arguing is a vital means by which a cultural group
builds its stock of knowledge. Even scientists, in principle the
most inveterate truth seekers, have been known to argue, and
indeed much of the process of science is conducted as arguing
with and about evidence. Individuals who are bred to argue
can thus combine to form groups that collectively accumulate
increasingly accurate knowledge. Meanwhile, hominids born
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with less capacity to argue would fail to participate fully in
culture, which may have reduced their ability to survive and
reproduce.
The notion that reasoning is for arguing fits nicely with another
argument we have endorsed, which is that human thought is for
sharing one’s thoughts and experiences with others. For more
than a century, psychology has regarded William James’s
famous conclusion that thinking is for doing as an unassailable
truism. Yet our own research has led us to entertain a rival
hypothesis, that much of thinking is for talking (see Baumeister
& Masicampo 2010). This applies particularly to conscious
thought, defined as the advanced human form of cognition that
differs from what most animals have.
Many investigators operationally define conscious thought as
those thoughts the person can report to others. Few, however,
seem to have heeded the implication that the purpose of conscious thought is precisely for enabling people to tell their
thoughts to one another.
The interpersonal bases of thinking are an exciting advance
and represent potentially a fundamental change in how the
field understands the goals and purposes of human thought,
especially conscious thought. There have been two overlapping
debates about consciousness in recent decades. One is whether
conscious thoughts have any causal influence on behavior.
A recent survey suggests a positive answer (Baumeister et al.
2011). The other, more difficult question is what value is
served by having thoughts be conscious. That is, could not
those same thoughts influence behavior just as effectively
without being conscious? It is difficult to make an evolutionary
or functional case for advantages of having thoughts inside the
individual mind be conscious. But it is easy to make the case
for the advantages of being able to communicate thoughts with
an organized group, which is what conscious thought enables.
Merely sharing thoughts is already helpful in terms of collective use of information, but M&S’s focus on arguing is a huge
boost and extension to this line of thinking. We wish we had
thought of it! Conscious thought enables people to talk to
others and thereby enables small groups to resolve differences.
By talking, people can resolve conflicts, influence one another,
converge on the truth (aided vitally by reasoning when there
are differences), and thereby function together more harmoniously and effectively than nonhuman groups. Nonhuman
animals, in contrast, have a have a relatively simple and unsophisticated language apparatus compared with humans. They resolve
conflicts through aggression instead of reconciliation, dominate
others instead of attempting to persuade one another, and rely
on what appears true in the present environment instead of
using logical reasoning to understand that things are not always
as they initially seem. Thus, M&S’s theory sheds light on what
has made human beings such a successful species in using
culture as an advanced form of social life to improve survival
and reproduction.
Consistent with that emphasis and with M&S’s article, we have
found that logical reasoning depends on conscious thought
(DeWall et al. 2008). These experiments showed that reasoning
improved as conscious processing was engaged, and reasoning
quickly deteriorated when conscious attention was preoccupied
elsewhere. In contrast, logical reasoning performance was unaffected by either preoccupying or engaging (priming) the unconscious processing system.
In short, we view M&S’s article as an important complement
to other work emphasizing human consciousness as serving
interpersonal and cultural functions. Conscious thought
enables both reasoning and advanced forms of communication,
including arguing. Human evolution was partly based on developing mental powers to enable group members to communicate information for group action, which is the foundation of
culture. Conscious logical reasoning and interpersonal
arguing are vital parts of that process and thus help to define
human nature.
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Abstract: Mercier and Sperber (M&S) argue that reasoning has evolved
primarily as an adjunct to persuasive communication rather than as a
basis for consequential choice. Recent research on decision-related
regret suggests that regret aversion and concomitant needs for
justification may underpin a complementary mechanism that can, if
appropriately deployed, convert M&S’s facile arguer into an effective
decision maker, with obvious evolutionary advantages.

Mercier and Sperber (M&S) make the provocative case that, in
evolutionary terms, reasoning is better seen as an adjunct to communication than as a guide to decision making. However, since
there are also evolutionary advantages to effective consequential
choice, broadly interpreted, what might this ability be based on?
We argue that emotional responses, specifically those associated
with regret aversion and justification, may serve such a role,
linking argument making of the sort described by M&S to consequential decision making.
In a continuing program of research, we have shown that regret
aversion can help in overcoming decision errors. Much of this
research draws on decision justification theory (Connolly & Zeelenberg 2002; Connolly et al. 1997), which distinguishes regret associated with a (comparatively) poor outcome (outcome regret) from
that associated with the judgment that the focal decision was
wrong or poorly made – that is, was “unjustified” (self-blame or
process regret). Efforts to avoid regret of this latter sort facilitates
improved decision processes (Reb & Connolly 2010), information
search (Reb 2008) and task learning (Reb & Connolly 2009).
It also appears to reduce or eliminate reason-based decision
errors, such as those discussed in M&S sections 5.2 and 5.3.
For example, Connolly et al. (2010) compared the effects of
external accountability and regret priming on the attraction (or
decoy) effect, in which an option is seen as more desirable
when it dominates an irrelevant decoy option. Replicating
earlier studies (Simonson & Nye 1992; Slaughter et al. 2006),
we showed that accountability (a demand to justify one’s choice
to others) exacerbated the attraction effect, consistent with
M&S’s argument. Regret priming, in contrast, with its demand
to justify one’s decision to oneself, eliminated the effect. It
seems that making regret salient may have led to a more balanced
use of reasoning whose goal was less to convince others and more
to arrive at a choice that satisfies one’s own values and standards.
Reb (2005) showed that regret priming also reduced or eliminated other “reason-based” effects such as the compromise effect
(Simonson 1989), in which an option is more desirable when presented as a compromise, and the accept/reject effect (Shafir &
Tversky 1992), in which the same option tends to be both
rejected and selected. In all these reason-based choice effects,
the justifying arguments do not withstand close scrutiny. They
are simply “shallow but nice-sounding rationales” (Simonson
1989, p. 170) that might serve to convince an uncritical external
audience but not one’s thoughtful self. In contrast, regret
priming did not reduce the most important attribute effect
(Slovic 1975) where the justifying argument can reasonably be
construed to both self and others as a legitimate tiebreaker
between equally valued options (Reb 2005).
Regret priming appears to involve both motivational and attention-directing effects, which are sometimes quite subtle. For
example, Reb and Connolly (2009) used unobtrusive priming of

either outcome or self-blame regret in a repeated decision task
where feedback on outcomes of unchosen options was offered.
Subjects primed for outcome regret rejected such feedback more
often, learned more slowly, and ultimately performed less well
than those primed for self-blame regret (thus falling victim to the
myopic regret aversion trap: avoiding short-term regret led them
to experience greater long-term regret). Both groups were motivated to avoid regret, but one did so by avoiding painful comparisons, the other by following a justifiable decision process.
In summary we find persuasive M&S’s case that reasoning is
primarily for persuasive argumentation rather than for effective
consequential choice. Given the evolutionary advantages of the
latter, however, it is plausible that other systems may have developed to support such choice processes. A growing body of evidence suggests that mechanisms of regret, regret avoidance,
and justification can serve such a decision-improving role.
Specifically, aversion of process regret may complement the
fluent argument maker and tweak it to pay more balanced attention to and weighing of the pros and cons associated with a
decision problem. Because of the anticipatory nature of regret,
attention may further be directed to future consequences that
are predicted to impact experienced regret. Mechanisms of
regret and justification thus suggest important linkages
between the argument-rich communicator sketched by M&S
and the purposive consequentialist demanded by rational
choice models of human decisions. We see such evidence as
dovetailing neatly with, and modestly extending, the findings
compiled in the target article. Perhaps ironically, as the central
role of reasoning in assuring good choices has come increasingly
into doubt in recent decision research, emotions, earlier seen as
an obstacle to effective decision making, are increasingly being
found to perform crucial functions in facilitating such decisions.
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Abstract: Mercier and Sperber (M&S) sketch a bleak picture of logical
reasoning in classic, nonargumentative tasks. I argue that recent
processing data indicate that despite people’s poor performance they at
least seek to adhere to traditional logical norms in these tasks. This
implies that classic reasoning tasks are less artificial – and logical
reasoning less exceptional – than M&S’s framework suggests.

Mercier and Sperber (M&S) argue that the notoriously bad
logical reasoning performance in classic reasoning and
decision-making tasks can be attributed to the lack of argumentative context or interaction in these tasks. They point out that
when the same problems are put in an argumentative context,
people have little trouble solving them. From this they conclude
that, except for a few “almost freakish” (sect. 6, para. 7) individuals, people will engage in a genuine logical reasoning process
only when arguing. Clearly, this seems to question the validity
of classic reasoning tasks: In these nonargumentative tasks,
people will typically not do what they do in the real (argumentative) world. This impression is further strengthened by M&S’s
claim that it would be a mistake to treat as paradigmatic examples
of human reasoning those few individuals who do exert control
over their biases and manage to solve the classic reasoning tasks.
I want to point out that although M&S nicely demonstrate that
providing an argumentative context can boost people’s logical
reasoning performance, this does not imply that people do not
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2
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already seek to reason logically in the absence of this context. It
should be stressed that M&S’s claims with respect to the poor
performance in classic reasoning tasks are typically based on traditional studies that focused merely on accuracy data (i.e., the
output of the reasoning process).
Recent studies that examined a wider range of processing
measures such as latency or brain-activation data (e.g., Bonner
& Newell 2010; De Neys et al. 2008) sketch a more optimistic
picture of people’s reasoning performance in the classic, nonargumentative tasks. These data suggest that although people
very often fail to select the correct logical response, they at
least seek to adhere to the logical norm. For example, although
people typically fail to solve classic reasoning problems in
which intuitive beliefs conflict with normative considerations,
latency studies indicate that people do take longer to respond
to these problems compared to problems in which the norms
are not being violated (e.g., Bonner & Newell 2010; De Neys
& Glumicic 2008). Problems in which cued intuitive beliefs conflict with logical considerations are also longer inspected and
better recalled (e.g., Ball et al. 2006; De Neys & Glumicic 2008).
Neuroscientific research further suggests that brain areas
involved in the detection of conflict between competing responses
are activated when people err and violate a logical norm (e.g., De
Neys et al. 2008; 2010). Clearly, if people were not at least engaged
in some elementary logical processing and tried to adhere to the
logical norm, it is hard to see why violating it would affect their
inference process. In addition, De Neys and Franssens (2009)
observed that after solving problems in which the intuitive believability and logical validity of a conclusion conflicted, reasoners
showed an impaired access to words that were associated with
the intuitive beliefs. Such an impaired memory access is considered a key marker of inhibitory processing. Even people who
were always biased by their beliefs showed a minimal impairment,
indicating that they had attempted to inhibit the intuitive beliefs
but failed to complete the process. Once again, if people were
not trying to adhere to the logical norm, there would be no
reason for them to block the conflicting belief-based response.
The crucial point is that these studies suggest that even without
an argumentative context people are already engaging in a logical
reasoning process. What the “freakish” individuals who give the
correct response seem to be better at is completing the inhibition
of conflicting intuitive heuristic responses (De Neys & Franssens
2009; Houdé et al. 2000). However, the important finding in the
studies cited is that all reasoners are at least engaging in this inhibition process and try to adhere to the logical norm. In that sense
we’re all freaks who seek logical truth when solving classic
reasoning tasks. The bottom line is that this indicates that the
standard tasks are less artificial – and logical reasoning in these
tasks less exceptional – than M&S’s framework might suggest.
In sum, M&S convincingly demonstrate that human reasoning
can benefit from an argumentative context. By pointing to recent
processing data, I tried to clarify that this does not necessarily
imply that people simply fail to engage in a logical reasoning
process in the absence of such a context. This should give
pause for thought before drawing strong negative conclusions
with respect to the validity of classic reasoning tasks or the illogical nature of people’s reasoning in these tasks.
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Abstract: The biological function of human reasoning abilities cannot be
to improve shared knowledge. This is at best a side effect. A more

76

BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2

plausible function of argumentation, and thus of reasoning, is to
advertise one’s ability to detect lies and errors. Such selfish behavior is
closer to what we should expect from a naturally selected competence.

I fully support the central claim by Mercier & Sperber’s (M&S)
that deliberative reasoning is a by-product of argumentative competence. But if the function of reasoning is argumentation, what
is the (biological) function of argumentation? According to
(M&S), argumentative reasoning improves “both in quantity
and in epistemic quality the information humans are able to
share” (sect. 1.2, para. 9) and, thanks to it, “human communication is made more reliable and more potent” (sect. 6, para. 2).
If the biological function of reasoning is to achieve shared
knowledge optimization (SKO), as suggested in the target
article, then why do people show obvious limitations such as confirmation bias? M&S answer that information quality is optimized, not at the individual level, but at the group level. It
would even be a good thing that individuals specialize on their
(probably erroneous) line of reasoning, as long as argument
exchange restores global information quality. The problem is
that natural selection does not operate at the collective level.
Shared knowledge belongs to the phenotype of no one.
How does the speaker benefit from uttering an argument? If
the purpose is to correct or update her own earlier beliefs, why
go public with it? And if it is to correct or update others’
beliefs, what’s her advantage? M&S’s explanation for the existence of deliberative reasoning does not escape the general evolutionary paradox of communication: If it benefits listeners only,
there should be no speakers; and if it benefits speakers only
(for example, by allowing manipulation), there should be no listeners. Invoking collective benefits does not offer an escape
route if we wish to remain on firm Darwinian ground.
To solve the paradox, we must depart from SKO. My proposal
(Dessalles 1998) is that humanlike reasoning started with logical
consistency checking (CC), and that humans used it as a lie detection (LD) device. As a response to the risk of appearing self-contradicting, the ability to restore consistency (RC) through
argumentation emerged. In this game, information quality is
not what is at stake. The point for individuals is to advertise
(AD) their ability to perform or resist LD. This advertisement behavior makes sense within a costly signaling model of human
communication (Dessalles 2007; 2008).
The main difference with M&S’s position comes from AD.
M&S are close to the CC/RC distinction when they speak of
evaluation vs. production (of arguments). They fail, however, to
see that these two faculties did not evolve for the sake of any
form of public knowledge, but as signals. Individuals who can
publicly signal lies or errors by naming inconsistencies (CC)
derive immediate social benefit (Dessalles 2007). Those who
publicly restore consistency (RC) gain social benefit, as well, or
regain their momentarily lost status.
Contrary to SKO, the competitive nature of AD explains why
reasoning is far from remaining a private activity: Argumentation
takes up the major part of the 16,000 words spoken daily, on
average (Mehl et al. 2007). Moreover, various observations by
M&S make more sense within AD rather than SKO, especially
the fact that people are better at finding inconsistencies in
others’ line of reasoning and at finding support for their own.
Another argument in favor of AD is the futility of many conversational topics, which makes no sense from an SKO perspective.
Yet another good example of the divergence between AD and
SKO is offered by the BBS commentary system: Commentators
are of course concerned by the overall quality of scientific knowledge, but most of them are even more motivated by the urge to
show their ability to point to some inconsistency in the target
article. SKO would perhaps hold if contributors accepted that
their names be omitted.
M&S strangely do not mention a fundamental common property between deliberative reasoning and argumentation. Both
processes seem to consist in a sequential alternation between
logical incompatibilities and attempts to resolve them. This
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property is concisely captured by the conflict-abduction-negation
procedure that describes argumentative processes (Dessalles
2008). The sequential nature of argumentative reasoning supports the central claim of the target article, but it is at odds
with any idea of knowledge optimization. Virtually all artificial
reasoning devices (from chess players to planning programs)
involve parallelism whenever possible (especially in mutioption
comparison). So-called truth-maintenance systems and argumentation systems make use of graph representations that are not
limited to sequential processing (e.g., Dung 1995). In comparison, human argumentative reasoning is skewed. It is bound to
start from a logical incompatibility, and then sequentially
creeps forward through recursive attempts to solve the current
incompatibility and then detect new ones. Such manifestly suboptimal procedure does not make sense if the aim is knowledge
optimization. It makes perfect sense, however, in the LD/AD
context.
The biological importance of informational capabilities is a
consequence of the particular political context of our species
(Dessalles 2007). In that context, information is not important
as such; it is rather an excuse to show off informational capabilities, such as being the first to point to unexpected events. In the
absence of a lie detection system, such communication is bound
to checkable, almost immediate, events. The advent of CC capabilities offered a new occasion for individuals to compete, by
allowing them to advertise their lie and error detection capabilities. This new competition has side effects, such as opening the
possibility of communicating about past events that cannot be
checked directly. Knowledge improvement also turns out to be
a side effect of reasoning and argumentation. When reasoning
and producing arguments, speakers follow a more selfish
agenda, which is to show off their competence for dealing with
anomalies in information.

Reasoning is for thinking, not just for arguing
doi:10.1017/S0140525X10002773
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Abstract: There is indeed extensive evidence that people perform fairly
poorly in reasoning tasks and that they often construct arguments for
intuitively cued responses. Mercier & Sperber (M&S) may also be right
to claim that reasoning evolved primarily as argumentation. However, if
it did, the facility became exapted to the function of supporting
uniquely human abilities for reflective thinking and consequential
decision making.

A number of claims are made in the target article that are difficult
to dispute. People do appear to be skilled at everyday argumentation while struggling to solve reasoning problems presented in
the psychological laboratory. There is a great deal of evidence in
the psychology of reasoning and decision making – as the
authors demonstrate with admirable scholarship – that people
frequently use reasoning to justify intuitively cued responses.
And of course it is much easier to argue that people evolved
skills of argumentation than the ability to solve reasoning problems. However, as is commonly observed by evolutionary theorists, a facility which evolves for one function may become
“exapted” for another. Hence, my only concern is that the
authors may have used their own formidable skills of argumentation to overstate the case against explicit reasoning as a tool for
rational thinking and decision making.
As Mercier and Sperber (M&S) note, their analysis has implications for the now ubiquitous dual-process theories of higher
cognition (Evans 2008). It is interesting to note that the very

first such theory in the psychology of reasoning was consistent
with the authors’ proposals. Wason and Evans (1975; Evans &
Wason 1976) distinguished between type 1 (intuitive) processes,
which unconsciously cued the relevance of certain cards on the
Wason selection task, and type 2 (explicit reasoning) processes,
which served to confabulate justifications for these choices.
Although it seems clear now that people do reason on the selection task, there is strong evidence that this is focused on finding
justifications for unconscious cued cards. However, where such a
justification cannot be found, recent evidence indicates that participants may withhold an intuitively prompted response (Evans
& Ball 2010). Hence, even in this case, reasoning is performing
some beneficial role in decision making.
M&S are also correct to say that in more recent years dualprocess theorists have emphasised the efficacy of type 2 processing in problem solving and decision making, especially for
novel problems (e.g., Evans 2010; Evans & Over 1996;
Kahneman & Frederick 2002; Stanovich 1999; 2010). In particular, theorists have emphasized the ability of some individuals,
especially those of higher cognitive ability, to engage in hypothetical thinking and mental simulation, decoupling their actual
beliefs in order to support suppositional reasoning (Evans
2007; Stanovich 2010). Such theorists attribute the unique cognitive and cultural achievements of the human species to the development of a second system of cognition or a new mind, largely
unavailable to other animals. Moreover, it is proposed that
while both new and old minds have instrumental rationality,
they pursue different goals by different cognitive mechanisms
(Evans 2010; Stanovich 2004). In particular, the old mind
(broadly shared with higher animals) is driven by the past, replicating by evolution or individual learning past successes, whereas
the new mind (distinctively human) can conduct mental simulations and reason consequentially, anticipating the future.
M&S deal with this issue rather dismissively, stating that “the
possibility to deal with novelty and to anticipate the future is less
a characterization of reasoning than it is of learning” (sect. 1.2,
para. 3), going on to argue that the occasional successes of reasoning in helping us to solve problems would be insufficient to explain
its evolution. It is possible to agree with the latter claim while
strongly disputing the former. First, the learning mechanisms of
the old mind do only enable us to repeat what has worked in the
past. For novel problems which require simulation of future
events, such a mechanism is largely useless. And while we are
admittedly fairly poor at consequential decision making (Baron
1994) we can do it. Since 1945, politicians have so far resisted
their traditional practice of applying their most powerful
weapons to their enemies when such weapons are nuclear, presumably because of the anticipated catastrophic consequences.
And while it is debatable whether the human race will in fact
avoid the disastrous effects of climate change, it could hardly be
denied that the world is currently engaged in detailed hypothetical
thinking (aided by computer models) about the future of the
planet, and that much current policy is being driven by this. No
other animal can even remotely think and act in this way.
M&S, as other evolutionary psychologists before them, assert
the domain-specific nature of human reasoning and apparently
overlook the importance of heritable general intelligence (for
detailed critique of such arguments, see Stanovich 2004; Stanovich & West 2003). Research on dual-process theory has provided a mass of evidence that the ability to solve novel
reasoning and decision problems is related to individual differences in general intelligence, working-memory capacity, and
other (highly correlated) measures of cognitive ability. Solving
novel problems is also related to rational thinking dispositions,
which help to determine (Stanovich 2009; 2010) the tendency
to engage reflective reasoning rather than rely on intuition (see
also Frederick 2005). Such findings fly in the face of fashionable
claims (e.g., Dijksterhuis et al. 2006b; Gigerenzer 2007; Gladwell
2005) that we are better off relying on intuition than engaging our
powers of reasoning.
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2
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The difficulty which such advocates of intuition have faced is to
explain why humans evolved a capacity for reasoning which is
best not trusted. M&S attempt to fill that gap in the target
article, thus supporting what I believe to be a dangerously
flawed line of reasoning about human intelligence. It is not
necessary to follow them down this path in order to respect the
integrity of their arguments about the evolution of reasoning
via argumentation. Unique human abilities for reflective
thought have required the evolution of a number of facilities,
including language, metarepresentation, and large forebrains,
none of which could plausibly have been driven by some Darwinian need for a new mind. If there were such a driver, surely
other animals would have evolved human-like intelligence. It is
more plausible to argue that the new mind was an evolutionary
accident, in which case an exapted ability for reasoning derived
from argumentation may well be part of that story.

“signature” that specifies how one set of sentences (e.g., propositions) is entailed by another set of sentences (e.g., a database
of propositions and rules). This is a typical inference signature:
Database
L
Conclusion

Inference

That is to say: Conclusion can be validly inferred from Database
under the axioms of inference system L.
Complex cognitive tasks like decision making and planning
require a more complex signature. To emulate human clinical
decision making, we sought a reasoning model in which general
medical knowledge is applied to specific patient data by arguing
the pros and cons of alternative ways of achieving clinical goals.
This is summarized by the following signature.
Knowledge < Data
LA
(Claim, Grounds, Qualifier)

Artificial cognitive systems: Where does
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Abstract: Mercier and Sperber (M&S) suggest that human reasoning is
reflective and has evolved to support social interaction. Cognitive agents
benefit from being able to reflect on their beliefs whether they are acting
alone or socially. A formal framework for argumentation that has emerged
from research on artificial cognitive systems that parallels M&S’s
proposals may shed light on mental processes that underpin social
interactions.

Mercier and Sperber (M&S) offer a provocative view of argumentation as reasoning for social purposes. Human reasoning,
they suggest, is not the same as classical inference in the sense
that in reasoning, the rationale for conclusions is available for
reflection and hence for communication and discussion. This is
an important distinction, but there are also grounds for believing
that reflective reasoning has general benefits for any cognitive
agent, not just for social interaction.
A domain in which these benefits are evident is reasoning and
decision making in medicine. I have a long-standing interest in
the cognitive mechanisms that support decision making and
other high-level cognitive processes that underpin human expertise, and argumentation has acquired a central role in our work.
Early approaches based on logical and probabilistic simulations
of cognitive processes yielded promising results (Fox 1980), but
extending either model to capture the flexible and adaptive character of human thinking proved difficult. Among the reasons for
this were that there was no representation of the rationale on
which to reflect – to question prior conclusions or the relevance
of evidence, for example.
Subsequent work has sought to address this. This research programme has focused on artificial intelligence (AI) rather than
psychology, so my comments should be taken as complementary
to the M&S hypothesis rather than directly addressing it.
However, I will suggest that a cognitive agent, whether human
or artificial, derives major benefits from being able to reflect on
its mental states; its goals, intentions, justifications for its
beliefs and so on (Das et al. 1997; Fox & Das 2000; Fox et al.
1990). Metacognitive capabilities confer flexibility and robustness whether an agent is acting alone or in concert with others.
Mercier and Sperber’s (M&S’s) distinction between inference,
which they call “intuitive,” and reasoning, which affords “reflection,” may perhaps be clarified by a formal perspective. A standard way of formalizing inference systems is to provide a
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In contrast to the atomic conclusion of the inference signature,
this formulation makes the structure of arguments explicit. In
LA, a Logic of Argument (Fox et al. 1993), the structure distinguishes three things: the Claim (a tentative conclusion),
Grounds (justification), and Qualifier (the confidence in the
Claim warranted by the argument. As in classical decision
theory, but not classical logic, collections of arguments can be
aggregated within the LA framework to yield an overall
measure of confidence in competing claims. For example, an
agent may have multiple lines of argument for and against competing diagnoses or treatments, each of which increases or
decreases overall confidence.
LA was developed for cognitive tasks like situation assessment,
decision making, and planning, which often involve uncertainty.
Uncertainty is modelled explicitly by means of the Qualifier and
therefore permits reflection. A qualifier may indicate that an
argument “supports” or “opposes” a claim, for example. In The
Uses of Argument the philosopher Stephen Toulmin has also
pointed out that people routinely use linguistic qualifiers such
as “presumably. . .,” “possibly. . .,” “probably. . .,” and their
lexical and affixal negative forms; linguistic qualifiers can be formalised as conditions for accepting claims based on collections of
arguments (Elvang-Goransson et al. 1993). Quantitative schemes
for expressing argument strength, such as Bayesian representations (e.g., Oaksford & Chater [2009] discussion in BBS
vol. 32) can also be accommodated within the framework (Fox
2003; Fox et al. 1993).
It is a truism that the more supporting (opposing) arguments
there are for a claim, the more (less) confidence we should
have in it, which we have called the evidential mode (Fox, in
press). Another mode, dialectical argumentation, exploits the
observation that discussion and debate also commonly involves
“attacks” which rebut or undercut the arguments of other
agents. Researchers in AI and computational logic are giving substantial attention to argumentation for modelling interactions and
dialogues between cognitive agents (Besnard & Hunter 2008).
Argumentation theory may therefore offer insights into the
kinds of social interactions that M&S are investigating.
Formal argumentation theory has practical applications. LA is
the foundation of PROforma, a language for modelling cognitive
agents (Fox & Das 2000; Fox et al. 2003); which has been used to
develop many practical decision tools, notably in medicine
(OpenClinical 2001– 2006). Argumentation theory may also
help to clarify the philosophical and theoretical nature of somewhat vague notions like evidence, as this term is commonly
used in legal, medical, scientific, and other kinds of reasoning
and in everyday decision-making and evidence-based discussions
(OpenClinical 2001– 2006).
These practical uses of argumentation theory do not directly
address M&S’s proposition that human cognition has evolved
to support argument-based reasoning, but the practical power
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of argumentation techniques seems to corroborate their belief
that there are good evolutionary reasons why humans argue. I
do not intend to make psychological claims or predictions
based on the specifics of LA, however. The logic was not developed as a descriptive model, and more recent argumentation
systems do not all comply with its signature. However the
general approach may offer a framework for articulating and
comparing psychological theories of inference and reasoning
and the cognitive processes that depend on them.
It appears that there are significant convergences between
M&S’s psychological proposals and developments in AI and computer science which have been driven by interests in artificial
cognitive systems. Argumentation is a new and versatile reasoning paradigm that is being studied in many different fields; it
may have wide implications for general theories of cognition.

Reasoning, argumentation, and cognition
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Abstract: This commentary does three things. First, it offers further
support for the view that explicit reasoning evolved for public
argumentation. Second, it suggests that promoting effective
communication may not be the only, or even the main, function of
public argumentation. Third, it argues that the data Mercier and
Sperber (M&S) cite are compatible with the view that reasoning has
subsequently been co-opted to play a role in individual cognition.

I agree with Mercier and Sperber (M&S) on the need for a dualprocess perspective that distinguishes intuitive inference and
explicit reasoning, and I find M&S’s case for the argumentative
theory of reasoning attractive. The theory is also a salutary corrective to the tendency of dual-process theorists to see explicit
(“type 2”) reasoning as unbiased and normatively correct. (Henceforth, I shall follow M&S in using “reasoning” for explicit
thought processes, as opposed to non-conscious intuitive
inferences.)
Here I shall add some brief, broadly sympathetic comments.
First, I want to outline a further reason for thinking that reasoning evolved for social, argumentative purposes. M&S claim that
reasoning is a personal-level activity, involving the construction
of complex arguments in response to intuitive beliefs about the
strength of the component steps. This view, which I have
myself defended in various places (e.g., Frankish 1998; 2004;
2009), requires that reasoners have intuitive-level knowledge of
rules of inference, such as modus ponens, which guides their
explicit reasoning. (Rules here includes rules of thumb; the arguments we construct need not be demonstrative; see Frankish
2004.) Now, there are two main forms these rules could take:
They could be abstract, defined over concepts and logical structures, or they could be linguistic, defined over the words and
structures of a natural language. (Rules of the latter kind can
be applied in constructing arguments, provided the arguments
are expressed linguistically, either overtly or in inner speech.)
They are far more likely to take the latter form, however,
especially in early human societies. Knowledge of linguistic
rules can be obtained relatively easily in the course of exposure
to, and engagement in, argument with one’s peers. (It might
even be purely procedural, embedded in routines for manipulating linguistic structures.) Knowledge of abstract rules, by contrast, would require explicit teaching, or at least abstraction
from previously acquired linguistic rules. (These considerations
are set out at more length in Frankish 1998 and 2004.) Note

that I am assuming here that the knowledge that guides explicit
argument construction is largely learned. The case for this is
strong; reasoning strategies are known to be responsive to
verbal instruction and to vary dramatically between individuals
(e.g., Stanovich 1999). Note, too, that this view is compatible
with M&S’s claim that there is a specialized intuitive mechanism
for representing arguments. It merely implies that the mechanism operates primarily on linguistic representations and that its
rule database is acquired.
If this is right, then it supports the view that the original function of reasoning was social and argumentative. For it suggests
that individual reasoning is an internalized version of overt argumentation, conducted in inner speech and guided by knowledge
acquired in the course of public argumentation. (There are other
reasons, too, for thinking that conscious reasoning is languageinvolving; see, e.g., Carruthers 1996 and 1998.) And this in
turn suggests that public argumentation predated individual
reasoning and that whatever adaptations we have for reasoning
originally evolved to serve the former. (We can tell a bootstrapping story about the origins of the knowledge that guides
public argumentation, involving a process of cultural evolution.)
Second, I want to say something about the function of public
argumentation. M&S argue that this is to make communication
more efficient and reliable. I agree that argumentation does
this, but it may not be its only, or even main, function. As the
data M&S cite make clear, group reasoning is often a strikingly
effective process of inquiry, which zeroes in on the correct solution. Reasoning may thus have evolved primarily for collective
cognition, if not for the individual variety. (It would not be surprising if evolution preferred collective cognitive mechanisms.
Early human societies would have depended heavily on collective
action and problem solving, whereas individual projects might
have disrupted group cohesion.) Argumentation may have
other important social functions, too. For example, displays of
argumentative prowess may serve to attract mates, providing evidence of health and mental acuity.
Third, while I agree that reasoning evolved to serve public
argumentation (and still does serve it), I suspect M&S underestimate the extent to which it has subsequently been co-opted to
play a role in individual cognition. For the demands of argumentation and individual cognition may not be as different as M&S
suppose. There are two points here. First, sound arguments
tend to be convincing and optimal decisions defensible, so an
argumentative mechanism will often deliver the same results a
cognitive mechanism would. Secondly, the biases natural to argumentation may also affect much individual reasoning. For this too
may often have a quasi-argumentative structure, with individuals
seeking to defend their attitudes and decisions against criticism
from their future selves.
I shall expand on the latter point. The idea is that, even as
private reasoners, we have other motives besides epistemic
ones. We often accept propositions for pragmatic reasons,
because we find them comforting, or because they are popular
with our peers. Moreover, we value psychological stability for
its own sake; we like to have a settled set of opinions (to know
our own minds) (Frankish 2004). We may therefore be inclined
to bolster our opinions with arguments, so that our future
selves will be able to resist counter-evidence and avoid distressing changes of mind. Thus, even in private we may tend to
display confirmation bias and motivated, proactive reasoning.
Something similar goes for decision making. Intentions serve to
coordinate future planning (e.g., Bratman 1987), and in many
cases it is better to form and stick with an intention, even if it
is not optimal, than to remain undecided or keep changing
one’s plans. Given this, people may tend to settle on decisions
they find easy to justify to themselves, and to buttress them
with arguments, so that they will not be tempted to revise
them later. Hence, they may still tend to exhibit reason-based
choice, even when they do not have an eye on the reactions of
their peers.
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2
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Thus, while the results cited by M&S may show that reasoning is
not well adapted for individual intellectual inquiry (which, as M&S
rightly stress, we find very hard), they do not show that it is not
adapted to other roles in individual cognition, broadly construed.
Of course, as M&S note, motivated reasoning and reason-based
choice often have unwelcome consequences (especially, perhaps,
in modern technological societies), but, if anything, this tends to
support the present suggestion, since the more functions these
biases have, the more gains there are to offset the costs.

Reasoning as deliberative in function but
dialogic in structure and origin
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Abstract: Mercier and Sperber (M&S) claim that the main function of
reasoning is to generate support for conclusions derived unconsciously.
An alternative account holds that reasoning has a deliberative function
even though it is an internalized analogue of public discourse. We
sketch this alternative and compare it with M&S’s in the light of the
empirical phenomena they discuss.

Mercier and Sperber (M&S) argue that the function of reasoning
is argumentative: “It is to devise and evaluate arguments intended
to persuade” (see their abstract). This contrasts with a more familiar deliberative view of reasoning, which holds that the function
of reasoning is to draw new conclusions and form new beliefs.
Reasoning within that more familiar view is then seen as a
special kind of inference, perhaps one with a distinctive relationship to consciousness and the rational faculties of the whole
agent. Such views also tend to be individualistic; they hold that
the psychology of reasoning has no special relation to social life.
M&S do allow that sometimes reasoning leads to new conclusions on practical and theoretical matters being drawn by
the reasoner, conclusions that can be put to use in guiding
action. But this is an incidental by-product of reasoning’s main
function, where “function” is understood in evolutionary terms.
There is also a third option, however, one drawing on the views
of the Russian psychologist Lev Vygotsky (1986). On this view,
reasoning is deliberative in function but dialogic in structure (Yegnashankaran 2010). Reasoning is an internalized analogue of interpersonal discourse. Interpersonal discourse itself might be
typically a complicated mix of attempts to persuade, attempts to
think things through and form new conclusions, and other activities, but what results in our psychology is a tool whose function
is primarily deliberative. We do not think that this view is clearly
superior to M&S’s, but we do think it is an important option to
have on the table when considering the evolution of reasoning
and the opposition between deliberative and argumentative views.
Once we have the contrast between M&S’s view and the
Vygotskian version of the deliberative view in mind, the
message of the empirical evidence is less clear. M&S say that,
on their view, “reasoning should produce its best results when
used in argumentative contexts, most notably in group discussions” (sect. 1.2, para. 11). This, they say, is what we actually
find. But if the aim of reasoning is to help in persuasion, one
would think that a context of dialogue would promote more
and more agile deployment of justifications for whatever each
agent antecedently believes, not a willingness to respond to
others’ arguments by changing one’s mind. M&S see people as
poor individual reasoners but “skilled arguers,” where skilled
arguers “are not after the truth but after arguments supporting
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their views” (see their abstract). But that picture is at tension
with the fact that people interacting in groups are, as M&S
accept, quite good at finding the truth by exchanging ideas, and
not merely at buttressing their own positions. And on the M&S
view as we understand it, any similarity between changes of
mind induced by the social exchange of ideas and changes of
mind induced by private reflection is incidental.
On the other side, some forms of confirmation bias do fit better
with M&S’s view. On a Vygotskian deliberative view, an agent has
no good reason to prefer a search for confirmation of a hypothesis
they are inclined to believe, to a search for disconfirmation of the
hypothesis. On M&S’s view, this tendency does make sense.
Finally, we suggest that M&S may underestimate the adaptive
value of the directions agents may be in led by conscious reasoning. For example, they discuss an experiment where individuals
are asked to choose between a small heart-shaped chocolate
and a larger chocolate shaped like a roach. Most individuals
chose the roach-shaped one, because making the other choice
would be harder to rationally justify. M&S say that “in the light
of the results from the psychology of disgust . . ., we can tell
that their choice was certainly the wrong one” (sect. 5.3.4,
para. 2). But if an analogue of this chocolate choice was faced
in an evolutionary setting, a reasoner would win out.

Understanding, evaluating, and producing
arguments: Training is necessary for
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Abstract: This commentary suggests that the general population has
much less reasoning skill than is claimed by Mercier & Sperber (M&S).
In particular, many studies suggest that the skills of understanding,
evaluating, and producing arguments are generally poor in the
population of people who have not had specific training.

The target article by Mercier & Sperber (M&S) offers several
arguments for their Reasoning is Argumentation hypothesis –
that the primary function of reasoning in human beings is to
evaluate and produce arguments intended to persuade. While
I believe that the Reasoning is Argumentation hypothesis is interesting and should be explored, my comments focus on one
specific claim M&S make.
To show that the predictions of their hypothesis are borne out,
M&S point to multiple psychological studies that purport to
demonstrate that people are generally able to reason well. In
this context, reasoning well consists in being able to understand,
evaluate, and produce arguments. In particular, M&S claim that
studies show that (1) people are good at evaluating both subarguments and overall arguments, and (2) people can generally
produce good arguments in a debatelike setting.
In fact, the experimental evidence from a variety of studies,
including surprisingly many that are cited favorably by M&S,
suggests that people do not have these particular skills. One
general challenge in extracting broader lessons from experimental data is that the skills of understanding, evaluating, and producing arguments are vaguely defined in the literature in general,
and the target article is no exception. There is a crucial distinction
between argument content and argument structure that is
ignored, and some studies focus solely on argument content,
while others focus on argument structure. The extent to which
either kind of study supports claims about participants’ ability
to reason well depends on this distinction in an important way.

Commentary/Mercier & Sperber: Why do humans reason?
The definition of an argument given by M&S is standard: A set
of statements, one of which is the conclusion, which is supposed to
be epistemically supported by the other statements, called the premises. The content of an argument refers to the propositions that
are expressed by the premises and conclusion, whereas the structure of the argument refers to the way the premises work together
to support the conclusion. Successfully understanding an argument consists in being able to identify both the content and the
structure of the argument: the conclusion, the premises, and the
particular way the premises support the conclusion (e.g.,
whether the premises are linked or convergent). Successfully evaluating an argument consists in being able to assess the content
(i.e., determine whether the premises are true) and the structure
(i.e., determine whether, assuming that they are true, the premises
actually do support the conclusion). Finally, successfully constructing an argument consists in being able to supply true premises and specify how those premises work together to support
the conclusion. Although structure and content are both relevant
for all three activities, they are relevant in different ways, and so
great care is required (but not always taken) in designing experimental tasks that appropriately test them.
Problematic empirical evidence arises for all three: argument
understanding, argument evaluation, and argument production.
For the first process, there actually seems to be scant research
in the area of argument understanding. The little research that
does exist in this area is mixed. Some studies (e.g., Ricco 2003,
cited by M&S) suggest that for simple arguments, adults can,
when prompted, differentiate between linked and convergent
arguments. Other studies, however, suggest that, even for
simple arguments, untrained college students can identify the
conclusion but without prompting are poor at both identifying
the premises and how the premises support the conclusion
(Harrell 2006; 2008; 2011).
Second, argument evaluation is usually loosely, and only
implicitly, defined as being able either to identify reasoning fallacies or to differentiate reasonable arguments from unreasonable
ones. The research on argument evaluation seems mixed, at best.
In particular, a number of systematic biases have been found.
When witnessing an argument from the outside, participants’ judgment of the burden of proof depends on who speaks first (Bailenson & Rips 1996, cited by M&S), and participants routinely mistake
innocuous repetition for circularity (Rips 2002, cited by M&S).
When participating in an argument themselves, participants tend
to reason less well than when witnessing an argument (Neuman
et al. 2006; Thompson et al. 2005b; both cited by M&S).
Finally, in many of these studies, the perception by the
researchers that participants were able to “build complex arguments” (sect. 2.2, para. 3) is vague or ambiguous. Producing an
argument is importantly different from, for example, mere fact
gathering, but the research focuses almost exclusively on nothing
more complex than the listing of reasons to believe. Even for
this simple kind of argument production, studies suggest that
both low- and high-cognitive-ability participants have difficulty
producing evidence for a claim (Sá et al. 2005, cited by M&S).
Contrary to the claims by M&S, a wide literature supports the
contention that the particular skills of understanding, evaluating,
and producing arguments are generally poor in the population of
people who have not had specific training and that specific training is what improves these skills. Some studies, for example, show
that students perform significantly better on reasoning tasks only
when they have learned to identify premises and conclusions
(Shaw 1996, cited by M&S) or have learned some standard argumentation norms (Weinstock et al. 2004, cited by M&S). M&S
may be correct that some of these negative results arise
because the stakes are too low, but many studies that show
improvements from specific training occur in high-stakes
environments like a college course (Harrell 2011; Twardy 2004;
van Gelder 2005; van Gelder et al. 2004). This suggests that difficulty with understanding, evaluating, and producing arguments
may be a deeper feature of our cognition.

The argumentative theory of reasoning applies
to scientists and philosophers, too
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Abstract: Logical consistency demands that Mercier and Sperber’s
(M&S’s) argumentative theory of reasoning apply to their own
reasoning in the target article. Although they hint that their argument
applies to professional reasoners such as scientists and philosophers,
they do not develop this idea. In this commentary, I discuss the
applicability of argumentative theory to science and philosophy,
emphasizing the perils of moral reasoning.

Mercier and Sperber (M&S) argue that the primary evolved
function of reasoning is persuasive argumentation. If the
primary function of any evolved trait – including reasoning
ability – is the same for all members of a species, then it
follows that professional reasoners (including scientists and philosophers) are primarily in the business of persuasive argumentation. Furthermore, if M&S’s dual-process model of reasoning is
accurate, professional reasoners initially arrive at their conclusions by intuitive leaps and only later construct logical arguments to convince others of these conclusions. The notion that
scientists and philosophers are more concerned with persuading
others that something is true than with discovering truth contradicts the image of scientists and philosophers as dispassionate
truth-seekers. This response to M&S’s target article aims to
develop this subversive implication of their argument.
That M&S’s argumentative theory applies to their own reasoning is necessary if their theory is to be consistent. To suggest
otherwise is to commit what Little (1972) called the nonreflexive
fallacy. Yet M&S spend virtually the entire article discussing
studies of nonscientists and nonphilosophers, with just the briefest mention of how their theory might apply to professional reasoners. One exception is a reference to reviewers of scientific
manuscripts who look for flaws in papers to justify rejection
when they do not agree with a paper’s conclusion. They also
remark near the end of their article that even among scientists
the ability to control one’s own biases is “uncommon” and
“almost freakish” (sect. 6, para. 7).
Perhaps the dearth of examples of professional-reasoning-quaargumentation is due to space limitations. Or, perhaps there is
little empirical research on this topic. Or, perhaps other professional reasoners will not find the theory as congenial as M&S
suggest in their concluding sentence. After all, it could be somewhat demeaning to see one’s professional activity (reasoning) as
equivalent to ordinary squabbling over whether my favorite
sports team is better than your favorite sports team. Whereas
Little (1972) aims to elevate ordinary people to the status of scientists, M&S appear to be challenging the status of scientists and philosophers as elite thinkers. To suggest that “[s]killed arguers,
however, are not after the truth but after arguments supporting
their views” (see the M&S abstract) is to challenge the idea that
scientists and philosophers are motivated in an unbiased way by
pure curiosity about what is true.
I believe that we professional reasoners should accept M&S’s
humbling view of our activities because it is an accurate description of reality. Yes, we are interested in truth, but we relish the
thought of convincing others that we have discovered important
truths. I must confess that the M&S thesis was immediately congenial to me because it affirms my own long-held beliefs about
how professional reasoners such as scientists and moral philosophers go about their work (Johnson et al. 1988). Observations of
the actual behavior of scientific researchers indicate that textbook
descriptions of science are highly inaccurate. Scientists do not
begin with a thorough set of dispassionate observations about
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2
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some aspect of the world, followed by formulation of hypotheses
that are tested and immediately abandoned if disconfirmed by
data. I propose that the following account is more accurate.
Research for professional reasoners begins with an emotional
attraction to certain ideas, an attraction Tomkins (1965) called
“ideo-affective resonance.” This emotional resonance can cause
scientists to cling tenaciously to ideas, even in the face of counterevidence. In some ways, science resembles legal proceedings in
which the very best case for guilt or innocence is presented by
uncompromising prosecuting and defense attorneys, respectively.
Scientists who resonate to different views clash in conferences
and in journals. Each seeks to convince others that he or she is
correct. M&S review research indicating that when members of
groups holding disparate views debate, each arguing for a different
view, “truth wins” (sect. 2.3, para. 1). Perhaps truth does win often
enough in jury trials and scientific debates, but as we all know,
sometimes it does not. M&S might be expressing unwarranted optimism here.
I want to close my commentary with some observations about
moral reasoning. Research by Haidt (2001), mentioned by M&S,
and by Joshua Greene (2003) strongly supports a dual-process
model wherein people instantaneously decide if an act is “good”
and therefore something we “ought” to do by taking note of the
immediate, reflexive feelings that emerge when thinking about
the act. In the second stage of the dual process, they may
attempt to defend their feelings in terms of rational argument. Professional philosophers are much better at the reasoning part of the
process, but are still guided initially by emotional reflexes. The
immediacy and inevitability of certain emotions (e.g., revulsion
on contemplating the torture of a child) can lead philosophers
and nonphilosophers alike into making pronouncements such
as “That we ought to refrain from torturing children is a moral
truth.”
But only propositions about what is the case can be true or false.
Moral pronouncements express reflexive feelings about how we
ought to behave and are therefore not truth-apt. “Moral truth” is
a category mistake. I have a yet-untested two-part hypothesis
about why so many people (including moral philosophers) make
this apparent category mistake (Johnson 2007). First, human
beings are prone to mistakenly assuming that when they feel a
strong and immediate emotion, this is a reliable sign of a selfevident truth. Second, although moral systems evolved because
they conferred benefits on all participants (compare M&S’s observation that persuasive communication must be sufficiently beneficial to both parties, else the capacity for being persuaded
would be selected against and go out of existence), the propensity
of a person to be responsive to moral “oughts” can be exploited by
someone who benefits at that person’s expense. Compare, for
example, the persuasiveness of “Give me ten percent of your
money because I want it” with “That we have a duty to tithe to
the church is a venerable moral truth.” Scrutiny of any rhetorical
effort is wise, particularly those in the moral domain.

True to the power of one? Cognition,
argument, and reasoning
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Abstract: While impressed by much of what Mercier & Sperber (M&S)
offer through their argumentative hypothesis, we question whether
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the specific competencies entailed in each system are adequate. In
particular, whether system 2 might not require independent reasoning
capabilities. We explore the adequacy of the explanations offered for
confirmation bias and the Wason selection task.

For Mercier and Sperber (M&S), what appears as poor reasoning
is actually appropriate argument – social dialogue facilitates
reasoning by prompting agents to formulate arguments and
defend them from objections. M&S propose a dual-process
model with system 1 (S1) a consortium of inference mechanisms
and system 2 (S2), an S1 apologist. We identify some features we
think require clarification and provide alternative interpretations
of phenomena used by M&S to support their model.
If S1 generates conclusions without revealing their derivation
(modular-like), then where does S2 acquire the competence to
support these arguments? What type of reasoning is required
for it to construct these arguments, or does it run data back
through S1 for a reasoned result? Related to this is the issue of
argumentative contexts which trigger S2. These appear to be
richer in information, creating a potential confound for the argumentative hypothesis: Is it the argumentative feature or the
increased information that is critical?
The social psychology findings M&S adduce to support their
view present a puzzle for it: How can truth win out amongst
sophistical S2s committed not to discovering the facts but to
defending S1’s representation of them? Convergence-on-truth
suggests there’s more to S2 than defence of S1. One alternative
views S2 as a dynamic, defeasible reasoner that sifts through S1
outputs, independently generating conclusions to be updated in
the light of new information.
Presumably S1 must support probabilistic as well as deductive
inferences. In which case, some regulatory role for S2 is inescapable. Suppose S1 has both deductive and probabilistic mechanisms and these produce compatible results with input X both
deductively entailing and probabilistically supporting Y. Imagine
new evidence E emerging that undermines Y so that X þ E
makes Y not probable. Nonetheless, E cannot affect the derivation
of Y from X. So X þ E still entails Y. Whence S2 has to decide
whether to defend Y since it is derivable from X þ E or surrender
Y as X þ E makes Y improbable. How would it make this decision?
Consider now M&S’s views on confirmation bias. M&S deny
confirmation bias is a flaw in reasoning. Yet if the aim of each
agent’s S2 is to persuade others, confirmation bias would just
polarize views with no agent prepared to listen to another’s arguments. Alternatively, if each S2 defends an agent’s beliefs against
objections, amassing evidence for those beliefs is important but
anticipating likely objections and preparing a defence is no less
so. Relative to aims of persuasion or defence, then, confirmation
bias registers as a fault in reasoning.
Compare an M&S-styled S2-reasoner Aaron with a defeasible
S2-reasoner Belle. Aaron is convinced the river mussels are good
to eat since he’s eaten them the past five days. Belle felt ill after
eating them the day before. She advises Aaron to refrain. Aaron’s
S2 considers positive evidence and discounts negative evidence.
So Aaron eats the mussels and falls ill. In contrast, Belle’s S2 constructs fast generalizations on the fly. Having eaten them for four
days, Belle inferred (G) the mussels are good to eat. But now her
S2 enables Belle to adopt a position appropriate to the evolving
evidence. The crucial difference between Aaron and Belle is
this: Were they to swap roles, Belle would feel no internal
pressure from her S2 to eat the mussels (unlike Aaron from
his): Evidence someone else fell ill can prompt a defeasible reasoner to update (G) as disconfirming and confirming evidence
are weighted equally. Whilst M&S’s model allows S1 to update
information, reasoning to a new conclusion (belief revision)
appears anomalous.
Does the argumentative hypothesis yield the best explanation
of reasoning performance? Take the Wason selection task. M&S
claim that when agents are asked to assess the truth of (W) If
there’s a vowel on one side of a card, there’s an even number on
its other side for an E, K, 4, 7 array, their S1 matches cards to
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verbal cues, prompting them to choose the E card and 4 card.
Their S2 then defends this choice against objections.
This matching hypothesis belies the semantic complexity of
(W), which contains an indefinite “a card” nested within the
scope of a conditional. Such constructions can vary in meaning.
“If Ralph has a credit card, he buys tickets with it” is true if
Ralph has four different credit cards but uses only one to buy
tickets. However “if Sue has a pet, she feeds it” is false if Sue
feeds her goldfish, starving her three kittens: “A pet” means
every pet where “a credit card” means some credit card. Indefinites such as “a card” in (W) could be assigned a default existential reading (some) by an S1 semantic module. If contextual clues
or background information don’t subsequently override it, this
(mistaken) interpretation could become fixed, leading subjects
to look for some card with an even number on one side and a
vowel on the other, as the majority do. Alternatively, if the
semantic module defaults to a generic reading of (W), since generics (like the mussels are good) tolerate exceptions, the 7 card’s
role becomes opaque, rendering it non-salient once more.
For defeasible reasoners used to generic generalisations, figuring out the minimum number of occluded elements that need to
be revealed to determine whether (W) is true is no trivial task.
They fail not because they aren’t called on to defend their
view, as M&S contend, but because they have little or no experience testing exceptionless generalisations.
Why then do they succeed in group settings? A rival problemsolving model of reasoning says this is due to two factors:
1. Group settings are informationally rich with alternative
hypotheses articulated, reasons for them explained and discussed, and
2. Subjects’ semantic modules are specifically designed to
compute the logical implications of others’ statements to determine what those statements mean (Crain & Khlentzos 2010).
Further, since this model assumes subjects share a common
goal of finding the correct solution, it is no mystery why subjects
should converge on that solution.

What people may do versus can do
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Abstract: It warrants examining how well people can come to argue
under supportive conditions, not only what they do under ordinary
conditions. Sustained engagement of young people in dialogic
argumentation yields more than the temporary “contextual effect” that
Mercier & Sperber (M&S) identify in the target article. If such
engagement were to become the norm, who can say what the
argumentive potential of future generations is?

In the target article, Mercier & Sperber (M&S) make the strong
claim that epistemic goals are not well served by argumentive
reasoning because it does not enhance the accuracy or validity
of one’s claims. Evidence is too ample to deny that people commonly invoke argumentive reasoning to support their assertions
in ways that are habitual, often mindless, and self-serving.
Where I would fault M&S, rather, is in their focus on how argumentive reasoning most often does function, to the exclusion of
how it can (and for some does) come to function, as a consequence of education, engagement, and a recognition of its epistemic value. Although people may use argument in self-serving
ways that they are in limited command of, it doesn’t follow that
they cannot achieve greater conscious command and come to
draw on it in a way that will enhance their cognitive power.

Moreover, as my own most recent research clearly shows
(Goldstein et al. 2009; Kuhn & Crowell, in press; Kuhn et al.
2008), sustained engagement of young people in dialogic argumentation yields more than the temporary “contextual effect”
of a social setting that M&S identify. In their review of our
research, they focus on earlier work in which on a single occasion
participants are asked to generate an argument to support their
view regarding the cause of a particular social problem (Kuhn
1991). The participants generally do poorly, with little sign of
improvement from adolescence through old age, tending to
describe a plausible scenario of how the problem could arise
and failing to differentiate that scenario from actual or potential
evidence that this is how it does in fact arise.
In more recent work, we have engaged young people in sustained dialogic argumentation about significant issues. We focus
on middle school as an optimal period to undertake this effort,
and we follow Billig (1987), Graff (2003), and, before him, the
sociocultural tradition of Vygotsky (1978) and others, in taking
the everyday social practice of argumentation as a starting point
and pathway for development of individual argumentive skill.
The dialogic context provides the “missing interlocutor” (Graff
2003) that gives expository argument its point. The medium of discourse is electronic, yielding the significant advantage of providing
a transcript of the exchange that remains available throughout and
following the discourse. Contributions to face-to-face discourse, in
contrast, disappear as soon as they are spoken. In addition to
serving as a reference point and framework during the dialogs,
these transcripts become the object of various reflective activities
participants engage in.
With sustained engagement over multiple months, dialogic argumentation progresses from what starts out as the norm among
young adolescents – exposition of one’s own views with scant
attention to those of the opponent – to recognition of the need
to attend to the opponent’s claims and identify weaknesses, and
from there to sustained sequences of counterargument and rebuttal. Perhaps most important, not immediately but with time, these
newly developed skills transfer to the individual context that M&S
focus on. Relative to a carefully matched comparison group at the
same school, our participants wrote superior individual essays on a
new topic, ones more often addressing strengths and weaknesses of
both sides of an issue. Equally important is young people’s progress
in the epistemological domain of recognizing the centrality of
counterargument and of evidence to sound argumentation. Again
relative to the comparison group, participants showed greater recognition of the role of both, for example in seeking information to
bring to bear on their arguments.
In a word, we need to examine how argument may come to be
used under these favorable, supportive conditions, not only
under more ordinary conditions. If broader engagement of this
sort were to become the norm, who can say what the argumentive
potential of future generations is? With education systems worldwide claiming commitment to the broad goal of students learning
to use their minds well, so as to be able to apply them to new,
unknown problems, we should at least seriously explore the
question.

The world looks small when you only look
through a telescope: The need for a broad and
developmental study of reasoning
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Abstract: If the target article represents the summary findings of the
field, reasoning research is deeply flawed. The vision is too narrow and
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seems to fall into biological determinism. Humans use reasoning in
effective ways apparently not studied by researchers, such as reasoning
for action. Moreover, as the brain develops through adulthood and
from experience so do reasoning capabilities.

My two critiques address the limited scope of the research and
the neglect of human development. These undermine the generalizability of Mercier and Sperber’s conclusions.
First, the way reasoning is deﬁned and studied leads to
narrow, incomplete ﬁndings. Mercier and Sperber cite research

that ignores a great deal of reasoning behavior. For example,
at the sociopolitical level humans use reason to design and
change laws, constitutions, institutions, and visions such as the
Declaration of Human Rights. Reasoning at the everyday level
includes figuring out what course of action to take: for our ancestors, when to migrate to the next foraging ground; for us, how to
balance the daily demands of work and family. Nor is there any
reference to how people reason after a poor outcome: For our
ancestors, why was the hunt unsuccessful today and what can
we do differently tomorrow? For us, how did I lose my cool
with my child and how can I avoid that in the future? The
authors make no distinctions among types of goal-motivated
reasoning, excluding pre-hoc (planning – what should my plans
be today?), post-hoc (reflecting—how did things go?), and
online executive reasoning (e.g., this plan is not working, what
should I do?). Even children employ reasoning for action when
they consider how to climb a tree, how it is going, and reflect
on their failure or success.
The authors describe reasoning as a process more akin to
rhetoric, completely leaving out practical reasoning. They claim
that human reasoning evolved to competitively persuade others
of one’s viewpoint rather than for making the best decision.
This astonished me – how adaptive would it be to follow a rhetorically gifted con man or inexperienced group member in the
Pleistocene? The experience-based wisdom of the elders was
much more advantageous.
The research tasks used and interpretations employed seem to
presume that humans are primarily self-interested, a notoriously
implausible view outside the West (Sahlins 2008). Of course
there can be situations that press individuals to be competitive
rather than cooperative in decision making, but from anthropological accounts our ancestors were cooperators within their
groups, not the ego-driven competitors described by the
authors (Fry 2006). It seems important to distinguish between
self-interested cognition and cognition motivated by other concerns. For example, how do the authors explain the efforts of
Warren Buffet and Bill Gates (givingpledge.org) to persuade
wealthy individuals to contribute half of their wealth towards
charity and the common good? Certainly they used rhetorical
skills in their mission but whence the motivation? How would
the authors explain the reasoning skills and motivations of the
likes of Nelson Mandela and Abraham Lincoln in solving their
society’s challenges?
Second, the authors seem to assume that people don’t
develop in reasoning capacities and that the college student
represents human capability. There seems to be an implicit bio-

logical determinism in the target article, a view that is empirically
untenable (Lewontin et al. 1987).
The research findings are circumscribed by the population
usually studied – college students – giving a false impression of
human capabilities. Wisdom is found more typically in mature
adults, not sophomores. Brain development after the teenage
years is fundamental for mature reasoning capabilities. In the
mid to late 20s humans acquire greater executive function
capacities (Luna et al. 2001), which allow for the ability to move
past the subcortical decision-making system, highly influenced
by the situation, and use prefrontal capacities that facilitate perspective taking and empathy with greater awareness of consequences (Goldberg 2001). In middle age, adult brains undergo
further myelinization, peaking in inductive reasoning (Schaie &
Willis 2010).
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One cannot draw any firm conclusions about reasoning
without examining mature adults in ecologically valid tasks.
Researchers should study reasoning in adults as they perform
their roles as experts: experienced parents, judges, ministers
and counselors, shopkeepers and community leaders, umpires
and zookeepers. These experts learn to merge self and moral
interests or they falter in their roles. Experts develop in reasoning
capabilities, tapping into intuitions, explicit knowledge, and
domain-specific paradigms that novices lack (Hogarth 2001).
Instead, the focus in psychological studies seems to be on what
underdeveloped minds and brains of a certain sort do well –
make quick judgments and use words to manipulate others to
get one’s way. Elsewhere I criticize this shortsighted focus in
moral judgment research (Narvaez 2010).
Further, it’s not at all clear that the researchers are studying
optimal brains even at the college level. The prefrontal cortex,
the seat of executive functions, apparently can be damaged
prior to its maturation from addictive use of drugs (Bechara
2005) and activities that keep the more primitive parts of the
brain active, such as violent video games (Mathews et al. 2005),
suggesting that reasoning capacities may be diminished in
those who engage deeply in such activities. Sociocultural
factors also affect reasoning, such as deteriorating child-rearing
practices (Narvaez 2008), which may play a role in the lower
rates of empathy (Konrath et al., in press) and moral reasoning
(Thoma & Bebeau 2008), and in greater egocentrism if not the
narcissism (Twenge & Campbell 2009) reported in college students today.
Finally, it is highly questionable whether it is appropriate at all
to generalize to human nature from the study of westerners or
Americans. Henrich et al. (2010) point out how the vast majority
of psychological studies and conclusions are based on Western,
Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) participants who represent less than 12% of the world population
(college students, a subset of that).
The review leaves this reader unsatisfied with the work in the
field. Reasoning needs to be defined more systematically and holistically by those who study it. In light of the narrow definition,
the limited task set, and the population usually studied, it is not
surprising that the findings are so pessimistic. Humans use
reason in many more adaptive ways than described here.
People and brains develop; experience and culture matter.
Rather than a review of human capabilities, we have a glimpse
into a narrow slice of reasoning by immature reasoners from an
abnormal culture.
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Abstract: This commentary agrees with Mercier and Sperber’s (M&S’s)
thesis on the argumentative function of reasoning but suggests that an
account of argument strength is required. A Bayesian account of
argument strength (Hahn & Oaksford 2007) shows how the
deployment of deductive fallacies, weak inductive arguments, and
judgment fallacies such as base-rate neglect, can all be rationally
defended in the right argumentative context.

Mercier and Sperber’s (M&S’s) hypothesis – “the function of
reasoning is argumentative. It is to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade” (see their abstract) – is a timely
and important thesis that sits well with related arguments
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in the literature. For example, Hahn & Oaksford (2007)
argued:
Typically, reasoning takes place in the service of argumentation, that is,
in the attempt to persuade yourself or others of a particular position.
Argumentation is the overarching human activity that studies of deductive reasoning, inductive reasoning, judgment, and decision making are
really required to explain. (p. 705)

M&S argue that demonstrations “that people are skilled at
assessing arguments seems to stand in sharp contrast with findings from the psychology of reasoning” (sect. 2.1, para. 3). They
discuss participants’ failures to employ logical rules but not the
frequent endorsement of logical fallacies, although they suggest
that, “unlike logical fallacies, fallacies of argumentation come in
degrees” (sect. 2.1, para. 4). Many argumentation theorists
argue that all argumentation, not just the fallacies, is a matter
of degree. For example, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969)
argued, “The aim of argumentation is not to deduce consequences from given premises; it is rather to elicit or increase
the adherence of the members of an audience to theses that
are presented for their consent” (p. 9). Here we argue that
logical fallacies and logical rules subserve argumentation but
only to the extent that they to “come in degrees.” A corollary to
this argument is that judgmental fallacies such as base-rate
neglect may also arise in the same context.
I focus on the deductive fallacy of denying the antecedent (DA)
in conditional reasoning, for example:

DA, Pr(bird is not whitejbird is not a swan)/Pr(bird is not whitejbird is a swan), is much lower; the bird is only about 2 times more
likely not to be white given it is not a swan than if it were a swan.
So, in terms of the force of the respective arguments, MP seems
stronger than DA, which seems to warrant Pro’s opening
argument.
Con’s DA counter-argument can be characterised as noting
that priors matter and that it is highly unlikely that the bird was
a swan. That is, his counter-argument suggests that Pro has neglected the base rates, a common bias in judgement research
(Bar-Hillel 1980; Kahneman & Tversky 1973). When priors are
taken in to account, Pro’s MP argument is weak; that is, the posterior probability is only 0.5. In contrast, the posterior probability
of the DA argument, Pr(bird is not whitejbird is not a swan), is
0.94. So, in this context, in terms of the strength of the respective
arguments DA seems stronger than MP, which seems to warrant
Con’s counter-argument: The conclusion of the DA argument
should be believed more than the conclusion of the MP argument. The next exchange between Pro and Con would probably
focus on Pro’s grounds for apparently neglecting the base rate
and believing that for this particular bird, Pr(bird is a swan) . 0.1.
This analysis supports M&S’s contention that reasoning is for
argument but only when we give a probabilistic analysis of how
logical rule and fallacies affect people’s degrees of belief in
their conclusions. In conclusion, we would argue that putting
reasoning and judgment in their proper argumentative place
compels us to a probabilistic understanding of deductive
reasoning.

If a bird is a swan, then it is white
That bird was not a swan
Therefore That bird was not white
This instance of DA is clearly a logical fallacy as there are white
birds that are not swans. However, suppose someone (Con) is
deploying DA against someone (Pro) who has argued that a
particular bird was white via the logical rule of modus ponens
(MP), if a bird is a swan, then it is white, that bird was a swan,
therefore, it was white. To refute Pro’s argument the respondent
must deny one of the premises. Con chooses to “deny the antecedent” – that is, to deny that the bird was a swan, from which
it “follows” that the bird was not white (Godden & Walton
2004). From an argumentative perspective this seems like a perfectly sound strategy.
However, the falsity of the consequent – the bird was not
white – could not follow logically from this use of DA. Rather
it undermines another property of Pro’s intended conclusion –
that is, “that it should be believed” (Godden & Walton 2004,
p. 232). A Bayesian probabilistic approach to argument strength
for the conditional cashes out this intuition (Hahn & Oaksford
2007; Oaksford & Hahn 2007). Hahn and Oaksford (2007) proposed that people’s degree of belief in the conclusion given the
premises provides one measure of argument strength. They
equate this measure with the conditional probability of the conclusion given the premises: for MP this is Pr(bird is whitejbird is a
swan) (see Oaksford & Chater 2007; Oaksford et al. 2000).
Another measure, which they refer to as “argument force,” is
the change in degree of belief brought about by the argument.
They equate this measure with the likelihood ratio, which maps
the prior odds into the posterior odds: for MP this ratio is
Pr(bird is whitejbird is a swan)/Pr(bird is whitejbird is not a
swan).
It is quite easy to show that contexts can arise where both Pro’s
and Con’s arguments seem warranted. Suppose that the swans
are in a bird sanctuary containing equal numbers of white and
black swans: Pr(bird is whitejbird is a swan) ¼ 0.5, and that
most of the birds in the sanctuary are neither white nor swans:
for example, Pr(bird is white) ¼ Pr(bird is a swan) ¼ 0.1. On
this distribution, the likelihood ratio for the MP argument is 9;
the bird is 9 times more likely to be white given it is a swan
than if it were not a swan. In contrast, the likelihood ratio for
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Abstract: It is unclear how an argumentative environment would select
for better reasoning given three general findings. First, argument
rationality typically fails to persuade poor reasoners. Second, reasoned
argumentation competes with more persuasive and less rational
arguments for limited cognitive resources. Third, those poor at
reasoning fail to distinguish between valid and invalid arguments.
Reasoning, therefore, is poorly designed for argument.

Did reasoning evolve because it is best suited for communicating
arguments? In the target article, Mercier & Sperber (M&S)
claim this might be the case even though individuals poorly
generate and recognize valid arguments. If, however, individuals
are poor at generating and recognizing valid arguments, there are
several – in our view, insurmountable – obstacles for this type of
thinking evolving for any social function.
First, reasoned argumentation would fail to achieve the goal of
persuasion – changes in beliefs and attitudes. One of the most
common pitfalls of everyday reasoning is that nonrational
factors (e.g., believability of an argument, confidence and status
of the arguer, and self-interest of the receiver) trump logical validity in argument evaluation (for review of believability effects,
see Evans et al. 1993). The emergence of a trait for recognizing
valid arguments, therefore, would offer no particular benefit in
a context of like-headed reasoners: Valid arguments would only
convert the converted. Examples of this come from the phenomenon of belief polarization (Lord et al. 1979), where open
exchanges of arguments serve only to pull disputants away
from recognizing valid alternatives.
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Another example of valid reasoning failing to persuade comes
from studies of dyadic learning in children. A common finding in
this literature (e.g., Ames & Murray 1982) is that when conservers and nonconservers share their reasons for conservation problems, the former persuade the latter. But is this a case of reason
triumphant – or of less-confident students yielding to their
more-confident peers? Suggesting this might be a victory for confidence over reason, Levin and Druyan (1993) found that confidence was much higher among conservers than nonconservers.
Further, when problems were switched to science problems
with high rates of misconceptions, the competence/confidence
correlation was flipped – and children found the confident
incompetents more persuasive than their better-reasoning
peers. (From this perspective, it’s easy to see why dogmatic creationists want scientists to “teach the controversy.”)
Could it be (as argued by M&S) that reasoning evolved to
help people detect untrustworthy sources by flagging inconsistency in their arguments? Developmental evidence suggests
that this is unlikely because children detect trustworthiness
long before they detect argument inconsistency. For example,
when Morris and Hasson (2010) presented children with simulated arguments of the simplest logical form (e.g., Puppet 1
claims “There is a sticker in the box!” and Puppet 2 claims
“There is no sticker in the box!”), nearly 100% of 4- and 5year-olds failed to detect an inconsistency between the two
claims (Morris & Hasson 2010). At the same time, ability to
detect a source as trustworthy emerges by 3 or 4 years of age
(e.g., Jaswal & Neely 2006; Koenig et al. 2004). Given this, it
cannot be that detecting trustworthiness requires the ability to
detect argument inconsistency.
Second, reasoned argumentation is expensive and may
compete for limited cognitive resources with less expensive
“hot” cognition. Recognizing and generating valid arguments
(that are not already believable) requires substantial cognitive
resources, including a heavy cost to working memory (Barrouillet et al. 2000). This cost increases dramatically with an increase
in the number of premises and introduction of quantifiers. At
the same time, if the goal is persuasion, “hot” cognition (e.g.,
appeals to emotionally laden examples) can offer a less expensive alternative (Petty & Cacioppo 1996). Given that the cost of
generating and comprehending logical arguments outweighs
those of “hot” cognition, without offering substantial benefits,
a mutant with an elevated ability for logical argument would
have no competitive advantage against her demagogic disputants. Thus, it is difficult to see how the argumentative context
would provide the ideal environment for the evolution of
logical argument.
Third, operator/receiver parity precludes benefits of social
learning or knowledge transfer. Although it is often tempting to
draw analogies between language and reasoning (e.g., Braine &
O’Brien 1998), the difference between the two is profound.
Unlike reasoning, language proficiency is (more or less) universal
in human adults. Consequently, in linguistic communication,
more proficient language users (operators) can pull less proficient language learners (receivers) along the path to greater proficiency. This is not the case with reasoned argumentation,
however. Here, operator and receiver characteristics are more
symmetrical: When a person who is receptive to invalid arguments is put in the role of the operator, invalid arguments
follow, and when a person who produces invalid arguments is
put in the role of the receiver, valid and invalid arguments are
not discriminated. Consequently, communicating reasons
across individuals cannot, by itself, add anything to argumentation. Indeed, one of the most striking findings in cognitive development concerns how greatly change in language proficiency
outpaces that of logical thinking, as well as how little reasoned
argumentation is affected by observing a more proficient reasoner (as observed by Levin & Druyan 1993).
The failures of everyday reasoning that we think would make
the argumentative context an inhospitable environment for the
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evolution of reasoning are seen in a strange light by M&S.
According to them, these failures support their account
because they arise mostly outside an argumentative context.
Yet, even if we were to stipulate this as true, superior reasoning
in an argumentative context does not support their claim about
the evolution of reasoning: It would imply that arguments facilitate reasoning, not that reasoning facilitates arguments. Yet, if
reasoning is designed for arguments, as M&S contend, quality
of reasoning must facilitate or hinder quality of arguments,
whereas the reverse is unnecessary. To take M&S’s analogy, to
show that the structure of the foot is designed for walking, one
must show that a different structure would facilitate or impede
walking – not that process of walking strengthens the foot of
the walker.
In our view, the kind of argument that is optimally designed for
social communication – that is, would have the largest effect on
manipulating another’s behavior – is not necessarily a reasoned
argument but an argument that is believable, emotive, easy to
generate on the fly, and clear to others. Put simply, reasoned
argumentation is no more likely to have evolved for social communication than is the posture of the foot to have evolved for
disco.

What is argument for? An adaptationist
approach to argument and debate
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Abstract: A consideration of selection pressures on the psychology of
argument suggests that fixing the truth value of claims is not the
primary criterion for argument generation or evaluation. Instead,
argument psychology is designed to change representations in other
minds as a way to negotiate conflicts of interest and as a way to signal
social coordination.

Mercier and Sperber’s (M&S’s) analysis of reasoning as designed
for argumentation represents another blow to certain long-held
assumptions about cognitive processes: That reasoning is the
abstract application of a propositional calculus used to determine
what is true. Instead, M&S suggest that reasoning is the output of
argumentation psychology, a suite of cognitive systems designed
to handle incommensurate representations between people. This
is courageous and provocative because it suggests that enterprises such as science are handled by a psychology designed
for argumentation. Insofar as reasoning can be defined as an
interestingly coherent natural category, M&S are likely correct.
However, the argument can be taken further. If reasoning is
for argument, what is argument for? While M&S allude to this,
there is some value in explicitly addressing the function of argument because it directly speaks to how argumentation psychology
should work.
Consider the case of the evaluation of factual or policy claims.
It is tempting to think that argument’s proper domain in such
cases is to determine the truth or accuracy of incommensurate
representations – a natural consequence of information being
distributed nonuniformly across bodies – that some people
have access to information that others do not, and that, given
imperfect information, each person is expected to prefer one’s
own data and conclusions and be wary of others. On this view,
even if reasoning is for argument, then the ultimate logic of argument is the same as the classical view of reasoning – as a way of
determining truth – albeit in a way that diverges from a rational
view, by virtue of the division of information access in the real
world.
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However, a consideration of the selection pressures for argument suggests that this is not a complete picture of the function
of argument and thus not a complete picture of the psychology of
argumentation, even when dealing with claims ostensibly about
truth. Here’s why.
Communication exists because it affects behavior. This makes
communicated information a particularly powerful way to leverage others’ capacities. This creates opportunity for collaboration,
as well as exploitation, and as such there will be selection on both
senders and receivers of argument. M&S do not ignore that conflict of interest is inherent in communication – suggesting the
existence of epistemic vigilance for ensuring that only “reliable,”
“effective,” “quality” information is acted on. But what constitutes reliable, effective, or quality information? Certainly, as
M&S imply, a criterion of accuracy applies to a class of claims.
“The bear is on this side of the river” and “The bear is on the
other side of the river” are factual claims warranting investigation
of truth value. The bear is somewhere, after all, and argument
will help determine where.
However, while there is reason to think that there is strong
selection for discovering the accuracy for certain classes of
claims, there is also good reason to think that there is little selection for searching for the accuracy of many others. Instead, if
signaled information is capable of causing others to act, there
is selection to broadcast representations that will cause others
to modify their current or future actions with respect to the
sender. Because utility and accuracy are ultimately separable,
even for factual claims, there is not always selection for
accuracy, but instead for a psychology that fixes representations – in oneself and in others – along actuarially beneficial
dimensions.
This suggests at least two broad classes of selection pressures
and, subsequently, two broad classes of argument psychology:
First, is a class of argumentation psychology designed to
handle conflicts of interest over self-regarding and other-regarding behaviors, the goal of which is to change representations of
the payoff structure of pursuing certain future plans. This view
of argument has already uncovered a highly-specific “grammar”
of argument structure in both senders and receivers (Petersen
et al. 2010; Sell 2006; Tooby et al. 2008).
Second, is a class of argumentation psychology designed
around social coordination. Because shared mental content is a
consequence of coordinated activities, and because cooperation
requires a meeting of the “minds,” shared mental representations
can be used as markers and facilitators of social coordination. In
other words, the exposition of claims – and the signal of agreement or disagreement with them – can be used as a social instrument to mark affiliation. Agreement and disagreement therefore
become commodities in themselves as a way of signaling the
coordination strength and challenging others. This class of argumentation psychology should be designed to conflate evaluations
of the argument with the source and social context of the argument; who is arguing should be just as important as what they
are saying when considering the “goodness” of an argument.
Additionally, the motivation to argue, and the choice of argument
content itself, should be at least in part the result of strategic nonconscious assessments of the local social world. This view of argument has already led to the discovery of evidence that the mind
treats certain classes of claims as markers of social affiliation (Pietraszewski et al., in preparation).
These are not aberrant uses of argument, but, rather, these
functions lie at the core of how the human psychological competence of argument – and thus how “reasoning” – works. The
valuation of social coordination, for example, is likely built right
into the sinew and bone of argumentation – both in terms of
the criteria for generating arguments and for the criteria of assessing argument. This suggests that reasoning is not simply based
on argument, but on argument designed for negotiating conflicts
of interest and signaling social coordination rather than exclusively fixing truth.
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Abstract: Mercier and Sperber’s (M&S’s) theory of reasoning cannot
predict reasoning in the absence of an argumentative context. Applying
the theory to hypothesis testing behavior, I propose that hypothesis
testing is often motivated by determining the true inference and that
reasoning models should account for utilities (affected by various
motives, including the wish to convince) of reasoning outcomes.

Mercier and Sperber’s (M&S’s) argumentative theory of reasoning (ATR) claims that reasoning is aimed not at improving knowledge, but at persuading. According to ATR, an argumentative
context (actual or proactive) is a necessary condition for reasoning and reasoning is biased toward winning the argument. It will
be argued that the very logic of ATR is problematic and that it
cannot deal with a large majority of reasoning contexts in
which agents (also) reason to determine a true or valid conclusion. I propose that a theory of reasoning should incorporate
utilities of reasoning outcomes, to explain various motives for
reasoning, including argumentative motives.
Although M&S discuss in detail the function of reasoning, it is
not always clear how reasoning is defined. If we assume reasoning
to be about opinions and preferences for which no normative standard is available, an argumentative view is quite straightforward.
People indeed may argue about political opinions and preferences
with no other goal than to convince. However, if reasoning is the
treatment of information about some (yet unknown) true or valid
inference, with the objective to reduce inference errors, then the
argumentative theory is puzzling. Indeed, the ATR theory of
reasoning disregards this inherent concern of approximating the
valid conclusion, going against what reasoning is defined to be.
The uneasy coexistence of finding out the truth and seeking confirmation for one’s belief in ATR is apparent in M&S’s analysis of the
confirmation bias in hypothesis testing studies (Wason 1960). On the
one hand, M&S acknowledge, in line with classical critical analyses of
the confirmation bias (Klayman & Ha 1987; Poletiek 1996; 2001;
Wetherick 1962), that participants’ behavior in these studies is not
indicative of a biased search of supporting test outcomes, but that
it reflects a sound heuristic. This heuristic is testing hypotheses
with positive predictions. Using M&S’s example, suppose I believe
that my keys are in my jacket because that is where I remember
putting them. I look for them in my jacket (positive testing) and
not in my purse (negative testing). Hence, as opposed to the
interpretation of positive testing as a tendency to confirm (confirmation bias) (Cowley & Byrne 2005; Wason 1960), positive testing
may occur with no other goal than finding out the truth, as the
real-life example suggests. According to ATR, positive testing is a
default heuristic that involves no reasoning proper.
However, as M&S further argue, reasoning can be triggered in
hypothesis testing situations if an argumentative context is provided.
Moreover, in such a context, reasoning is directed at falsification,
according to ATR: Falsification is accessible provided that the situation encourages participants to argue against a hypothesis that is
not their own, as M&S propose This logic reveals the old misinterpretation that test choice (positive or negative) is tuned at the emergence of favorable test result. In fact, putting one’s idea to a (either
positive or negative) test assumes the objective to find out the truth
and is therefore at odds with testing in order to save our idea from
confirmations or disconfirmations. Poletiek (1996) showed that participants in a hypothesis testing experiment are aware of the incompatibility of finding out the truth and coming up with confirming
test outcomes only. Participants felt that they were looking for information about the validity of a hypothesis, and that they could not
control the test outcomes by choosing a test strategy. It was only
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2
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Table 1 (Poletiek). Utilities of reasoning outcomes about H (the
reasoner’s subjective belief), assuming an epistemic motive (A), an
argumentative motive (B), and both types of motives (C).
A

Infer H
Infer not-H

H is true

Not-H is true

10
0

0
10
B

Infer H
Infer not-H

10
0

10
0
C

Infer H
Infer not-H

10
0

4
6

their expectation of the outcome that changed when they tested a
hypothesis they did not believe to be true (falsification was
expected). When testing their best guess, they expected a confirming outcome.
Besides determining the truth, many considerations may affect
how we reason and whether we reason. These considerations can
be modeled as a cost-benefit analysis of making the right inference. In Wason’s (1960) task, students participating in the experiment might not care much about making reasoning errors. The
key seeker might perform a negative test (looking for the keys in
some place other than the jacket) because the costs of a positive
one are too high: The jacket was left behind in a friend’s house
and the effort too great to walk back to check the jacket. Alternatively, we might be in a hurry and have time to check just one
location, enhancing the benefits of good reasoning.
To predict reasoning behavior, we need a model with utilities
of reasoning outcomes. A suitable tool is signal-detection theory.
Motives can be expressed in the utilities of inference errors and
in reasoning behavior predicted on the basis of the risk we are
prepared to take with regard to particular erroneous inferences
(Poletiek & Berndsen 2000). For example, as shown in Table 1,
a pure epistemic motive would be modeled with (A) low utilities
of making any false inferences. A pure argumentative motive
would be expressed in (B) a very high willingness to make the
false inference that our favorite hypothesis is true; and (C)
reasoning with both motives (searching for a valid inference
within both practical or argumentative constraints) is reflected
with some in-between utilities with regard to making a false or
a correct inference about our favorite hypothesis.
In this manner, reasoning in a variety of contexts and with a
variety of goals can be modeled, offering an elegant alternative
to the paradox of the ATR that we start up a reasoning trajectory
about a prior belief if and only if the end of the route leads us to
inferring that belief again.
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Abstract: Mercier and Sperber (M&S) are correct that reasoning and
argumentation are closely related. But they are wrong in arguing that
this relationship is one of evolutionary adaptation. In fact, persuasive
reasoning that is not veridical can be fatal to the individual and to the
propagation of his or her genes, as well as to the human species as a
whole.

In the target article, Mercier & Sperber (M&S) brilliantly show a
crucial relationship between argumentation and reasoning. But
the relationship is not the one they claim to show.
Consider two individuals facing an adaptive challenge. A threat
of some kind is about to confront them. One of the individuals, A,
recognizes the threat; the other, B, fails, for whatever reason, to
recognize it. The two individuals argue over the existence of the
threat or, perhaps, its severity. Each argues compellingly for his
or her point of view. After all, with inductive reasoning based
on incomplete and often ambiguous information, arguments can
have inductive strength but not deductive certainty; and their
inductive strength does not necessarily correspond to their veridicality (as anyone will have observed who has seen a defense attorney gets off his guilty client scot free). A and B both act on the
basis of their reasoning. A survives and B dies (as a result of a
bear attack, a lightning strike, an automobile accident, a plane
crash, or whatever the threat in question happened to be).
A and B both used their reasoning in the service of argumentation, but reasoning was adaptive by virtue of the veridicality of its
conclusion, not by virtue of the persuasiveness of the arguments
(which may or may not correspond to veridicality in real-world
ambiguous situations with incomplete information). So reasoning
could scarcely have evolved in the service of argumentation,
because those wonderful arguers who did not perceive things
veridically would have been less able to reproduce than those
arguers who did perceive things veridically. The brilliant reasoners who argued wrongly regarding threats had many more opportunities to perish before reproducing than those reasoners,
persuasive or not, who saw threats as they were.
The same phenomenon occurs at a group level. Consider global
warming. Global warming threatens the existence of human and
other life on the planet Earth, and yet deniers, including scientists, put the life of all human organisms on the planet – the replication of the species’ genes and hence the survival of the species
– at risk. Reasoning is being used in the service of argumentation,
but not always for evolutionarily adaptive purposes, at least with
respect to the genes of the individuals involved.
The opening view of M&S that “reasoning should produce its
best results when used in argumentative contexts, most notably in
group discussions” (sect. 1.2, para. 11) is clearly wrong, as are the
arguments that follow from it. The problem is that in this quotation, as throughout the article, there is an ambiguity regarding
the meaning of “best results.” If reasoning is about persuasiveness, perhaps the authors are right. But if reasoning is about veridicality, they are wrong.
Janis (1972) recognized the fallacy of the reasoning in his work
on groupthink. He observed that groups of academically brilliant
government officials could make horrible mistakes that were
actually compounded by their being in groups. More generally,
the phenomenon is referred to as “group polarization” (Moscovici & Zavalloni 1969). People like Robert McNamara and,
more recently, Donald Rumsfeld, come to mind – people who,
despite their academic brilliance, reasoned poorly, yet were
able to persuade many by their (false) arguments. Stanovich
(1993; 2009) coined the irrational but often persuasive reasoning
of IQ-smart people “dysrationalia” (for related ideas, see also
Sternberg 2002).
In the short run, reasoning in the service of argument may well
be adaptive. For example, a job candidate who is persuasive is
perhaps more likely to get the job than one who is unpersuasive;
a politician who is persuasive is more likely to be elected or, at
least, to be believed. But as recent presidential and other elections have shown, persuasiveness (at least to the masses) can be
attained even by candidates who cannot string together a
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coherent sentence. In the long run, the arguments of demagogic
politicians are likely to lead to chaos. In the same way, the arguments of unscrupulous but persuasive clergymen are leading to
terrorist attacks today.
If, as the authors argue, “the main function of reasoning is to
produce arguments to convince others rather than to find the
best decision” (sect. 1.2, para. 11), then human survival is in
serious jeopardy. In today’s world, reasoning very likely is
being used primarily to convince others rather than to find the
best decision, but this use of reasoning is not evolutionarily adaptive for survival in the long run.
Perhaps, as a society, we are placing too much emphasis on
reasoning in the service of argumentation, whether it is on
college applications, in job interviews, or in elections. Instead,
our society should place more emphasis on wisdom, the direction
of reasoning (and other skills) toward a common good, over the
long as well as the short term, through the infusion of positive
ethical values (Sternberg et al. 2007). In a microcosm, the
target article represents what has gone wrong with society as a
whole: Society has come to care more about reasoning in the
service of persuasion than reasoning in the service of truth or
even some kind of ethical good. This trend risks leading not to
better adaptation of humans but, rather, to their ultimate
destruction.
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Abstract: Mercier & Sperber (M&S) claim that the phenomenon of
belief bias – which they consider to be an archetypal manifestation of a
general confirmation bias in human reasoning – provides fundamental
support for their argumentative theory and its basis in intuitive
judgement. We propose that chronometric evidence necessitates a
more nuanced account of belief bias that is not readily captured by
argumentative theory.

Mercier & Sperber’s (M&S’s) impressive argumentative theory
reassesses the function of reasoning, not as involving the noble
pursuit of truth, but instead as a Machiavellian communicative
art with persuasion and self-interest at its core. A case in point
is the infamous confirmation bias, whereby individuals seem
motivated to seek confirmatory evidence for their existing
beliefs and hypotheses and fail to look for counterevidence or
counterarguments (Nickerson 1998). M&S claim that a quintessential demonstration of confirmation bias that supports their
theory can be seen in the phenomenon of belief bias, where
some contemporary theories suggest that people try to confirm
believable conclusions but disconfirm unbelievable ones (see
the selective processing model described by Evans 2007, and
the multinomial model of Klauer et al. 2000). Thus, in both the
case of believable and unbelievable conclusions, M&S claim
that people show a motivation “to confirm their initial intuition”
(sect. 3.3, para. 3) with unbelievable conclusions effectively promoting an intuition-guided debias (Evans 2000) leading to
improved logical responding. M&S further propose that, when
people deal with an unbelievable conclusion, “it is not that they
reason more in this case. . . . It is just that the direction reasoning

takes is mostly determined by the participants’ initial intuitions”
(sect 3.3, para. 3).
Our contention, however, is that this latter claim flies in the
face of current chronometric evidence in the belief-bias literature, which suggests that a more subtle interpretation of the
phenomenon is needed that is not couched purely in terms of
the operation of a general confirmation bias. In particular, processing-time data for syllogistic arguments consistently indicate
that participants reason most when the conclusion is believable
but invalid (Ball et al. 2006; Stupple & Ball 2008; Thompson
et al. 2003). Such a finding is inconsistent with M&S’s view
that people simply seek support for prior beliefs. Confirmatory
mental models of the premises of arguments with believableinvalid conclusions are readily available, so why should significantly longer processing times arise with these problems? We
propose instead that many participants show a capacity to
inhibit confirmation-oriented processing with such arguments,
with the resulting attempt at logical analysis taking time to
apply. Of course, the complexity of the required logical processing means that a belief-based response may still often win out,
perhaps with people defaulting to such a response under cognitive load (cf. Quayle & Ball 2000). This would produce a response
pattern that looks like confirmatory behaviour, but where the
chronometric data support a very different account of the processing that is actually taking place.
To elaborate on our proposals, we outline three possible routes
that participants could take through Evans’ (2007) selective processing model when confronted with belief-oriented syllogistic
arguments (cf. Ball 2010; Evans 2009). First, participants could
employ a pure response bias and respond in accordance with
belief without engaging any analytic processing whatsoever,
either for a truth-seeking or argumentative purpose. Second, in
accordance with argumentative theory, participants could seek
confirmatory evidence so as to warrant the acceptance of believable conclusions (including believable-invalid ones) and the refutation of unbelievable conclusions (including unbelievable-valid
ones). Finally, participants could attempt to suspend notions of
belief and disbelief altogether. For example, rather than searching for a supporting model for an believable-invalid conclusion,
they would inhibit a heuristic response as well as confirmatoryoriented analytic response, instead engaging in an exhaustive
search for a model of the premises that provides a counterexample to the given conclusion.
The important question that follows from our analysis is this:
What if examples of all three reasoning approaches were
present in belief-bias data sets? We suggest that the resulting
aggregation of these strategies would lead to the pattern of
response times that has typically been observed (Ball et al.
2006; Stupple & Ball 2008; Thompson et al. 2003), with believable-invalid conclusions being associated with extended processing times relative to other problems because of the presence
of a subset of reasoners who resist intuitive judgements. This
group of reasoners would most likely be those described by Stanovich and West (2000) as adopting the “normative construal” of
the task because they possess the cognitive capacity needed to
reason through demanding deductive problems.
This latter interpretation of chronometric findings is supported
by data that we have recently acquired (for a preliminary report,
see Ball 2010) demonstrating that increased response times for
believable-invalid problems are predictive of increased overall
response accuracies across belief-oriented problems (i.e., these
times reflect the behaviour of high-ability reasoners). These
data also concur with the observation by Thompson et al.
(2010) that the participants who spend more time reasoning
are more likely to reach a logical conclusion. However, Thompson et al. propose an alternative interpretation of the inflated
inspection times for believable-invalid problems that is more in
keeping with argumentative theory than our account. In their
Modified Verbal Reasoning theory they suggest that participants
are motivated to find confirmatory support for believable
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2
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problems and so allow an extended response deadline for such
problems (perhaps an attractive proposition for the argumentative theory). Thompson et al. claim that since the reasoning
process is more difficult for invalid than valid problems, this combined with the increased motivation to support believable conclusions results in the corresponding increase in response times
for believable-invalid problems. We would argue, however, that
in adopting this perspective one would expect a far greater acceptance rate for believable-invalid problems than is observed
(acceptances are typically in the 50% –70% range), since a confirming model is readily available to those participants who
expend the effort trying to find one.
In sum, we disagree with M&S’s assertion that a motivated
attempt at confirmation necessarily drives belief-bias effects in
syllogistic reasoning. Instead, we claim that many participants
attempt to seek out the deductive truth of presented arguments
and do so at the considerable cognitive expense of inhibiting
their intuitive judgements, as is particularly evident in the case
of syllogisms with believable-invalid conclusions. On this issue,
at least, we would argue against M&S’s argumentative theory,
but perhaps we cannot rule out having done so in order to
confirm a pre-existing hypothesis.
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Abstract: Spontaneous inferences are unconscious, automatic, and
apparently ubiquitous. Research has documented their variety
(particularly in the social domain) and impact on memory and
judgment. They are good candidates for Mercier and Sperber’s
(M&S’s) “intuitive beliefs.” Forming spontaneous inferences is highly
context sensitive, varying with the perceiver’s conscious and
unconscious goals, and implicit and explicit theories about the domain
in question.

Persuasive as the target article is in arguing that “reasoning
proper” is implicitly intended “to devise and evaluate arguments
intended to persuade” (abstract of the target article), it says too
little about the unconscious “process of inference” that generates
the “intuitive beliefs” that are input to this reasoning. This is a
serious omission, because one cannot document how reasoning
might select and shape arguments without specifying what the
inputs to reasoning are. Recent work on spontaneous social inferences (e.g., Uleman et al. 2008) illustrates some of the methods
and findings that may fill in this gap.
Spontaneous inferences are unintended, unconscious, practically effortless, typically uncontrollable, and apparently ubiquitous. Most research has been on spontaneous trait inferences
(STIs; for an early review, see Uleman et al. 1996). Consider
“John returned the wallet with all the money in it.” When
asked to memorize or merely familiarize themselves with such
sentences, most people infer that John is honest. This has been
shown with cued recall, lexical decisions, probe reaction times,
savings-in-relearning, and false-recognition paradigms. People
are more likely to assert that “honest” was in the sentence
paired with John’s photo than the sentence paired with Harry’s
photo, even though it was not (false recognition; Todorov &
Uleman 2002). When people are subsequently asked to learn
word pairs such as “John – honest,” they do so more readily
than “Harry – honest,” even though they no longer recognize
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which trait-implying sentence described John (savings-inrelearning). And they rate John (in a photo) as more honest,
even though they cannot remember what he did or that they
made any inference at all (Carlston & Skowronski 2005). So, as
Mercier & Sperber (M&S) claim, these unconscious inferences
provide the raw material for conscious judgments and presumably for the “reasoning proper” that justifies these judgments.
Spontaneous social inferences are not restricted to traits.
There is good evidence that goals and situational (not just trait)
causes of behavior are spontaneously inferred. When people
read about unjust situations, they spontaneously activate such
concepts as “unfair” and “injustice,” but only when they
imagine themselves being treated unfairly (Ham & Van den
Bos 2008). They spontaneously infer causes of largely nonsocial
events (Hassin et al. 2002). In these studies, the texts (or pictures;
see Fiedler et al. 2005) are pretested by asking people for their
conscious inferences. Stimuli that reliably imply whatever is of
interest are then tested for spontaneous inferences. The same
methods have been used to demonstrate that there are cultural
and personality differences in who makes which inferences (see
Uleman et al. 2008).
Multiple spontaneous inferences can occur simultaneously to
the same stimuli. For example, Ham and Vonk (2003) showed
that both dispositional and situational inferences during comprehension of a single event (“She got an A on the chemistry exam.”
! smart, and ! easy). This suggests that, just as Swinney
(1979) found that homonyms (“bank”) initially activate multiple
meanings (“money,” “river”) during text comprehension, multiple inferences occur spontaneously during the observation of
events, and later selection among them occurs on the basis of
wider contexts.
Like many concepts, traits have multiple meanings and uses
(Uleman 2005). Traits can function as causal explainations of behavior, or traits can function as simple descriptions of behavior.
The same is likely true of other concepts that are activated spontaneously. In explicit dialogue, the pragmatic context in which
traits appear allows us to determine their intended meaning
and function. But when inferences are spontaneous (i.e., unconscious), no such context exists. Recent research has shown that
isolated trait terms function cognitively as causes, not merely as
descriptions (Kressel & Uleman 2010). And subsequent unpublished work (Kressel 2010) shows that people with stronger
implicit (as well as explicit) causal theories of traits’ meaning
are more likely to make STIs.
Such trait inferences can become associated with the “wrong”
actors, in spontaneous trait transference (STT). If person A says
something that implies a trait about person B, and only person A
is present (or pictured), that trait becomes associated with person
A (Skowronski et al. 1998). This does not occur if person B is also
pictured, however (Goren & Todorov 2009). This suggests that
spontaneously inferred concepts are easily “bound” to incorrect
sources. Thus, events can spontaneously activate a variety of
unconscious concepts and associations, all of which provide
grist for the “reasoning proper” mill.
Which concepts are activated, and which associations or bindings occur, are context sensitive in other ways. Rim et al. (2009)
have shown that, consistent with construal level theory, STI is
more likely if the actor is more psychologically distant, either
temporally or spatially. People think of distant things more
abstractly, and traits are an important kind of social abstraction.
Furthermore, unpublished data (Rim et al. 2010) show that nonconsciously primed goals can shape which inferences occur spontaneously and are bound to actors. Thus, nonconscious goals
affect spontaneous inferences in several ways, all outside of
awareness.
Finally, research on the logical inferences made during text
comprehension goes well beyond bridging and predictive inferences. Lea (1995) showed that deductions according to modus
ponens (if p, then q; p; therefore q) occur spontaneously, and
Campion (2006) uncovered ways that certain and hypothetical
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inferences differ. Thus, spontaneous inferences are not limited to
the social domain. When stimuli present enough clear information and constraints, both logical and illogical inferences
occur (e.g., Rader & Sloutsky 2002).
The formation of “intuitive beliefs” is more complex than the
target article describes. Research on spontaneous inferences
(social and otherwise) can tell us much about how intuitive
beliefs are formed and what they are, before reasoning proper
shapes them into persuasive arguments.
Incidentally, the argument that people can distinguish good
arguments from bad, based on Petty and Cacioppo’s (1979) persuasion research, is completely circular. They have no principled
basis for constructing good versus poor arguments; the arguments are simply pretested to have these properties.
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Abstract: Mercier and Sperber (M&S) argue that reasoning is social and
argumentative, and that this explains many apparently irrational judgment
phenomena. We look at the relationship between interpersonal and
intrapersonal argumentation and discuss parallels and differences from
the perspective of query theory, a memory-based model of constructive
preferences. We suggest an important goal is to integrate models across
inference and preference.

Mercier and Sperber’s (M&S’s) provocative perspective suggests
that inference has adapted to a social world where argumentation
is common, and that many phenomena identified as reasoning
errors are not errors but adaptive when considered as inferences
embedded in a social world.
We agree that inferences are often constructed when confronting a problem, and that this construction is influenced by context
rather than generated by unvarying algorithms. We suggest,
however, that inference construction is affected not just by
social forces but also by properties of human memory retrieval
and multiple goals of decision makers.
This commentary describes parallels and differences between
M&S’s argumentative hypothesis and a memory-based account
of preference construction: query theory (QT). M&S cite two
applications of QT as examples of reason-based choice with
resulting choice inconsistencies; namely, the endowment effect
(Johnson et al. 2007) and greater discounting of time during
delay than during acceleration decisions (Weber et al. 2007).
However, QT is more than another example of reason-based
choice. It provides evidence and process-level specification of
the implicit memory-retrieval and argument-integration processes people use to evaluate choice options and demonstrates
their causal role in arriving at a decision. Just as M&S unpack
intuitive inference, QT treats intuitive preferences neither as a
primitive (as in economics [Becker & Stigler 1977]) nor as a mysterious black box (as in social cognition [Dijksterhuis et al.
2006a]), but instead documents the cognitive mechanisms used
in constructing preferences (Weber & Johnson 2006).
These are the key process specifications of QT: (1) People
query past experience for evidence supporting different choice
options, (2) these queries are executed sequentially, and (3) the
first query produces richer representations because of output
interference. This occurs because, as evidence for the first
option is generated, evidence supporting other choice options
is temporarily suppressed. Finally, (4) choice follows from the
resulting balance of evidence. Since the order of options

consideration influences the balance of evidence, it is important
to know what determines which choice option gets queried first.
Characteristics of the choice environment often determine what
option is considered first, such as the existence of decision
defaults. Like M&S, QT suggests that framing effects occur
because different frames make reasons differentially available.
QT finds that framing works by influencing the order in which
two options are considered and thus the balance of evidence,
which mediates choice (Johnson et al. 2007; Weber et al.
2007). For example, different countries have different defaults
for organ donation, which changes the order in which queries
pro versus con donating are considered, producing different
levels of organ donation (Johnson & Goldstein 2003). Similarly
the order of consideration can be affected by different attribute
labels that trigger positive versus negative emotions for different
choice options (Hardisty et al. 2010).
Just like the inferential processes described by M&S, QT
processes operate automatically, without awareness, and are
effective (though sometimes biased) products of motivated cognition. The motivation for which option to consider first makes
sense most of the time. Default options currently in place were
typically selected for good reasons and have not caused injury
or harm. Options that trigger desire have desirable features,
and options that don’t trigger disgust or contempt are typically
superior to those that do. Giving such options an advantage by
querying arguments for their selection first is a way of making
the right decision faster and with greater confidence. Both inference and preference trade off between accuracy and efficiency
and confidence, though these different goals do not always
work in opposite directions. Whereas argumentative goals raise
confidence in one’s inferences or decisions and also shorten
time to reach them, the initially favored options or opinions typically have good reason behind them, and the seemingly biased
inference or preference reflects mostly reasonable Bayesian
priors, with perhaps some built-in conservatism.
These parallels between M&S’s hypothesis and QT suggest
that the purpose of argumentation is not purely interpersonal,
but that implicit argument recruitment, in some outcomebiasing fashion, is also an intrapsychic process that is part of
implicit preference construction. Note that Franklin’s comment
about the human ability to “find or make a reason for everything
one has a mind to do” (cited by M&S in support of social argumentation [sect. 4.1.4, para. 1]) was prompted by his internal
struggle between vegetarian beliefs and the tempting smell of
freshly caught fish on a sea voyage (Franklin 1817/2006). (He
justified eating the fish by recalling the observation, while watching the fish being cleaned, that it had eaten other, smaller fish.)
While this is an example of conscious inference, justification,
and argumentation, M&S and QT argue that such memory retrievals and inferences occur constantly and without conscious
awareness to guide our actions. Few choices offer dominating
alternatives, and internal conflict between competing objectives
and hence choice alternatives is the norm. Like Franklin’s
example, many decisions also have the potential for postdecisional regret, making it important to bolster confidence that the
chosen option is in fact the best one.
Are there differences between intrapsychic and interpersonal
argumentation? One difference relates to one of the most
crucial components of QT’s sequential argumentation; namely,
the process of output interference, where the first query for evidence supporting the implicitly favored, and thus first-considered, choice option temporarily inhibits arguments for other
choice options, hence reducing generation of support for it
during subsequent queries. This is clearly an intrapsychic
process, not an interpersonal one. It is only when I generate arguments for a given action (and not when someone else does so)
that the accessibility of arguments for other actions in my mind
gets inhibited. To the extent that we find similar subtle biasing
of choices in line with the goals of motivated cognition in
group discussion and decision settings, it must be accomplished
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2
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by different processes. Smith et al. (2009) suggest that interpersonal argumentation in group decisions changes goal-specific
weights and not the order by which evidence is considered and
thus its recall success. M&S find similar differences in implicit
inference processes when inferences are made by a single individual or by several individuals in a group setting.
In summary, preference and inference tasks seem connected,
among other things, by a common argumentative nature, which
may suggest shared cognitive mechanisms (Weber & Johnson
2009).
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Abstract: Mercier & Sperber (M&S) argue for their argumentative
theory in terms of communicative abilities. Insights can be gained by
extending the discussion beyond human reasoning to rodent and robot
navigation. The selection of arguments and conclusions that are
mutually reinforcing can be cast as a form of abductive reasoning that I
argue underlies the construction of cognitive maps in navigation tasks.

Mercier and Sperber’s (M&S’s) theory of the adaptive value of
argumentative reasoning is intriguing from a computational perspective, since the search for arguments that support a given conclusion is computationally more difficult (viewed as a reasoning
problem) than logical reasoning. The first logical solvers were
developed in the 1950s (Newell & Simon 1956). Argumentative
computers are yet to be developed.
Argumentative reasoning, defined broadly as the discovery of
statements to support a given conclusion can be cast as a form
of adbuctive reasoning, or inferring a precondition from a consequent (following Peirce 1931– 35). Such reasoning is logically fallacious, but as M&S’s target article details, it is typical of human
behaviour to select arguments and conclusions that together are
mutually reinforcing.
We accept M&S’s arguments for the adaptive value of argumentative reasoning as a communicative skill. However, just as
questions have been raised in other fields about the evolution
of the sophisticated communicative abilities of humans, we can
also ask how an argumentative ability could have evolved.
Many evolutionary adaptations are thought to be exaptations;
that is, new uses for existing structures. Verbal argumentative
reasoning obviously draws on linguistic ability, but it need not
postdate it. We consider the possibility that cognitive abilities
underlying argumentative reasoning may predate the evolution
of language by exapting abductive abilities from other domains.
Reasoning is not the only domain where adaptive behaviour
may utilise abductive reasoning. A much more ancient evolutionary ability, which humans share with other mammals, birds, reptiles, and even insects, is the ability to navigate. Much is known
about the navigational systems of mammals, including the
neural representations of places (O’Keefe & Dostrovsky 1971)
linked into cognitive maps (O’Keefe & Nadel 1978; Tolman
1948), grid cells (Moser et al. 2008), and head-direction cells
(Taube et al. 1990). Complementing neural studies are computational models and embodied robots, and it is the fully functional
robotic systems (Arleo & Gerstner 2000; Kuipers 2000; Milford
& Wyeth 2003; Thrun 2003) that provide insight for this
commentary.
Two approaches can be contrasted for robotic navigational
systems: a logically correct approach based on Bayesian
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reasoning (analogous to deductive reasoning), and one based
on a bio-inspired approach that exploits a form of abductive
reasoning to constructive a cognitive map. In mobile robots, a
key problem is to maintain an estimate of one’s current location
while exploring and mapping a new environment (called simultaneous localisation and mapping [SLAM]).Given information
about localisation (such as a Global Positioning System [GPS]),
mapping is a relatively straightforward deductive reasoning
problem, and conversely, given a map, localisation is straightforward. However, when both tasks must be solved simultaneously
(in the absence of GPS), the errors in each compound. Many
locations do not have unique landmarks; apparently unique features of one environment may turn out to be present only transiently or to be shared by other locations. Even recognising a
previously visited location at a later time can be challenging. In
vision-only SLAM, one of the best-performing systems is the
RatSLAM system (Milford 2008), inspired by the hippocampal
mapping system of the rodent. Initially developed using place
cells and head-direction cells, it was discovered early on that
the robots also needed something akin to grid cells (although
when the model was first developed in 2003, grid cells themselves
were yet to be discovered). RatSLAM learns the paths that a
robot traverses through its environment and links them into
maps. It uses a unique optimisation system that maintains information that is locally consistent, while also estimating a global
map.
If a location is considered a “conclusion” in a mapping task,
and features of the environment are considered “arguments to
support that conclusion,” then systems that are effective at navigation are of necessity abductive reasoners. Maps are constructed
by using locations for which there is evidence, and evidence is
retained when it is useful for localisation. Maps and their evidence need to be mutually reinforcing to be useful. The hippocampus has been linked to many aspects of cognition as well as
spatial memory. Argumentative reasoning may well be the
latest of its exapted abilities.
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Abstract: The empirical research on the psychology of argumentation
suggests that people are prone to fallacies and suboptimal performance
in generating, comprehending, and evaluating arguments. Reasoning
and argumentation are interrelated skills that use many of the same
cognitive processes. The processes we use to convince others are also
used to convince ourselves. Argumentation would be ineffective if we
couldn’t reason for ourselves.

Mercier and Sperber (M&S) are insightful in proposing a strong
link between reasoning and argumentation. Understanding the
argumentative context sheds light on the processes of reasoning.
However, empirical research on the psychology of argumentation
contradicts several of their key claims. Contrary to their position,
reasoning biases are common even in the context of argumentation, the confirmation bias is not a feature of argumentation and
actually weakens arguments, and people cling to claims less
rigidly than is tacitly assumed by the authors.
M&S’s review of the literature on the psychology of argumentation is surprisingly sparse. Unfortunately, the data suggest that
people are subject to fallacies and suboptimal performance in
generating, comprehending, and evaluating arguments. Kuhn
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(2001) found that 4-year-old children are able to distinguish
between evidence and explanation. However, children are
often poor at generating arguments (Means & Voss 1996). In adolescents, national educational assessments find that only about
15% of 12th graders are adequately skilled in developing
written arguments (Beatty 1996; Greenwald et al. 1999). Anne
Britt and colleagues conducted a series of experiments on the
comprehension, evaluation, and generation of argumentative
texts by college students. Among their findings, only about 35%
of participants were able to identify the main claims and
reasons in arguments, 37% failed to reject unsupported arguments, 32% failed to reject unwarranted arguments, 48%
included other-side information in their arguments, and 65%
wrote essays that did not include a single reason to support
their claims (Britt & Kurby 2005; Britt & Larson 2003; Britt
et al. 2005; Larson et al. 2004). Britt et al. (2008) found that university students have difficulty precisely recalling the main predicate of argument claims, but less difficulty recalling the
predicates of comparable narrative statements. Wolfe et al.
(2007) found that highly implausible reasons and warrants (for
example, Paul should walk to the store “because walking is the
absolute best exercise that will ever exist, and exercising can
lead to immortality”) yielded higher agreement than the same
claims without support. Argumentation is a fundamental skill
that permeates human thinking (Voss & Van Dyke 2001).
However, M&S have painted an unduly optimistic portrait of
our argumentation abilities.
Some of what M&S describe as “confirmation bias” is sometimes called the “myside bias” (Baron 1995; Perkins et al. 1991;
Toplak & Stanovich 2003; Wolfe & Britt 2005; 2008; Wolfe
et al. 2009a). Although some authors use the terms interchangeably, confirmation bias typically refers to a biased search for or
weighing of evidence, whereas myside bias refers to biases in
generating reasons or arguments (Wolfe & Britt 2008). M&S
state that the confirmation bias “is a consequence of the function
of reasoning and hence a feature of reasoning when used for the
production of arguments” (sect. 3, para. 1, emphasis theirs). My
colleagues and I have conducted a series of experiments on argumentation, and the evidence differs in key respects from their
assertions (Wolfe & Britt 2005; 2008; Wolfe et al. 2009a).
Wolfe & Britt (2008) had participants write argumentative
essays under different conditions. Some were assigned to write
essays for and others against an unpopular proposition. Participants had access to a number of pro and con online texts, and
we also examined their search behavior. We found that the
myside bias was pervasive. However, it was not linked to participant’s personal opinions. People exhibited the myside bias when
arguing for the side with which they personally disagreed just as
often as for the side with which they agreed. We have replicated
this finding, yet also find significant correlations between opinion
strength and myside bias on nonargumentative reasoning tasks
(Wolfe & Boone, under review; Wolfe & Britt 2008). Moreover,
participants exhibiting the myside bias in their arguments were
not biased in their search. They sought out both pro-side and
con-side texts.
The myside bias is indeed a bias – even in the context of argumentation. To illustrate, a content analysis of published authentic
arguments found that most writers included other-side information in their arguments, commonly for the purpose of rebuttal
(see Wolfe & Britt 2008). In laboratory experiments, presenting
and rebutting other-side information consistently leads to
better ratings of agreement, argument quality, and impressions
of authors than does excluding other-side information (Wolfe &
Boone, under review; Wolfe et al. 2009a). The myside bias
weakens arguments measurably.
The factors predicting the myside bias in written essays are
individual differences in beliefs about argumentation. Evidence
stems from successful tutorials that significantly reduce the
myside bias in generating and evaluating arguments (Wolfe
et al. 2009a; 2009b), answers to the open-ended question “what

makes a good argument?” (Wolfe & Britt 2008), and reliable individual difference measures (Wolfe & Boone, under review;
Wolfe & Britt 2009). The context of argumentation changes the
nature of the myside bias, but one-sided argumentation is problematic and not an inherent feature of argumentation.
A tacit assumption in M&S’s account is that people have
strong, stable preferences and unwavering commitments to
claims. Argumentation is seen as a form of rationalization used
to convince others of claims derived from intuitive processes
about which people are only dimly aware. Yet, starting with
early research on informal reasoning (Perkins et al. 1983), we
have learned that positions are often fluid and tentative. As
reasoning progresses, those positions undergo changes. We typically argue about matters that are “debatable,” where reasonable
people arrive at different conclusions and are open to persuasion.
I believe that reasoning and argumentation are interrelated skills
drawing on many of the same cognitive processes – two sides of
the same coin. Dual-process theories suggest that people lack
access to many of our own cognitive processes. Thus, when we
have tentative intuitions that are not well understood, we use
many of the same processes to convince ourselves that in other
contexts we use to convince other people. However flawed
these processes may be, argumentation would be ineffective if
we were not also able to reason for ourselves.

Deliberative democracy and epistemic
humility
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Abstract: Deliberative democracy is one of the best designs that could
facilitate good public policy decision making and bring about epistemic
good based on Mercier and Sperber’s (M&S’s) theory of reasoning.
However, three conditions are necessary: (1) an ethic of individual
epistemic humility, (2) a pragmatic deflationist definition of truth, and
(3) a microscopic framing power analysis during group reasoning.

In recent decades, we have witnessed many public policy scandals and controversies in which, compared with laypersons,
experts are not necessarily better in either epistemic or moral
aspects (Godlee 2010; Jasanoff 2003; Wynne 1996). Following
the loss of public trust in expert decision making, new discourses
of deliberative democracy for public policy making have
appeared (Lengwiler 2008). Examples in the new trend of
emphasizing public participation are consensus conferences, citizens’ juries, citizens’ panels, and the like (Abelson et al. 2003).
Usually, there are two meanings of deliberation: The first is “a
particular sort of discussion” that “involves the careful and
serious weighing of reasons for and against some proposition”
(Fearon 1998, p. 63). The second is “an interior process” of
reason weighing by an individual (Fearon 1998, p. 63). Deliberative democracy adopts the first meaning, so deliberative democracy fits in Mercier and Sperber’s (M&S’s) group-reasoning
situation.
Many theoretical arguments support deliberative democracy,
but here I focus on the epistemic aspect of deliberative democracy. According to John Dewey’s experimentalist account of
democracy, the epistemic power of democracy is inseparable
from citizens’ collective deliberation. In a democratic regime,
citizens are engaged to deliberate collectively over the foreseen
consequences of public policies and then choose, test, evaluate,
and revise the policies implemented. Accordingly, the discussions among citizens with diverse backgrounds and local knowledge could facilitate the fair recognition of public interest
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2
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problems and the adoption of public policy proposals that are
comprehensive enough. Public policy choice and implementation is like an experiment in whether dynamic feedback from
the policy implementation will render another session of democratic deliberation (Anderson 2006). Also, according to another
pragmatist, C. S. Peirce, a proposition could be true if it can
survive the test of best reasons, evidence, and arguments
(Misak 2009). Since almost no one would deem the seeking of
truth an unworthy goal, it holds that deliberation in a democratic
regime would offer the best chance of achieving this goal (Talisse
2009).
As already mentioned, the typically adopted concept criteria of
deliberative democracy include the state of disagreement among
the participants and the task of reaching collective decisions
(Thompson 2008). Therefore, a good design of deliberative
democracy would be compatible with the propositions by M&S
about reasoning for arguments. Accordingly, all individuals, no
matter whether they are experts or laypersons, are subject to
proactive reasoning. When these individuals deliberate alone,
they usually reason to confirm, rather than scrutinize, their original arguments. It is better to conduct group reasoning such that
each member can contribute to mutual non-proactive evaluations
of arguments and conclusions not in their favor. For M&S,
“[a]rgumentation is uniquely effective in overcoming disagreements that are likely to occur, in particular in relatively equalitarian groups” (sect. 1.2, para. 9).
Also, to legitimize the conclusions reached through deliberative democracy, it is usually proposed that in the process of
mutual justification (presenting and responding to reasons
intended to justify a political decision [Gutmann & Thompson
2004]), deliberative democracy should have such characteristics
as public spiritedness (arguments for common good), equal
respect for each participant, accommodation (retaining the possibility of collaboration on other issues), and equal participation
(no domination phenomenon) (Thompson 2008). The epistemic
good of deliberative democracy comes from engaging people
with different motivations for group reasoning and subjecting
each version of reasoning to mutual scrutiny. Thus, current
theoretical proposals have shown that deliberative democracy is
one of the best designs for facilitating good public policy, as
implied in M&S’s theory.
Empirical research into the effectiveness of deliberative
democracy is still in its burgeoning stage, but the qualified
promise of deliberative democracy demonstrates that deliberation is not an easy task (Ryfe 2005). A good design of deliberative
democracy should establish rules to maintain the theoretical
aims, allow people to tell stories to make cultural meanings in
addition to making cognitive sense, encourage leadership that
facilitates deliberation, endeavor to relate the outcome of deliberation to the participants, and finally create environments to
facilitate learning how to deliberate (Ryfe 2005). All these
complicated issues were not addressed by M&S and could
supplement their propositions as applied outside of the experimental fields.
Three conditions are needed for deliberative democracy to
achieve epistemic good. First, when it comes to equal participation in deliberative democracy, the explicit and implicit standards for the concepts used in the communication might lead
to the exclusion of the concepts used by the marginalized
groups to make cultural meanings. In this kind of “hermeneutic
injustice” (Fricker 2007), the majority’s conceptual framework
might squeeze out or mask the minority’s specific experiences.
For example, in John Rawls’ formulation of public reason, if
the contents of claims contain concepts that are not easily available and assessable by the public, these claims would be excluded
from the public domains because they contain no recognitionworthy reasons (Morgan-Olsen 2010). However, we should not
forget that the frames and ways we observe and analyze things
often constrain our decisions and results (Wu 2008). Therefore,
we should uphold an ethic of epistemic humility by which we

94

BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2

take serious novel concepts and experiences presented in
deliberation.
Second, we should recognize that if the epistemic goal of deliberative democracy were to seek truth, then the dynamism in the
process would only point us to the deflationist version of truth.
There is no way we could ascertain the realist version of truth
through deliberation over the feedback from the implementation
of public policies. Sticking to the realist version of truth would
disrupt the function of deliberation, bringing it to a halt. Third,
pursuing the previous two conditions, we have to analyze the
explicit and implicit operations of microscopic framing powers
empirically during group reasoning. Here, I do not insist on
the abolition of all these operations of framing powers (Lengwiler
2008), but we should understand whether the minority concepts
and frames are given their due course for sense making and
meaning making. Based on the findings, we could further
design the rules that would meet the requirements of epistemic
humility.
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Abstract: Having defended the usefulness of our definition of
reasoning, we stress that reasoning is not only for convincing
but also for evaluating arguments, and that as such it has an
epistemic function. We defend the evidence supporting the
theory against several challenges: People are good informal
arguers, they reason better in groups, and they have a
confirmation bias. Finally, we consider possible extensions, first
in terms of process-level theories of reasoning, and second in
the effects of reasoning outside the lab.

We are grateful to the commentators for their support,
their insightful criticisms, and their useful suggestions.
Even when we felt we were being misunderstood, we
learned – or so we hope – how to make our case in a
clearer and more compelling manner. In answering
these commentaries, we focus in turn on the evolution
and the function of reasoning, on its strengths and
biases, and on its mode of operation. But first we have to
defend our definition of reasoning against several
challenges.
R1. Different definitions of reasoning
In the target article, we defined reasoning as the mental act
of constructing or evaluating an argument that is at least
partly explicit In particular, it must contain both a conclusion and reasons to accept this conclusion, even if
some of the steps leading from these reasons to the conclusions are left implicit. In this sense, reasoning is in
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contrast with ordinary intuitive inference, a process that
yields a conclusion without articulating the reasons to
accept it. So far, our definition is close enough to philosophical and commonsense use of the term reasoning and at
odds with the now widespread use in psychology of
“reasoning” as a mere synonym of inference. Needless to
say, several definitions of reasoning may each target a
phenomenon worth studying.
In line with much evolutionary psychology, we
assumed that the mind is an articulation of many fairly
specialized mechanisms; in particular, mechanisms of
intuitive inference that are specialized for a specific cognitive domain or task such as recognizing faces, interpreting
their expressions, processing frequencies, and decoding
speech. Even though it contrasts with ordinary intuitive
inference, reasoning as we describe it is itself a form of
higher-order intuitive inference with a specialized
domain and task: It delivers intuitions about reasons-conclusions relationships. This way of distinguishing reasoning proper from other inferential mechanisms is largely
rooted in the same kind of observations and concerns
that have led to the development of dual-process or
dual-system approaches to reasoning (as we have discussed in greater detail in Mercier & Sperber 2009).
Several commentaries defend a different definition of
reasoning that may be closer to that of inference in
general or to a more standard dual-process approach to
system 2 reasoning.
Khlentzos & Stevenson suggest that some type of
system 2 reasoning must have evolved to arbitrate
between contradictory system 1 outputs. Unless a very
liberal definition of system 2 is adopted – one that encompasses much more than reasoning as it is defined here – it
seems as though such problems are routinely solved by
system 1 itself. Any cognitively complex organism will be
faced with contradictory outputs – for instance, when perception contradicts memory because the environment has
changed – and must have ways to arbitrate among them.
Reasoning may help accomplish this task in some difficult
cases, but it is specifically geared toward this end – and
this would be true even with a much broader definition
of the term reasoning.
Poletiek makes a comparable proposal regarding action
selection, using the example of people looking for their keys
and having to choose between different search strategies.
According to her, it is mostly a consideration of costs and
benefits that decide whether the search is “confirmatory”
or “falsificatory.” But, as we suggested, such choices are
commonly made without reasoning proper (a point Poletiek
seems to agree with). Evolved intuitive mechanisms of
action selection are designed to take into account costs
and benefits without producing the reasons for their
choices. Reasoning, on the other hand, produces such
reasons and hence a justification for a course of action
without directly triggering it. Narvaez suggests in the
same vein that reasoning “includes figuring out what
course of action to take” (para. 2). While reasoning is sometimes used in decision making – as reviewed in section 5 of
the target article – the vast majority of our actions are
guided by intuitions and so fall outside of the scope of
reasoning as defined and thus outside the scope of the
article, as well.
More generally, thinking and action selection involve
more than just domain-specific intuitive inferences and

reflective reasoning. In many dual-process models,
system 2 is in fact likely to encompass mechanisms other
than reasoning. Evans suggests hypothetical thinking –
the ability to represent future situations. Narvaez refers
to some forms of elaborated planning. Connolly & Reb
talk of mechanisms designed to avoid decisions we
would regret, making interesting suggestions regarding
ways to eliminate some reasoning biases – in particular
reason-based choice. These authors point out that these
mechanisms can directly lead to good outcomes without
involving argumentation, and see this as an objection to
our evolutionary argument. But these mechanisms do
not qualify as reasoning under our definition – they are
not necessarily reflective, they do not deal with arguments,
and so on. Still, these suggestion point towards an interesting direction of research. While system 1 is commonly
seen as a set of difference mechanisms, system 2 is often
considered to be more unitary. It is also possible
however to view system 2 as comprising several different
mechanisms, such as reasoning, planning, imagination,
and strategic thinking, each with a specific function.
What might justify seeing these different mechanisms as
part of a single system is, for instance, their heavy use of
working memory or of metarepresentational machinery.
If different system 2 mechanisms shared such common
resources, this might help explain the covariation of
traits measured by various measures of cognitive ability
stressed by Evans.
Our definition of reasoning may be debatable, but the
argumentative approach to reasoning is about reasoning
as we defined it. To object to this definition, it is not
enough to offer another definition that may be reasonable
and useful. What would have to be shown is that ours fails
to identify a phenomenon with enough autonomy and
integrity to be a proper object of study and insight.

R2. Evolution and function of reasoning
A number of objections and suggestions were based, we
feel, on a partial or, in some cases, mistaken understanding
of our hypothesis on the evolution and the function of
reasoning. The misunderstanding we are most eager to
correct consists in attributing to us the view that reasoning
has only rhetorical rather than both rhetorical and epistemic goals. We didn’t argue that reasoning is designed only
to find arguments in order to persuade others (GodfreySmith & Yegnashankaran; Poletiek). We don’t hold
that epistemic goals should be poorly served by reasoning
(Khlentzos & Stevenson; Kuhn), or that mere rhetoric is
all it takes to influence people (Narvaez; Sternberg). Nor
does it follow from our account that people should hardly
ever change their mind (Wolfe). On the contrary, reasoning evolved in part to make people change their mind by
giving them good reasons to do so. These misunderstandings may be linked to the fact that, in the target article, we
devoted more space to the production of arguments by
communicators (whose goal is indeed to persuade) than
to the evaluation of these arguments by the audience
(whose goal is to be informed). This imbalance reflected
the present state of the literature we surveyed rather
than a theoretical bias. Actually, the argumentative
theory would not make evolutionary sense if arguments
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were addressed to people who were wholly unable to
evaluate them from a sound epistemic perspective.
R2.1. The double-sided argumentative function
of reasoning

Why does reasoning exist at all, given that it is a relatively
high-cost mental activity with a relatively high failure rate?
To answer this question, we proposed to step back from
the study of individual cognitive processes and to look at
the evolution of human communication. Humans are
immersed in a flow of socially transmitted information
and are highly dependent on it. For communication to
have evolved, it had to be advantageous to both communicators and receivers (who are, of course, the same individuals but acting in two different capacities). What makes
communication advantageous to receivers is that it provides them with rich information that they could not, or
not easily, have obtained on their own. For this, the information they receive has to be genuine information; that is,
close enough to truth. What makes communication advantageous to communicators is that it allows them to achieve
some desirable effect in the receivers. For this, the information they emit has to be conducive to this effect,
whether it is true or false.
Dessalles, who has himself developed a perspective in
some respects comparable to ours, understands us to claim
that “the biological function of reasoning is to achieve
shared knowledge optimization” (para. 2) and that this is
done not at the individual but at the group level. We do
argue that the main function of reasoning is indeed
social but by serving the social interests of individuals
rather than the collective interests of the group.
To reap the benefits of communication while limiting
the risk of being misled, receivers must exercise what we
have called epistemic vigilance (Sperber et al. 2010).
There is no fail-safe algorithm to sort genuine from spurious information; hence, we argue, various cost-effective
heuristics that may contribute to approximating such a
sorting are likely to have evolved. The main heuristic of
epistemic vigilance consists in assessing the trustworthiness of communicators. Thus, we agree with Opfer &
Sloutsky that “children detect trustworthiness long
before they detect argument inconsistency” (para. 4)
(e.g., see Mascaro & Sperber 2009). But if detecting the
trustworthiness of communicators were the only heuristic
used, then receivers would end up rejecting a good
amount of genuine and relevant information when they
lack sufficient ground to accept it on trust. For instance,
few if any readers of our article would accept its conclusions just out of trust in its authors! To be more effective, epistemic vigilance must be exercised not only
towards the source of information but also towards its
content. Independently of its source, a message may
have a greater or a lesser believability. This believability
is assessed by considering its coherence with background
knowledge. Coherence checking, we argue, is the second
major heuristic used in filtering communicated information, and is at the basis of reasoning proper.
Coherence checking starts as a method for receivers to
filter information; it ends up being exploited also by communicators who engage in coherence displays in order to
have their messages accepted. Just as receivers would
filter out some genuine information if they relied only on
96

BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2

the trustworthiness of the source, communicators would
fail to communicate some believable messages if they
relied only on their own authority. Arguing consists in displaying coherence-based reasons for the acceptance of a
given message. It is, in essence, an “honest display” strategy opened to evaluation and aimed at the audience’s epistemic concerns. Of course, what is displayed may be an
invalid argument made in the service of deception and
in the hope that its invalidity won’t be detected. Contrary
to what Dessalles attributes to us, we do not believe that
communicators argue in order “to correct or update
others’ beliefs” (para. 3) when it is not to their advantage.
They argue for whatever it is advantageous to them to have
their audience believe. Often enough, for instance, when
communicating to coordinate action, communicator and
audience have convergent interests in sharing true information, but this is far from being always the case.
In an evolutionary perspective, receivers’ coherence
checking creates selective pressure for communicators’
coherence displays in the form of arguments, which in
turn creates selective pressure for adequate evaluation of
arguments on the part of receivers. At least in some cultural contexts, this results in a kind of arms race towards
greater sophistication in the production and evaluation
of arguments. Of course, argumentation can be misused
and abused – for instance, by arguing above the head of
one’s audience (Sperber 2009) or by lacing arguments
with appeals to emotion. Doing so, however, is more
likely to serve the interests of the communicator than
those of the audience. Contrary to what Opfer &
Sloutsky maintain, “hot” persuasion is advantageous to
communicators only to the extent that receivers yield to
it, but it is not advantageous to receivers who care to be
well informed. For this they had better reason, as Petty
and Cacioppo (whom Opfer & Sloutsky oddly cite in
support of their claim) have shown in numerous experiments that demonstrate precisely this point: When
people are motivated to reason, they do a better job at
accepting only sound arguments, which is quite generally
to their advantage (e.g., see Petty et al. 1981).

R2.2. Other functions of reasoning?

Several commentators, while agreeing that argumentation
may be an important function of reasoning, suggest that it
may serve other functions, as well: either social functions
other than the production and evaluation of arguments
(Baumeister, Masicampo, & DeWall [Baumeister
et al.]; Dessalles; Frankish; Pietraszewski) or functions
contributing to individual cognition (Evans; Frankish;
Godfrey-Smith & Yegnashankaran). We recognize the
possibility. Our claim is that argumentation is the main function of reasoning, and we tried to demonstrate this claim by
showing the signature of this function in the way reasoning
actually functions, and in particular in what has been seen
as flaws and that we argue are features of reasoning. Any
evolved mechanism can be put to a variety of uses: The
mouth can be used to play a wind instrument, the skin can
be used to display tattoos, and the sense of smell can be
used to develop wine expertise. Whether these additional
uses become functions in the biological sense, or even
main functions (in which case Gould and Vrba’s term exaptation might be properly applied) depends on the relative
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contribution these uses make to the fitness of organisms
endowed with the mechanism.
Dessalles and Frankish suggest that argumentation
could have evolved as a means to display one’s intellectual
skills. Indeed, argumentation can be put to such a use.
However, the human drive to show off is so strong that
just about everything in our physical and cognitive
makeup has been recruited to that effect. People may
indeed run, fight, or argue to impress others. But what
makes these performances not only impressive but relevant is that running, fighting and arguing are useful for
purposes other than impressing others. Moreover, the production of arguments typically involves a high degree of
mere satisficing (Mercier, submitted a). People do not
look for the best formulation of the best possible argument. Instead, they use the first minimally decent argument that comes to mind. If it works, then it wasn’t
worth expending more effort. If it doesn’t, it is easy to
try a rebuttal or another argument. This way of arguing
is to be expected only if the goal is to convince, but it
would be very surprising if reasoning had the function to
display one’s skills by producing impressive arguments.
In other words, reasoning is more like a crow’s than a peacock’s tail: It may be a bit drab, but it serves its main function well. Its occasional use, for instance, in academic
milieus, to display one’s intellectual skills is unlikely to
contribute to fitness to the point of having become a biological function, let alone the main function of reasoning.
Pietraszewski rightly points out that argumentation is
used not just in the defense of factual claims but also of
claims that are not properly speaking matters of fact but
more matters of choice or of social alignment. He distinguishes two classes of cases, one where the goal of arguments is “to change representations of the payoff structure
of pursuing certain future plans” (para. 8). When argumentation is used for such purpose, it recruits intuitions
that bear on the domain at hand – for example, what is
advantageous or what is well regarded – and puts
forward reasons for a conclusion. Such cases may fall
squarely under the characterization we have given of
reasoning. Pietraszewski also draws attention to a second
class of cases where “agreement and disagreement . . .
become commodities in themselves as a way of signaling
the coordination strength and challenging others. This
class of argumentation psychology should be designed to
conflate evaluations of the argument with the source and
social context of the argument; who is arguing should be
just as important as what they are saying when considering
the ‘goodness’ of an argument” (para. 9). This is a welcome
and important observation, but does it point to another
function of reasoning? We would suggest rather that it
highlights that communication typically involves a mix of
means and goals. The main relevance of a communicative
act may be in its explicit content, in its implicatures, or in
the very fact that it took place at all (Sperber & Wilson
1995); it may have to do with transmission of factual information or, indeed, with signaling agreement and disagreement. This can be done in particular by using arguments
not so much to convince but to polarize. The phenomenon
of polarization that, in the target article, we discussed
mostly in negative terms, should probably be seen as fulfilling a function along the lines suggested by Pietraszewski. This said, it is not clear that it bears so much on
the function of reasoning rather than on a wider range of

mechanisms of social cognition that exploit and interact
with argumentation in a variety of communicative interactions. In particular, as Opfer & Sloutsky insist and as
Sell (2006, quoted by Pietraszewski) has shown with the
example of anger, “hot” communication interferes with
argumentation in important ways, reminding us that argumentation is only one device for persuasion among several.
Baumeister et al. draw attention to two major
phenomena linked to reasoning: consciousness and
culture. We noted that reasoning is a typically conscious
activity but we did not elaborate for lack of sufficiently
clear ideas regarding consciousness in general and its
relationship to reasoning in particular. Baumeister et al.
propose to extend the social hypothesis towards conscious
thought in general: “Conscious thought enables people to
talk to others and thereby enables small groups to resolve
differences” (para. 6). Their arguments are indeed very
congenial to the argumentative theory. Reasoning could
then be seen as one part of a larger set of mental processes
that are not typically thought of as being social by nature,
even though they actually are. Baumeister and colleagues
have made forays in this direction, and we hope that more
research will follow, shedding new light on well-known but
still puzzling results.
Regarding the role of reasoning in culture, we agree that
indeed it is a source of cultural innovation (for example, in
technology, law, and the sciences) and that it plays a role in
cultural communication (with great cultural variations, we
surmise). However, we are not convinced that this is the
function or even a function of reasoning. Reasoning is
advantageous to individuals who are better able to persuade
others or to discriminate good from bad arguments. Most of
the arguments humans produce and evaluate are about very
local concerns: Who forgot to close the door? Should we
walk or take the bus? Was John lying or mistaken?
Reasoned answers to these local questions don’t ever
reach a cultural level of distribution. Reasoning in order
to improve laws or to discover new techniques is very
rare. It may well be beneficial to the group, but that is
not enough to assume that reasoning evolved, through
group selection, for such a benefit.
Godfrey-Smith & Yegnashankaran, drawing on
Vygotsky, make the interesting suggestion that “reasoning
is deliberative [i.e., individualistic] in function but dialogic
in structure” (para. 3). We do not dispute that reasoning
can be used for individual ratiocination. Even though solitary reasoning may not be the most effective way to
enhance individual cognitive goals, we do not exclude
that such enhancement may have sufficiently contributed
to the relative fitness of reasoners to constitute a function
of reasoning. What we would dispute is that this is at all
likely to be the main function of reasoning, and the
Godfrey-Smith & Yegnashankaran commentary is helpful
to spell out the argument. If they are right and individualistic reasoning is dialogic in structure, why should this be
so? Were a computer scientist to design a reasoning
program (not specifically aimed at argumentation),
would she opt for such a structure? In fact, many reasoning program have been developed in artificial intelligence
(AI) and in the psychology of reasoning (e.g., JohnsonLaird 2006; Rips 1994), and typically they generate
arguments (in the formal sense of the term) without any
dialogic back-and-forth between two agents. We suggest
that this dialogic structure of individual reasoning is the
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signature of its primarily argumentative main function. We
would argue moreover that the main contribution of
reasoning to individual cognition is in helping people
evaluate other people’s arguments.
Both Evans and Frankish suggest an interesting way to
reconcile our suggestion that reasoning may have evolved
for argumentation and the more classical view that it
serves first and foremost individual cognitive goals. This individualistic function, Evans argues, might be an exaptation
from an initial argumentative function favored by the concomitant evolution of “language, metarepresentation, and large
forebrains” (para. 6). Frankish proposes that reasoning, even
if it primarily evolved for argumentation, might have been
substantially “co-opted to play a role in individual cognition”
(para. 5). As we said in the preceding paragraph, we do not
exclude the possibility that reasoning may also be adaptive in
helping individual ratiocination. Still, our argument remains
that the many apparent failings of reasoning – our knowledge of which owes much to Evans himself – make better
sense as the signature of a main argumentative function.
Evans insists on the role of reasoning in anticipating the
future. While anticipating the future is a major aspect of
human cognition, it is not clear to us what specific role
reasoning plays in this process, by contrast with other abilities such as imagination and simulation. It is even less
clear what features of reasoning, if any, are specifically tailored for this role. Frankish points out that reasoning can
be used to strengthen our resolve by buttressing our
decisions with supporting arguments. Indeed, reasoning
can do exactly that. However, if weakness of resolve had
been enough of a problem to favor the evolution of a
mechanism to deal with it, presumably the natural selection solution would have been to strengthen our resolve
directly rather than to adapt reasoning to find resolutionstrengthening arguments. Moreover, this very tendency
to use reasoning to bolster our beliefs and decisions is
likely to have more negative than positive consequences,
as highlighted in section 4.2 of the target article.
R3. Strengths and biases of reasoning
and argumentation
R3.1. Are we really good at argumentation?

If reasoning evolved for argumentation, humans should
possess decent argumentative skills: They should be able
to engage in an informal debate, constructing, evaluating,
and rebutting arguments. Several commentators question
that this is so, pointing to research that shows significant
improvement in argumentative ability through learning
and casting doubt on the data we presented to defend
argumentative skills.
Harrell, Kuhn, and Wolfe all point to very interesting
data showing improvement in argumentation skills with
training – as well as the relative poverty of these skills
before training. Most of the studies cited, however, bear
on meta-argumentative skills. Kuhn et al. (2008) report
gains in “meta-level communications about the discourse”
(p. 1310). Larson et al. (2004) study the understanding of
long written arguments. Critical thinking skills are often
evaluated through the ability to draw argument schemas
or to recognize the different components of an argument
and their relationship to one another. Such skills may
very well be crucial for success in modern academic life
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or even be of relevance to participation in democratic life,
and their study in important in its own right. However,
they are not part of what one can expect basic argumentative skills to be. Language provides a useful analogy. One
can be a fluent language user without being able to tell
what a verb is or, a fortiori, to parse a sentence. Likewise,
one can be a skilled arguer without being able to recognize
argument forms or draw argument schemas. In both cases,
these abilities can help – a mastery of syntax can make one
a better poet, a mastery of argument schemes a better essayist – but they are not necessary.
One study seems to tap into a more fundamental argumentative skill – the ability to draw counterarguments (Goldstein
et al. 2009). In this experiment, sixth and seventh graders had
to choose between a counterargument and a novel argument
in a fictitious discussion, and they tended to choose the latter
instead of the former. Even though the context successfully
mimicked a debate, it does not follow that the participants
were highly motivated to defend a position that had been arbitrarily assigned to them. In such a context, it is not surprising
that they should engage in satisficing and pick an argument
that might just be enough. Moreover, although the counterargument option might have been formally superior, it is not
clear that it would have been the most efficient one in a real
discussion.
Harrell and Wolfe also dispute the data used as evidence
of people’s basic argumentative skills. Harrell suggests deflationary interpretations for several of the findings we cite,
but, however ingenious, these interpretations are not compelling. To be more specific: Bailenson and Rips (1996) do
observe that being the first speaker increases the burden
of proof. But with contentious first sentences such as “abortions should not be illegal” (p. S7), this is hardly surprising –
or nonnormative. In Rips (2002), the repetitions are nothing
but innocuous, and so participants are right to discount
arguments accordingly. Neuman et al. (2006) do not really
observe worse performance among people who argue. Participants were merely avoiding pointing out a fallacy in a
polite dialogue (cf. Rips 2002, n. 1), but they were still perfectly able to detect it in a rougher discussion. Thompson
et al. (2005) observed more belief bias when people were
engaged in an argument . . . because people were asked
about their opinion and not logical validity. Far from
having “difficulty producing evidence for a claim” (Harrell,
para. 7), the participants in the study by Sá et al. (2005)
were able to muster nearly six arguments to defend their
opinion on difficult topics (for example, Why do children
fail in school?). If these arguments were not always the
best, this is only to be expected in such circumstances (as
explained in sect. 2.3 of the target article).
Uleman, Kressel, & Rim [Uleman et al.] point out
that the strong and weak arguments used in most persuasion research are “pretested . . . to have these properties”
(para. 10), so that it is hardly surprising that strong arguments should be more convincing. That researchers want
to make sure their intuitions about argument strength
are appropriate does not mean that they are without
grounding, however. For instance, when trying to persuade students that a new exam would be beneficial, a
strong argument might be that “average starting salaries
are higher for graduates of schools with the exams”
(Petty & Cacioppo 1979, p. 1921) accompanied by relevant
statistics. By contrast, a weak argument might read “by not
administering the exams, a tradition dating back to the
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ancient Greeks was being violated.” It is not a stretch to find
some objectivity in this judgment of strength: It is not a
mere experimental artifact that the stronger arguments, in
these experiments, do actually provide more support for
their conclusion. Finally, Wolfe mentions a study in
which “implausible reasons and warrants . . . yielded
higher agreement than the same claims without support”
(para. 2). Famously, Langer et al. (1978) had already
demonstrated the effect of poor reasons more than 30
years ago. However, they also showed that the effect
mostly disappeared when the stakes increased – as argued
in the target article, whether people genuinely evaluate
arguments depends on how much they care about (and disagree with) the conclusion.
So, without denying that spontaneous argumentation
skills are imperfect and can be improved by teaching –
and that this is linked to the variable importance given
to argumentation in different cultures and institutions –
we maintain that they display a remarkable superiority to
the reasoning skill elicited in nonargumentative contexts.
R3.2. How efﬁcient is group reasoning?

This question has elicited contrary opinions from the commentators. Khlentzos & Stevenson think that good performance in groups is obvious since “subjects share a
common goal of finding the correct solution” (para. 11).
However, the same participants can face the same problems
with the same goal but individually fail, so having the
correct answer as a goal can hardly be the whole story.
Johnson, on the other hand, questions the generality of
good group performance, and Sternberg claims that
groups are actually very poor at reasoning or decision
making, citing as a support the groupthink syndrome or
group polarization. First, it should be stressed that the argumentative theory does not predict that groups will always
make better decisions, but merely that reasoning should
work better in the context of a genuine debate. Many
other factors besides reasoning can impact the outcome of
a discussion – strategic considerations, face saving, and so
forth. And reasoning in group can also bring poor outcomes
when there is no genuine deliberation. Actually, in section
2.3 of the target article, we offer an explanation based on
the argumentative theory for group polarization. Without
a refutation of this explanation, we don’t see how this very
phenomenon can be used as evidence against the theory.
Finally, Opfer & Sloutsky mention one study that
showed groups of children performing more poorly after
a discussion (Levin & Druyan 1993). It is true that sometimes the best arguments will point in the wrong direction.
When, in the early 20th century, geologists argued against
Alfred Wegener’s theory of continental drift, their mistaken
conclusions stemmed not from poor reasoning but from the
state of knowledge at the time. Moreover, the explanation
offered by Opfer & Sloutsky – that the group member
with the correct answer is simply more confident – has
already been refuted in section 2.3 of the target article
(for instance, how could that account for groups performing
better than their best member?).

side. This is why, we surmised, the confirmation bias is a
feature of reasoning, at least in its role of argument producer. De Neys, Poletiek, Stupple & Ball, and Wolfe have
reservations about the prevalence and robustness of this
bias.
Poletiek questions the evidence from hypothesis
testing problems cited in support of the idea that the confirmation bias is specific to reasoning (sect. 3.1). We agree
with Poletiek that most of hypothesis testing is actually not
directed by reasoning, and that confirmatory strategies are
the result of heuristics that do not display a genuine confirmation bias. But this does not explain why people fail
to adopt falsificatory strategies when they are asked to
and adopt them spontaneously when they test someone
else’s hypothesis. It seems as though reasoning is unable
to correct our own intuitions even though it can easily
try to correct those of others.
Wolfe mentions a number of studies about the myside
bias; that is, the tendency for participants to mostly – or
only – give arguments that support their opinion. One of
these studies show that, although “pervasive,” the myside
bias could be oriented by the instructions (Wolfe & Britt
2008). Participants could be made to write essays against
their opinion about a pretend requirement to “impose a
2-year math requirement for all students” (p. 8). But in
this experiment, participants did not have to generate
the arguments themselves. Instead, they were provided
with a series of arguments for and against the position.
As a result, they did not have to fight their confirmation
bias and engage in the truly hard task of generating arguments against their own point of view. The resulting
myside bias merely reflects a belief that it is better to
provide arguments only for one’s side rather than also
for the other side. As Wolfe and Britt (2008) observed,
essayists often mention arguments for the other side –
typically to rebut them and give even more weight to
their own argument. But writing essays is as much of a
basic argumentative skill as writing novels is a basic linguistic skill. It is therefore not surprising that untrained
participants should exhibit a myside bias and that, as
Wolfe points out, training can attenuate it.
The belief bias is one of the phenomena that, we surmised,
show that people have a confirmation bias: They will take
into account their beliefs about the conclusion when evaluating the logical validity of a syllogism. De Neys and Stupple
& Ball question our interpretation of the belief bias data.
They both point out that people – at least some people –
try to engage in logical reasoning when faced with such problems. That they try is hardly surprising: Participants are
merely responding to instructions that emphasize logical validity. We agree that in reasoning tasks people try to provide
the correct, logically valid answer. What is more interesting is
that most of them fail. Given that the tasks are not computationally hard, this indicates that reasoning is not geared
towards pure logical validity, but that it takes into account
other factors, such as believability.
R4. On the working of reasoning
R4.1. The algorithmic level

R3.3. The strength of the conﬁrmation bias

When we look for arguments in a debate, we are mostly
interested in arguments for our side or against the other

Our target article focuses on the ultimate level of explanation: What is the function of reasoning? A theory
at that level has implications for the algorithmic
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implementation of reasoning, but this was not the subject
matter of our article, and, to be candid, we are still in the
process of working out these implications satisfactorily. At
first blush, moreover, the argumentative approach does
not imply a single, narrow characterization of this
implementation. We therefore acknowledge this present
limitation of our contribution that in particular Khlentzos
& Stevenson have underscored, and we are grateful for
the positive suggestions of several commentators.
Oaksford’s Bayesian probabilistic approach (para. 4)
allows for a fine-grained analysis of argument strength
and of the changes in degree of beliefs they warrant.
Like ours, this a computational theory, but it specifies a
proximal function – how to change our beliefs in response
to arguments – rather than an ultimate one. As a consequence, it has the potential of taking us one step further
in the direction of an algorithmic theory.
Dessalles points out the sequential nature of reasoning,
and asks how the argumentative theory can account for
this feature. First, it is important to mention that even if
the explicit part of reasoning is sequential – we make
only one argument step at a time – other processes
within reasoning (such as argument search) may well
work in a parallel fashion. The sequential nature of explicit
reasoning can be explained by its linguistic character (that
might not be necessary for pure solitary reasoning if it
exists, but that cannot be bypassed in argumentation),
language itself being sequential, for several reasons unrelated to reasoning or argumentation (Pinker & Bloom
1990; see also Carruthers 1996).
Wiles mentions abduction as a plausible mechanism
through which reasoning could find arguments. She
points to other psychological mechanisms that also rely
on abduction, such as spatial navigation, suggesting that
reasoning might have been exapted from these mechanisms. However, given that reasoning deals with inputs
and outputs that are very different from those of these
other systems, the possibility of an evolutionary exaptation
scenario remains very speculative. This does not mean that
these other mechanisms have nothing to teach students of
reasoning. To the extent that the problems solved by, for
example, mechanisms of spatial navigation are similar to
the problem facing reasoning – finding an acceptable
argument within a large set of potentially relevant propositions – then, as suggested by Wiles’s commentary, we
can expect commonalities in the solutions used in both
cases (for further elaboration on this point, see Mercier,
submitted a).
Uleman et al. present interesting evidence and arguments on intuitive (or “spontaneous”) inferences. We
agree that these inferences constitute most of cognition,
and that they influence which arguments are used and
how they are evaluated. We agree moreover that much
more must be done on the relationship between intuitive
inference and reasoning, even if much relevant work has
already been done in the framework of dual-system
approaches to reasoning.
Finally, Weber & Johnson offer a process-level specification of how reasoning works in decision making. According to their theory – query theory – participants facing a
decision query their memory for relevant information or
experiences. Two features of this theory are particularly
relevant in the context of the argumentative theory.
First, as a result of this process, “choice follows from the
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resulting balance of evidence,” so that this theory predicts
reason-based choice. The second important point is that
“the first query produces richer representations because
of output interference” (para. 5). To the extent that
further queries might represent perspective that are less
congenial to the individual – for instance, trying to see
the problem from someone else’s perspective – a mechanism that favors the first query can create a form of confirmation bias. Given that query theory predicts reasonbased choice and that it might also explain some forms
of confirmation bias, it is quite congenial to the argumentative approach. However, rather than being a question of
“intrapsychic and interpersonal argumentation” (para. 8),
as Weber & Johnson suggest, the question can perhaps
be more usefully framed as a difference in level of analysis.
We believe that query theory could also help explain
aspects of interpersonal argumentation – how we find
arguments – whereas the argumentative theory also
makes predictions regarding intrapsychic phenomena –
such as reason-based choice. The difference is that
query theory offers predictions based on the workings of
reasoning, whereas the argumentative theory offers predictions based on the function of reasoning. Given that
they are not at the same level, these explanations do not
compete. Assume, for instance, that reason-based choice
is entirely due to the processes delineated in query
theory. We would still need to understand why this
process is there in the first place, and why the outcomes
of such a process are generally adaptive – questions that
the argumentative theory aims at answering.
Another way to better understand the processes of
reasoning is through modeling. Fox’s Logic of Argument
is a possible solution that is congenial to our proposal
because it distances itself from formal logic to encompass
the subtleties of argument structure. The fields of AI and
informal logic are now teeming with models of arguments
that can be conveniently simulated on computers, and this
is certainly an interesting way to develop for any theory of
reasoning or argumentation.
R4.2. Reasoning outside the lab

The target article focused its review on experiments
carried out in the laboratory, mostly with Western
college students. Narvaez rightly points out the limitations of such a narrow focus. In their review of cross-cultural psychology work, Henrich et al. (2010) have shown
that in many domains WEIRD people – people from
western educated industrialized rich democratic
countries – behave in ways that are different from the
rest of the world (para. 9). In the case of reasoning and
argumentation, scholars have hypothesized that such
skills are a mostly Western tradition, born in classical
Greece and nurtured in the Enlightenment. It would
indeed by a deadly blow to the theory if some cultures
were unwilling to argue or unable to reason. Happily for
us (and for these cultures), the available data do not
point in that direction. While there certainly are differences in reasoning and argumentative style (e.g., see
Norenzayan et al. 2002), there is no report of a culture
that would be deprived of these skills. The two most frequently alleged cases are illiterate societies – which are
supposed to be unable to reason – and Eastern cultures –
which are supposed to be unwilling to argue. Yet members
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of illiterate populations can solve logical problems in the
proper contexts, and the intellectual history of Eastern cultures is as fraught with debates as that of the West. While
our theory could certainly be strengthened if the data from
non-WEIRD cultures were richer, available data point to
similar patterns the whole world over (Mercier, in press a).
Narvaez also regrets the absence of developmental
data from the target article, accusing us of “implicit biological determinism” (para 5). Our thesis is evolutionary
and pays attention to biological factors, but development
itself is of obvious biological relevance. Again, language
can be a useful analogy. Researchers who think that
language is an adaptation do not deny that different
languages are acquired in cognitive development. Likewise, the argumentative theory does not need argumentative skills to be just innate. The main reason so little
space was devoted to an analysis of developmental evidence is that there is so much of it that it warranted a
whole other article (Mercier, in press b). In this other
article, it is shown that children can argue from very
early on – long before they can do any abstract reasoning – that they are also prone to the confirmation bias,
and that they reason better in groups – which is why collaborative learning has proven to be so successful in
education.
Narvaez is joined by Wu in drawing attention to
reasoning in the political sphere. The results discussed
by Wu offer further support for the argumentative
theory. In particular, he refers to the development of
deliberative democracy as illustrating the power of group
reasoning. Many arguments can be garnered in support
of an increased participation of citizens in policy
debates: more legitimate and fairer outcomes, increase
in trust and positive public behavior, etc. But Wu points
to a more recent trend that emphasizes the epistemic
value of deliberative democracy: Beyond all their other
advantages, debates can also yield epistemically superior
outcomes (Cohen 1986; Estlund 2007; Landemore
2007). Empirical results in political science support the
claim that groups can perform well, with deliberations
yielding more informed and more coherent opinions and
decisions (for review, see Mercier & Landemore, in
press). Incidentally, the argumentative theory is also in a
good position to help explain some of the blatant failures
of political debates, whether it is polarization (Landemore
& Mercier, submitted) or the dangers of widely publicized
debates (Mercier, submitted b).
Johnson correctly argues that the theory should apply to
scientists and philosophers – including the authors of this
target article – as well as to laypersons. Indeed, it is not
unlikely that, despite genuine efforts to remain objective,
we have been guilty of the confirmation bias, thereby illustrating our argumentative theory by the very manner in
which we were arguing for it. Argumentation and debates
have always played a central role in philosophy, be it in classical Greece, Akbar’s India, or the Warring States Period in
China. The lone philosopher always runs the risk of using
her great reasoning abilities to build a system of high
internal coherence on shaky intuitive foundations. Even if
scientists rely more on empirical evidence than do philosophers to correct their intuitions, their reasoning is still
deeply argumentative. A scientific article or book is always
a “long argument” in Darwin’s famous words. Moreover –
and contrary to popular representation of the lone genius –

groups have always been the crucial place for scientific
reasoning (e.g., see Dunbar 1995).
Johnson also points out the importance of arguments in
the moral domain, suggesting that people might be
especially vulnerable to arguments that exploit moral
“oughts.” Some moral psychologists would disagree and
suggest instead that people are rarely receptive to moral
arguments, being more easily influenced by narratives or
emotional appeals (Bloom 2010; Haidt & Bjorklund
2007). The argumentative theory predicts an intermediary
state of affairs: People should be somewhat receptive to
moral arguments while evaluating them on the basis of
their own moral intuitions (Mercier, in press c).
R5. Conclusion
While our target article may have unwittingly offered an
illustration of the confirmation bias, we hope that this discussion has, at least a little, exemplified the epistemic benefits of
reasoning in group. It has not led us to revise the theory in
any major way. Still, several commentaries point to fascinating directions for future research. More needs to be done to
link our ultimate level theory with process theories of reasoning, and we are grateful for several very useful suggestions in
this respect. We agree that reasoning outside the laboratory
needs to be investigated more thoroughly and hope that a
focus on argumentation and reasoning in interaction can
help push in this direction. Finally, other mechanisms
besides reasoning might benefit from being seen as having
a social function. Ours is a contribution to the growing
body of research showing how, and how much, the human
mind is a social mind.
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